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Miniatures Adventure => The Great War => Topic started by: FramFramson on December 25, 2018, 08:11:48 PM

Title: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: FramFramson on December 25, 2018, 08:11:48 PM
This is true. And it is also clear that some veterans wrote passionately about the seeming futility and waste. There were some veterans who loved being involved, who wanted to continue, who missed being in action. We see this today, for example, with some veterans taking up arms against ISIS. It seems to be a very small minority but there are WW1 memoirs that are full of these sentiments. The Master of Belhaven is one such book, about a British artillery officer who didn't survive the war but whose diaries were published.

Peter Jackson's film is full of comments from veterans that echo what my Grandfather spoke about when he was alive. He never glorified war, quite the opposite. In his view, however, the war was a terrible necessity. In the 1970s, he had no truck for the idea that the generals had little or no idea how to fight a modern war. My Grandfather was very clear that the Germans were an extremely formidable and determined enemy. We can see this echoed in the fact that Germany continued fighting for more than 4 years. There was no simple or 'easy' way to overcome such a determined enemy. Like the American Civil War, the Great War was a massive struggle between two enemies that would not give way or give in.

World War 2 was the same. Indeed, the only reason that we lament the casualties in WW1 is that we did not have to do what the USSR did in the Great Patriotic War. Had the Soviets not borne the brunt of the Germans in WW2 then we would be praising the ability of the WW1 generals to sustain so few casualties by comparison.

War is a terrible thing. It exacts a terrible toll when determined foes remained locked in battles for years. We miss the point, however, if we think that generals were to 'blame' for what happened in WW1. This approach leads to a desire to praise and admire generals who seem flamboyant and daring. Remember the gasps of admiration as 'smart' bombs struck buildings so precisely in the First Iraq War? And the 'daring' left hook through the desert? But the 'war' was not won. The enemy learned and adapted, just as the Germans (and British and French) did in WW1.

We need to stop wars happening the first place...

Robert

Well, I'd certainly agree that the best measure would be to stop wars happening in the first place.

I do disagree about the responsibility of command. While "Led by donkeys" is a common trope which is probably overstated, it is true that much of the senior allied leadership were older men, used to colonial wars or who leaned on the memories of the highly misleading Franco-Prussian war.

Obviously it's clearer in hindsight, but any war on even footing from the American Civil War to the Edwardian era showed the the dominance of defensive technology vs offensive technology at the time. Funny enough, three years was also roughly the amount of time it took the Union forces to elevate effective leadership to senior positions as well. The only times this paradigm broke apart in the Victorian era were between grossly overmatched participants (colonial wars again, or the various Balkan Wars directly preceding WWI), or when some serious failure of organization took place (I would classify the FPW under the latter).

So I do place blame on senior Allied commanders during WWI. As someone in such a position, higher standards ought to be expected than those of a middle manager of an everyday plodding business. The post-Crimean reforms DID do away with the outright purchase of offices, but the British army still grappled with the effects of class bias on their officer corps (as did many European armies of the age, to be fair). I also feel that the German army on the other hand was less likely to suffer the effects of non-military class distinctions and tended to allow more autonomy to junior officers, which generally led to more effective command at lower levels (a doctrine which they took much further in WWII of course).

Even without the shackles of past experience, the war went on long enough that unworkable tactics were pursued long after it became clear that pre-battle projections were consistently, repeatedly over-optimistic. There's certainly hay to be made arguing about how quickly a person in that position might be expected to learn, or about how much the allied leadership were let down by unknowable factors outside their control (such as the disastrous quality of British shells early in the war, the horrible French attempts at an early light machine gun, or the understandably protracted development period of mobile offensive weapons such as tanks), but it's also clear that there were many younger officers champing at the bit with new ideas who could have been given opportunities one or even two years sooner. Hell, the Americans demonstrated far too late it would have been possible to greatly increase the effectiveness of trench assaults with a mundane existing weapon - the shotgun - whose absence from earlier assaults was almost shocking in retrospect. Certainly it was clear after the first year that this was warfare on a completely unprecedented scale, requiring different thinking, but the response to this was muddled.

It's worth noting that the Central Powers, (well, mainly Germany in this case) managed to hold out with what was essentially half the military forces. As as percentage of mobilized men, of course the Central Powers were hit harder, being the losers, but in overall terms of casualties, the German figures are significantly lower year-over-year. There's an argument to be made that there was certainly room for improvement among the Allies even by contemporary standards, as the Central Powers clearly held their own with far fewer men. On the other hand, picking apart casualty figures can open a rather dangerous can of worms with many many caveats, so I wouldn't push that claim too hard.

It's also worth noting that, we're used to British sources which may have been negative, or which may have simply seen the effort involved as necessary, but French sources tend to be far more negative of their early leadership, given their losses drove them to the point of outright refusal en masse during the 1917 Mutiny. This is a personal bias, of course, but the French accounts I've seen are deeply bitter and cynical to a degree not typically seen even in English anti-war sources.

As for the very correct observation that it was largely Russia who bled Germany dry in WWII, I must point out that Russian casualties as a ratio to German ones were so high due to severe depletion of the officer corps, technology and tactics which fell far behind German operational technologies and tactics during the initial invasion (or poor implementation of good existing Russian technology and tactics - many early Russian tactical improvements were implemented by officers who outright disobeyed standing orders), and the simple circumstances of Eastern Front warfare taking place mostly on Russian territory. Had Tukachevsky and most of the officer corps not been purged and had the Russian 'Deep Battle' doctrine (far superior to German tactics, IMO) been allowed to fully develop PRIOR to the war, it's clear the Russians would have had significantly lower casualty figures. How much lower, well, that's another can of worms.

I'll happily concede though that - like the war itself - the whole thing is a massive, sprawling quagmire with room to stake out all manner of positions. 
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: Metternich on December 26, 2018, 06:17:06 PM
My kids just bought it for me on DVD (delivery second week in January).
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: monk2002uk on December 26, 2018, 09:20:47 PM
While "Led by donkeys" is a common trope which is probably overstated, it is true that much of the senior allied leadership were older men, used to colonial wars or who leaned on the memories of the highly misleading Franco-Prussian war.

Obviously it's clearer in hindsight, but any war on even footing from the American Civil War to the Edwardian era showed the the dominance of defensive technology vs offensive technology at the time. Funny enough, three years was also roughly the amount of time it took the Union forces to elevate effective leadership to senior positions as well.
Thank you for your reply. I will discuss the various points in different posts.

All of the 'senior allied leadership' were familiar with the lessons of the Sino-Russian, Balkan, and South African wars. Observers from all of the major Western powers were present if their forces were not actively engaged. For example, lessons from aerial reconnaissance in the Italian invasion of Libya were applied during the British military manoeuvres before WW1. All of the major powers emphasised fire and manouevre, even down to the section/squad level prior to the Great War. This reflected a clear and oft-repeated analysis of the superiority of defence over attack, which could only be overcome by fire superiority and movement.

The American Civil War was studied extensively in the British, French and German military colleges or equivalent. A key lesson from all of these studies (and from Kitchener's personal involvement in the Franco-Prussian War) was that the Great War was likely to be protracted. This view was reinforced in the Great German General Staff by the Volkskrieg [People's War] of the Franco-Prussian War - the long period of guerrilla warfare that took place after the 'highly misleading', seemingly dramatic collapse of France in the first weeks of the war. The German Army strove hard to avoid a protracted war in 1914 but General von Moltke the Younger knew full well what the failure on the Marne meant.

It did take the Union several years to settle on General Grant as the most effective leader. His approach was to push and keep pushing, no matter what the cost. Grant's battles of attrition mirror what had to happen in the First World War too. The South was no more likely to collapse than the Germans - both were utterly determined adversaries.

Robert
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: FramFramson on December 27, 2018, 04:29:02 AM
Thank you for your reply. I will discuss the various points in different posts.

All of the 'senior allied leadership' were familiar with the lessons of the Sino-Russian, Balkan, and South African wars. Observers from all of the major Western powers were present if their forces were not actively engaged. For example, lessons from aerial reconnaissance in the Italian invasion of Libya were applied during the British military manoeuvres before WW1. All of the major powers emphasised fire and manouevre, even down to the section/squad level prior to the Great War. This reflected a clear and oft-repeated analysis of the superiority of defence over attack, which could only be overcome by fire superiority and movement.

The American Civil War was studied extensively in the British, French and German military colleges or equivalent. A key lesson from all of these studies (and from Kitchener's personal involvement in the Franco-Prussian War) was that the Great War was likely to be protracted. This view was reinforced in the Great German General Staff by the Volkskrieg [People's War] of the Franco-Prussian War - the long period of guerrilla warfare that took place after the 'highly misleading', seemingly dramatic collapse of France in the first weeks of the war. The German Army strove hard to avoid a protracted war in 1914 but General von Moltke the Younger knew full well what the failure on the Marne meant.

It did take the Union several years to settle on General Grant as the most effective leader. His approach was to push and keep pushing, no matter what the cost. Grant's battles of attrition mirror what had to happen in the First World War too. The South was no more likely to collapse than the Germans - both were utterly determined adversaries.

Robert
In reverse order...

The Union did have the benefit of the blockade, as well as a massive advantage in manpower and materiel - basic math always had the Union winning unless foreign intervention tipped the scales and both sides realized that "sheer determination" alone would not be enough. Many, like Gen. Sherman, did recognize this quite clearly "Not a bolt of cloth or pair of shoes can you make", and the ACW essentially followed the Anaconda Plan laid down by Winfield Scott at the beginning of the war - another who all-but-predicted the exact course of the war. 

At the same time, inexperience and a reluctance to accept casualties by inexperienced Union generals led to several famous misses where attacks were called off or not pressed, which could have shortened the war by one or two more years. So leadership was certainly an issue there as well, even if we accept stubborn resistance. As Lincoln said of Grant "He fights!", as a way of explaining that Grant clearly understood, as he did, that undue avoidance of casualties would only make the war more protracted and lethal in the long run anyway.

Now, looking at WWI, we see the reverse. Of course when you delve into the details of individual campaigns, we can acknowledge that the choices made were not blind, that legitimate efforts were made to secure meaningful advantage, but I think the generals were too eager to overcome resistance with stubborn Grant-like attrition strategies, when the same strategy did NOT apply in the Western Front where the sides were far more equal (especially as trench warfare mitigated numeric differences to a degree). The two sides were far more balanced in technological and industrial capacity, and both sides had various advantages and disadvantages throughout the war (the traded periods of air supremacy, for example). Too much hope was placed too frequently on minor, incremental advantage, and too often battle plans were laid down which were only a minor change from those of the weeks and months prior, when it was very clear by 1915 (1916, if you're feeling generous) that only an overwhelming difference in force would have any real chance to break the western stalemate in the end. Both sides did eventually have their shot at such a campaign.

Strategic considerations which would produce a far bigger imbalance were required. The Germans did manage this in some ways - the Fleet In Being concept, Unrestricted Submarine warfare, the undermining of Russia as the political level, the East African shoestring campaign draining massive numbers of troops which might have gone to the Western Front and so on, and these did give them a significant advantage in holding their own against a larger foe. The Zimmerman telegram also represents an attempt, albeit a desperate one, which backfired spectacularly.

The Entente on the other hand mostly failed to follow similar high-level strategic plans which would have made a significant difference in manpower, and by continually engaging in battle, they simply depleted reserves which (in theory) they could have built up to a breaking point sooner (though to be fair, I recall the French WERE actually trying to formulate such a buildup, but were interrupted by the German strategic failure of the Verdun offensive). There were a few exceptions, such as Lawrence's infamous guerrilla wars which met a double goal of securing middle-eastern territory, while also tying down large amounts of Turkish troops with only a handful of British ones. For the most part however, the Entente could have explored many other options or bungled the ones they did pursue: Bulgaria was a complete disaster as the Entente did not do their research and completely failed to follow through with their promises; Greece was courted but at the same time her neutrality was repeatedly violated, leaving a divided and ultimately damaged Greece; Western help for the failing Russians came too little, too late (though to be fair, attempts WERE made and the logistics were terrible); attempts to destabilize a very vulnerable Austro-Hungary or support the Italians in their Austrian campaigns were essentially non-existent; the RN failed to lure the German fleet out more or to risk a direct attack on German naval bases, and the SIS (MI6) completely failed to develop a network of ANY sort whatsoever in Germany, when better information was so crucial. Ultimately the one major success of Entente strategic diplomacy - the entry of America into the war - would have been enough to make the difference on its own (given a few more months). Yet even there, this was not so much an Entente success as it was a German failure.

Meanwhile command on the front lines was lacking - I still find the repetition of failures due to campaigns repeatedly made with only minor tweaks or comparatively small increases in manpower to be nearly criminal in their negligence. The Allies, especially the British continually underestimated the depth of German defences and reserves (a famous case was that Haig was noteworthy for only accepting intel reports from Charteris, who tended to tell Haig what he liked to hear), and while the Germans did the same on occasion, they did so far less often and were usually not as far off as the Entente were in their estimations - Verdun came fairly close to succeeding, for example and might very well have come off (or been avoided) had the French buildup been known to them.

While we could go back and forth all day about mid-level Entente leadership and western combat operations, there's certainly enough material out there centring on the excessive, even obsessive political activities of the senior Entente military leadership, the exact sort of leaders for whom larger strategic concerns should have been paramount. Yet instead of cooperating, the British and French often clashed harshly (at minimum through to mid-late 1917), failed to share information and resources, tried to stick each other with poor sections of the front, and in Haig's case specifically, literally spent more time engaged in domestic political manoeuvring against real and imagined enemies within the military and political leadership, than in actually formulating military operations.

Ah Haig. Even if you think Haig was a skilled leader (and I obviously don't, ha), or accept that some amount of politics is unavoidable at the highest levels of military leadership (debatable), this was grossly irresponsible. The war and millions of men's lives were far less important than butting heads with the CIGS of the moment, intriguing against Lloyd George, playing revolving door with his subordinates, or grousing about Wilson, the French, or whoever else had irritated him or made him fear he was about to be sacked that week (I seem to recall that Napoleon supposedly had a witticism about second-rate men hiring third-rate men...). One is struck by how profound Haig's insecurity was, hell, he almost gave up and wanted to retreat to the channel during Blucher! And wanted the French to sacrifice themselves to cover a British retreat! Even his great "success" of the Hundred Days is cannot be clearly attributed to him. First off, he was locked into the cavalryman's mindset, so I feel that this is at least partially the result of the stopped clock being right twice a day, and in any case this was right after the Germans had conveniently exhausted themselves on their "Gambler's throw". Plus it's very arguable how much direct operational command he had at that time, as subordinates like Plumer, Byng, Currie, Monash, etc. and allies like Foch were arguably were more important in actual combat operations (certainly the French credited Foch and not Haig... though of course this would be natural in any case).
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: monk2002uk on December 27, 2018, 07:18:26 AM
The post-Crimean reforms DID do away with the outright purchase of offices, but the British army still grappled with the effects of class bias on their officer corps (as did many European armies of the age, to be fair). I also feel that the German army on the other hand was less likely to suffer the effects of non-military class distinctions and tended to allow more autonomy to junior officers, which generally led to more effective command at lower levels (a doctrine which they took much further in WWII of course).
Class bias was an issue in the British and German armies alike; much less so with the Republican French army. Within the German army, there were the biases at the equivalent of the state level. Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers, etc often wrote about being treated as inferior by Prussians. The biggest problem within the German army, however, was the relationship between the General Staff and the other senior commanders. Writers like Jack Sheldon have clearly shown how the role of the General Staff created significant friction within the German army. The concept also saw men like von Loßberg and Bruchmüller elevated to positions of great influence, without having climbed the normal chain of command. The latter officer planned the artillery barrages for Operation Michael. One German army chose to follow his 'advice'; the other did not. The latter did not succeed anywhere near as well on the first day, despite however well the junior officers were trained and exercised command at the tactical level.

Robert
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: monk2002uk on December 27, 2018, 07:44:52 AM
Even without the shackles of past experience, the war went on long enough that unworkable tactics were pursued long after it became clear that pre-battle projections were consistently, repeatedly over-optimistic. There's certainly hay to be made arguing about how quickly a person in that position might be expected to learn, or about how much the allied leadership were let down by unknowable factors outside their control (such as the disastrous quality of British shells early in the war, the horrible French attempts at an early light machine gun, or the understandably protracted development period of mobile offensive weapons such as tanks), but it's also clear that there were many younger officers champing at the bit with new ideas who could have been given opportunities one or even two years sooner.
The issue of the 'learning curve' lies at the crux of this debate. The notion is predicated on the idea that there was a way to overcome the Germans but no-one was smart enough to figure it out or flexible enough to lay aside outdated views until several years had gone by. The latter concept conjures up a view of 'stuck-in-the-mud' generals who refused to 'see' what was actually happening.

In reality, there was a complex set of processes that mitigated against a 'quick win'. Most significantly, at no point in the war was there a 'simple fix' that, once applied, could overcome the enemy. The reason being that all sides were constantly adapting to each other within weeks, eventually almost in real-time. Take the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for example. This was launched by the British in early 1915 after the introduction of static warfare. A hurricane bombardment, supported by artillery in the front line firing over open sights, opened up the German trenches and enabled a rapid penetration of the British attacking force, except on the British left flank. Despite having been requested by Haig to plan for quick exploitation of such success, Rawlinson refused to let the advance continue immediately. He preferred to consolidate the situation rather than push on, which enabled the German reinforcements to come forward and negate any further advance. The initial assault was so successful that details were published throughout the French army as an example of best practice.

The Germans quickly examined the 'lessons learned' by way of their After Action Reports. Immediately, they set about putting counter-measures in place. The depth of trench lines was increased. MG nests were positioned at ground level within the parapets, protected by metal rails. Barbed wire defences were upgraded, with wire being placed below ground level in many cases. This made the wire obstacles invisible to advancing troops. These changes meant that the next time the British attacked, it was not possible to create or maintain a deep lodgement as happened in Neuve Chapelle.

The process of development and counter-development went on throughout the war. By way of another example, as the Germans mastered the techniques of immediate counter-attacks with Stoßtruppen in 1916 and 1917 so the British developed new tactics to counter the counter-attacks. In the Third Battle of Ypres, British intelligence officers followed immediately behind the advancing British and Dominion attacking forces in each of the major advances. They quickly interrogated captured German prisoners and read any captured documents. This enabled them to understand, in near real-time, how and where the German counter-attacks would be launched. British artillery were then tasked with interdiction missions, based on the new intelligence. Ludendorff and his architect of the counter-attack, von Loßberg, became desperate to figure out how to negate the advantage that now lay with the British. The new tactics exacted a heavy toll of German forces, causing one German writer to note how drained and worn out von Loßberg had become as he tried to figure the next move. As it happened, Ludendorff decided to go back to packing the German front line with defenders, just like Neuve Chapelle. The consequences were disastrous for the German defenders. Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote of the huge relief that the rains brought late in the extended battle. Otherwise, the Germans would have had to execute their plan for abandoning the Ypres area.

Robert
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: FramFramson on December 27, 2018, 09:38:38 AM
Class bias was an issue in the British and German armies alike; much less so with the Republican French army. Within the German army, there were the biases at the equivalent of the state level. Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers, etc often wrote about being treated as inferior by Prussians. The biggest problem within the German army, however, was the relationship between the General Staff and the other senior commanders. Writers like Jack Sheldon have clearly shown how the role of the General Staff created significant friction within the German army. The concept also saw men like von Loßberg and Bruchmüller elevated to positions of great influence, without having climbed the normal chain of command. The latter officer planned the artillery barrages for Operation Michael. One German army chose to follow his 'advice'; the other did not. The latter did not succeed anywhere near as well on the first day, despite however well the junior officers were trained and exercised command at the tactical level.

Robert

No question the Germans faced the same Victorian/Edwardian class issues in WWI (the air service being the most famous example) and the pro-Prussian bias is well-known and then there's the whole issue of Ludendorff - worth many books all on it's own. I would only argue that they suffered somewhat less than the British, who were particularly egregious in this regard. Even today, Britain remains one of the most highly stratified nations in Europe, though the link between the British upper class and the leadership of the BA or RN has mercifully been greatly diminished.

I've probably pushed a bit far in comparing the British and German command style, when the original point was that the war was exceptionally grossly wasteful and futile (if not outright devastating) from the point of view of many of the participants.

The issue of the 'learning curve' lies at the crux of this debate. The notion is predicated on the idea that there was a way to overcome the Germans but no-one was smart enough to figure it out or flexible enough to lay aside outdated views until several years had gone by. The latter concept conjures up a view of 'stuck-in-the-mud' generals who refused to 'see' what was actually happening.

In reality, there was a complex set of processes that mitigated against a 'quick win'. Most significantly, at no point in the war was there a 'simple fix' that, once applied, could overcome the enemy. The reason being that all sides were constantly adapting to each other within weeks, eventually almost in real-time. Take the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for example. This was launched by the British in early 1915 after the introduction of static warfare. A hurricane bombardment, supported by artillery in the front line firing over open sights, opened up the German trenches and enabled a rapid penetration of the British attacking force, except on the British left flank. Despite having been requested by Haig to plan for quick exploitation of such success, Rawlinson refused to let the advance continue immediately. He preferred to consolidate the situation rather than push on, which enabled the German reinforcements to come forward and negate any further advance. The initial assault was so successful that details were published throughout the French army as an example of best practice.

The Germans quickly examined the 'lessons learned' by way of their After Action Reports. Immediately, they set about putting counter-measures in place. The depth of trench lines was increased. MG nests were positioned at ground level within the parapets, protected by metal rails. Barbed wire defences were upgraded, with wire being placed below ground level in many cases. This made the wire obstacles invisible to advancing troops. These changes meant that the next time the British attacked, it was not possible to create or maintain a deep lodgement as happened in Neuve Chapelle.

The process of development and counter-development went on throughout the war. By way of another example, as the Germans mastered the techniques of immediate counter-attacks with Stoßtruppen in 1916 and 1917 so the British developed new tactics to counter the counter-attacks. In the Third Battle of Ypres, British intelligence officers followed immediately behind the advancing British and Dominion attacking forces in each of the major advances. They quickly interrogated captured German prisoners and read any captured documents. This enabled them to understand, in near real-time, how and where the German counter-attacks would be launched. British artillery were then tasked with interdiction missions, based on the new intelligence. Ludendorff and his architect of the counter-attack, von Loßberg, became desperate to figure out how to negate the advantage that now lay with the British. The new tactics exacted a heavy toll of German forces, causing one German writer to note how drained and worn out von Loßberg had become as he tried to figure the next move. As it happened, Ludendorff decided to go back to packing the German front line with defenders, just like Neuve Chapelle. The consequences were disastrous for the German defenders. Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote of the huge relief that the rains brought late in the extended battle. Otherwise, the Germans would have had to execute their plan for abandoning the Ypres area.

Robert

This is fair.

However, it's not so much the individual tactical changes that I'm focusing on, but the failure to rise above that pattern of extremely rapid adaptation. I've read my share of what-ifs in the wake of bunglings, but even if Rawlinson had committed the reserves, it's unlikely this would have crucially changed the outcome of the war, along with a hundred other what-ifs. 

It's the conflicts between staffs and allied nations (the internal German divisions had nothing on the British-French mistrust, well that's my opinion anyway), and the horrible failure to think in larger scales which bother me more. It's a very military habit to focus on those brief incremental tactical advantages, but an excessive focus on them to me indicates a leader promoted well beyond his ability; a case of target fixation no army side could afford.

Military buffs do this too! The what-if of battles past are fun to think about, and as wargamers how often do we see historical battles refought on a 4x6 table? But just as the better leaders in Union in the ACW realized that it was about the larger strategic numbers. Even Grant didn't just want to run a meat grinder, and he took many steps to avoid straight one-for-one attrition as much as possible. What was key was that Winfield Scott, Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman all understood very well that losing a single battle was not as important as overall strategic considerations. Grant knew they had to USE the manpower and materiel advantages of the Union in full, especially for major strategic operations which would result in meaningful changes in the war's situation - Vicksburg, being a prime example; casualties were atrocious, but splitting the Confederacy in twain constituted a massive strategic blow. Sherman, in his turn, moved to destroy the tottering economy of the Confederacy. These were grand plans appropriate to their position as high-ranking senior generals, and they worked together harmoniously not only to sketch their operations but to execute them - famously so in Grant and Sherman's case.

By contrast, you never see anything half so clear out of the office of the CIGS, GOCinC, etc. instead it was the politicking, personal acrimony, and shocking insecurity that seems to characterize most of the higher-level interactions (French weren't so bad about this, but the English could be atrocious about it when dealing with the French). Who would outrank who, who was responsible for what, etc. Coherent strategic plans, when they did come up, were tainted by association by their creator and often shelved. Even tanks ended up being developed by the damn admiralty at first due to such ridiculous politics and Kitchener's intransigence, and only because Churchill exceeded his authority on his own initiative (I have found that many of my favourite military leaders are those who have first learned the rules and then learned to break them, I will admit to a happy bias here).

The Germans were always looking for those angles: ways to tie down or force the commitment of vast numbers of enemy troops, or gain efficiencies on a great strategic scale. Now, it's perfectly possible that the Germans were not particularly talented in this regard and only pursued such things more vigorously out of necessity, given their weaker allies and having a lesser force overall. But they did so with more vigour, more focus, and with many remarkable successes, most crucially, in Russia.

But British efforts in this regard weren't just bad... sometimes they were plain disgraceful. The British attempt to involve Romania - who could have been a major threat to the Alliance, had matters been better planned - was such a complete cock up, that the British essentially destroyed what was left of the country just to deny it to the Germans. The major agreement in the mideast, Sykes-Pecot, was far more about two sides overconfident in eventual victory carving up the spoils in a holdover of colonial-style wrangling than it was about coordinating war plans. And the suspension of the Third Home Rule act was just utterly disastrous. The politicians were so frequently at odds, while the military leadership failed to press for those crucial political solutions.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: FramFramson on December 27, 2018, 09:55:49 AM
Thanks for the threadsplit Driscoles. This had gotten rather off track from the film.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: Driscoles on December 27, 2018, 09:59:38 AM
youre welcome !
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on December 27, 2018, 09:09:22 PM
...the Americans demonstrated far too late it would have been possible to greatly increase the effectiveness of trench assaults with a mundane existing weapon - the shotgun - whose absence from earlier assaults was almost shocking in retrospect.
As it happens, I am translating a copy of a German account of one of the first major battles featuring the American 2nd Division. This is the series of battles that took place in June 1918, in and around Belleau Wood. The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments featured in these battles. The book is entitled 'Sternenbanner gegen Schwarz-weiß-rot', which translates as 'Star-spangled Banner versus Black-White-Red'. The latter refers to the colours of the Reich war flag:

(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2e/War_Ensign_of_Germany_%281867-1892%29.svg/100px-War_Ensign_of_Germany_%281867-1892%29.svg.png)

General Pershing had come to the conclusion that the British and French armies were using outmoded tactics. He was keen that the American forces should demonstrate a better way to conduct infantry assaults. The Big Red One had enjoyed a minor success in capturing Cantigny earlier, with the aid of French tanks and flamethrower units. Belleau Wood brought home how difficult the problem of assaulting German forces could be. For ten days, the Marines attempted to take Belleau Wood and surrounds. The Germans described their attempts as brave but naive essentially. The initial assaults were cut to ribbons with enfilade machine gun fire. Eventually, in a battle of attrition in which numbers won out, the Marines took and then finally held the wood. The Germans had huge respect for what the Marines achieved in the end but not so for the means.

It wasn't possible to get close enough to use shotguns until Day 11 (not that there is any evidence that shotguns were actually used in this battle).

Worse was to come in the Meuse-Argonne offensive...

The point is not that the American forces were useless, far from it! But there was a massive lesson that had to be learned the hard way - there was no 'simple' bloodless way to beat the Germans in the field of battle.

Robert
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: monk2002uk on December 27, 2018, 09:21:39 PM
But British efforts in this regard weren't just bad... sometimes they were plain disgraceful. The British attempt to involve Romania - who could have been a major threat to the Alliance, had matters been better planned - was such a complete cock up, that the British essentially destroyed what was left of the country just to deny it to the Germans.
I respectfully disagree. The Romanians were completely responsible for their decision to join the war. They illustrated what could happen when a military force attempted to engage with the Entente after the latter had two years of experience in the war. The Romanian example is one of the best at illustrating how the war had evolved. The major powers had kept up with each other, constantly innovating and nullifying the enemy's progress, who in turn nullified the new innovations. Bring in a new player after two years... the Romanians were no match until the front finally stabilised after the fall of Bucharest. The Romanians were then refitted and retrained, subsequently performing well in the Battle of Mărășești for example.

Robert
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: FramFramson on December 28, 2018, 12:56:54 AM
I respectfully disagree. The Romanians were completely responsible for their decision to join the war. They illustrated what could happen when a military force attempted to engage with the Entente after the latter had two years of experience in the war. The Romanian example is one of the best at illustrating how the war had evolved. The major powers had kept up with each other, constantly innovating and nullifying the enemy's progress, who in turn nullified the new innovations. Bring in a new player after two years... the Romanians were no match until the front finally stabilised after the fall of Bucharest. The Romanians were then refitted and retrained, subsequently performing well in the Battle of Mărășești for example.

Robert

The Romanians were responsible for their own decision, but it was made under false pretenses by the Allied powers, especially the British, who cajoled them into the declaration with big promises (land guarantees, supplies, armaments, as well as crucial coordinated offensives against Bulgaria and the Ottomans to ensure Romania would not face them all alone), only to hang Romania out to dry.

The British KNEW early on in the war that Romania was not prepared in any way and would end up more a liability than an asset in the state she was in in 1916. Christopher Thomson (the eventual commander of the British troops in Romania) fully and clearly warned the British government, but they ignored his assessment, even though he'd been sent there in 1915 for the express purpose of doing just that. Worse, the agreement signed between the Allied powers and the Romanians - upon which the Romanians depended and planned for - was not fulfilled in any meaningful way by the allies and the few Allied (British) troops who did go to Romania and who clearly knew the parlous state of the Romanian military, failed to seriously prepare the Romanians in any way (though this was not their fault as they had no time or resources to work with).

Romania's comparatively large army for its size, was completely wasted, when they might have otherwise had a serious influence on the course of the war, given Romania's geographic position. It was disgraceful on the part of the Allied powers, and even apart from moral considerations, or the propaganda effect of serving an ally so badly on other wavering neutrals, it was horrible strategic math. An incredible waste.

The Germans on the other hand were continually pressing the Austro-Hungarians to make concessions in order to buy Romanian (and Italian) neutrality, correctly assuming that Romania would join the allies as they had (on paper) far more to offer. It was pure good fortune on their part that the Entente failed Romania so badly.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: FramFramson on December 28, 2018, 01:24:37 AM
As it happens, I am translating a copy of a German account of one of the first major battles featuring the American 2nd Division. This is the series of battles that took place in June 1918, in and around Belleau Wood. The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments featured in these battles. The book is entitled 'Sternenbanner gegen Schwarz-weiß-rot', which translates as 'Star-spangled Banner versus Black-White-Red'. The latter refers to the colours of the Reich war flag:

(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2e/War_Ensign_of_Germany_%281867-1892%29.svg/100px-War_Ensign_of_Germany_%281867-1892%29.svg.png)

General Pershing had come to the conclusion that the British and French armies were using outmoded tactics. He was keen that the American forces should demonstrate a better way to conduct infantry assaults. The Big Red One had enjoyed a minor success in capturing Cantigny earlier, with the aid of French tanks and flamethrower units. Belleau Wood brought home how difficult the problem of assaulting German forces could be. For ten days, the Marines attempted to take Belleau Wood and surrounds. The Germans described their attempts as brave but naive essentially. The initial assaults were cut to ribbons with enfilade machine gun fire. Eventually, in a battle of attrition in which numbers won out, the Marines took and then finally held the wood. The Germans had huge respect for what the Marines achieved in the end but not so for the means.

It wasn't possible to get close enough to use shotguns until Day 11 (not that there is any evidence that shotguns were actually used in this battle).

Worse was to come in the Meuse-Argonne offensive...

The point is not that the American forces were useless, far from it! But there was a massive lesson that had to be learned the hard way - there was no 'simple' bloodless way to beat the Germans in the field of battle.

Robert

Heh. Pershing. Another fellow I happen to have a rather low opinion of, the great gormless goof...

I don't mean that shotguns would have been a magic answer, but the Germans ARE on record as remarking on their efficacy, irrespective of the naivete of American soldiery (to the point of even engaging in a bit of political theatre in September 1918, threatening to execute any American POWs who had been found armed with shotguns). Effective pump action shotguns were available before 1900 (with the model the Americans carried dating back to 1912), and though they were not originally envisioned as weapons for trench warfare, the Americans quickly seized the possibilities they offered.

This isn't about the Meuse-Argonne specifically or about inexperienced American troops (they certainly were), but about the failure to use such a weapon earlier on by the Allied Powers (or, to be fair, the Central ones too), when they might have served earlier in the war in the same manner as the MP18 later did for the Germans, allowing both sides to attempt stormtrooper-type tactics earlier on, which might have made breakthroughs more definitive or meaningful (though I don't want to get too far into theorycrafting).

Forget about shotguns in the hands of raw Americans in 1918, and instead imagine them in the hands of experienced British troops in 1916 or 1917. This wasn't some crazy new innovation in warfare, it was rather a curious blind spot, where a well-established and proven effective weapon failed to be used - by both sides!
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: monk2002uk on December 30, 2018, 08:26:40 AM
However, it's not so much the individual tactical changes that I'm focusing on, but the failure to rise above that pattern of extremely rapid adaptation. I've read my share of what-ifs in the wake of bunglings, but even if Rawlinson had committed the reserves, it's unlikely this would have crucially changed the outcome of the war, along with a hundred other what-ifs.

If Rawlinson had committed his reserves then the outcome of the war would not have been changed. Many commentators hold up Rawlinson's early view of 'bite and hold' as the major lesson that should have been learned. Even Rawlinson, however, recognised that this tactic was not war-winning in general either. As long as the major combatants were prepared to keep going then the war was going to exact a high price on manpower. Although a temporary minor advance in tactics might reduce manpower losses for a brief period, the long-term price was going to be the same no matter what.

There were plenty of attempts at rising about the 'pattern of extremely rapid adaptation'. General Nivelle's ill-fated Chemin des Dames offensive in 1917 was just such an example. Gallipoli was another.

Quote
It's the conflicts between staffs and allied nations (the internal German divisions had nothing on the British-French mistrust, well that's my opinion anyway), and the horrible failure to think in larger scales which bother me more. It's a very military habit to focus on those brief incremental tactical advantages, but an excessive focus on them to me indicates a leader promoted well beyond his ability; a case of target fixation no army side could afford.
Each incremental tactic change may have been 'brief' but they were constant and multiple. There was no respite, as all sides constantly sought to gain a lasting advantage. Ultimately, manpower reserves, manufacturing capacity, and access to resources won out but none of these strategic elements were 'brief' in execution or time to conclusion.

Respectfully, you over-estimate the mistrust between the British and French. I have read many accounts from various British and French politicians, generals, liaison officers on both sides (not just Spears), senior staff officers (for example, Pierrefeu's accounts of French GQG) and others. There were diverse opinions, disagreements, but rarely severe dysfunctional failures. The oft-reported incidents between Generals French and Lanrezac in August 1914 were not representative of the working relationships across the spectrum of political and military liaisons. Indeed, there was a tremendous sharing of information and lessons-learned, along with detailed strategic debates and planning sessions, such as General Joffre led in late 1915/early 1916. The French-Russian-British plans were undone by the German Verdun offensive, reminding us that the enemy never stood still.

Robert
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: monk2002uk on December 30, 2018, 08:37:33 AM
Military buffs do this too! The what-if of battles past are fun to think about, and as wargamers how often do we see historical battles refought on a 4x6 table? But just as the better leaders in Union in the ACW realized that it was about the larger strategic numbers. Even Grant didn't just want to run a meat grinder, and he took many steps to avoid straight one-for-one attrition as much as possible. What was key was that Winfield Scott, Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman all understood very well that losing a single battle was not as important as overall strategic considerations. Grant knew they had to USE the manpower and materiel advantages of the Union in full, especially for major strategic operations which would result in meaningful changes in the war's situation - Vicksburg, being a prime example; casualties were atrocious, but splitting the Confederacy in twain constituted a massive strategic blow. Sherman, in his turn, moved to destroy the tottering economy of the Confederacy. These were grand plans appropriate to their position as high-ranking senior generals, and they worked together harmoniously not only to sketch their operations but to execute them - famously so in Grant and Sherman's case.
With respect to wargaming, I have focused on reproducing the huge scale of WW1 battles. The most interesting was the First Battle of the Marne, where we set out 50' of tables, with 10,000 figures, and reproduced the battles involving the German First and Second Armies versus the French Vth and VIth Armies as well as the BEF.

I can't comment on whether Grant wanted to run a meat grinder but the reality is that, even with the various additional efforts of Sherman and Sheridan, the war continued to exact a heavy toll on casualties until the end. So it was with WW1 as well. There was extensive cooperation between the British and French forces on the Western Front for example; the more so after Foch was appointed Generalissimo. He worked closely with Haig and Pershing, as well as Pétain, to ensure that the Germans were hit with multiple rolling offensives across the whole line. This high-level strategy finally broke the German resistance but the casualty rate during the last 100 Days was amongst the highest in the war on the British side.

Robert
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: MartinR on December 30, 2018, 10:06:54 AM
I also generally prefer to fight historical battles, and you can fit surprisingly large battles onto a small table if you go with a high enough scale of game. We've done Mons, Le Cateau, Peronne, Cambrai, 1st and 2nd Gaza, Ctesiphon, Vimy Ridge and the entire Battle of Amiens on 4x4 or smaller. Generally using battalion sized elements. The Battle of the Marne beckons now I have enough French troops.
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: FramFramson on December 30, 2018, 07:36:50 PM
If Rawlinson had committed his reserves then the outcome of the war would not have been changed. Many commentators hold up Rawlinson's early view of 'bite and hold' as the major lesson that should have been learned. Even Rawlinson, however, recognised that this tactic was not war-winning in general either. As long as the major combatants were prepared to keep going then the war was going to exact a high price on manpower. Although a temporary minor advance in tactics might reduce manpower losses for a brief period, the long-term price was going to be the same no matter what.

There were plenty of attempts at rising about the 'pattern of extremely rapid adaptation'. General Nivelle's ill-fated Chemin des Dames offensive in 1917 was just such an example. Gallipoli was another.
Each incremental tactic change may have been 'brief' but they were constant and multiple. There was no respite, as all sides constantly sought to gain a lasting advantage. Ultimately, manpower reserves, manufacturing capacity, and access to resources won out but none of these strategic elements were 'brief' in execution or time to conclusion.

Respectfully, you over-estimate the mistrust between the British and French. I have read many accounts from various British and French politicians, generals, liaison officers on both sides (not just Spears), senior staff officers (for example, Pierrefeu's accounts of French GQG) and others. There were diverse opinions, disagreements, but rarely severe dysfunctional failures. The oft-reported incidents between Generals French and Lanrezac in August 1914 were not representative of the working relationships across the spectrum of political and military liaisons. Indeed, there was a tremendous sharing of information and lessons-learned, along with detailed strategic debates and planning sessions, such as General Joffre led in late 1915/early 1916. The French-Russian-British plans were undone by the German Verdun offensive, reminding us that the enemy never stood still.

Robert

I mean, I agree with all that. No contradictions between us there! Perhaps I made it sound like I thought the French/English conflicts were perpetual and endemic, but they rose and fell with the personalities involved, just as you say.
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: FramFramson on December 30, 2018, 07:42:39 PM
With respect to wargaming, I have focused on reproducing the huge scale of WW1 battles. The most interesting was the First Battle of the Marne, where we set out 50' of tables, with 10,000 figures, and reproduced the battles involving the German First and Second Armies versus the French Vth and VIth Armies as well as the BEF.

I can't comment on whether Grant wanted to run a meat grinder but the reality is that, even with the various additional efforts of Sherman and Sheridan, the war continued to exact a heavy toll on casualties until the end. So it was with WW1 as well. There was extensive cooperation between the British and French forces on the Western Front for example; the more so after Foch was appointed Generalissimo. He worked closely with Haig and Pershing, as well as Pétain, to ensure that the Germans were hit with multiple rolling offensives across the whole line. This high-level strategy finally broke the German resistance but the casualty rate during the last 100 Days was amongst the highest in the war on the British side.

Robert

Again, that's an agreement. If better strategic considerations had allowed something like the Hundred Days to take place in 1916 or even 1917, the overall casualties of the war as a whole would no doubt have been lower even if casualties in a major breakthrough campaign would have been high in any case.

Verdun was a surprise for both sides, as each had been building up for something more decisive and this nullified any advantage the other might have held. However this points more to a failure of intelligence on both sides, as both the Allied Powers and Central Powers seemed to end up simultaneously back-footed.

As I hazily recall this was partially due to this being one of those lopsided periods of air dominance by one side (the Germans, IIRC? I think this was the time of the "Fokker Scourge").
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: monk2002uk on December 31, 2018, 10:28:42 PM
If better strategic considerations had allowed something like the Hundred Days to take place in 1916 or even 1917, the overall casualties of the war as a whole would no doubt have been lower even if casualties in a major breakthrough campaign would have been high in any case.
The initial German invasion of France was an example of an all-out and everywhere attempt to destroy the Entente armies in Western Europe. First Ypres was another, though lesser attempt as it only covered a small proportion of the front. The former produced another very high casualty rate, mirroring the last 100 Days, but did not come close to achieving what the latter did. The British, French and Germans were able to feed in huge numbers of reinforcements in the first months of the war. Once the ability to manoeuvre was curtailed then the lack of heavy artillery and, more importantly, munitions prevented anything like the impact of 1918 from occurring in 1914. By 1918, the combination of massive manufacturing capabilities, extensive rail networks and other logistics improvements, American reinforcements, heavily depleted and over-extended German forces plus enormous Entente firepower finally brought the war to an end. These factors were not in place in 1916 or 1917. The combined efforts of Russia (Brusilov's offensive), Verdun, and the Somme did not have the same effects as the last 100 Days because, in part, the German forces were not depleted to anything like the same degree as 1918.

Note the parallel to the length of time it took before the Soviets could mount the same type of rolling offensive actions in the latter stages of the Great Patriotic War.

Robert
Title: Re: Re: New WWI documentary "They Shall Not Grow Old", anyone seen it yet?
Post by: FramFramson on January 01, 2019, 03:28:28 AM
The initial German invasion of France was an example of an all-out and everywhere attempt to destroy the Entente armies in Western Europe. First Ypres was another, though lesser attempt as it only covered a small proportion of the front. The former produced another very high casualty rate, mirroring the last 100 Days, but did not come close to achieving what the latter did. The British, French and Germans were able to feed in huge numbers of reinforcements in the first months of the war. Once the ability to manoeuvre was curtailed then the lack of heavy artillery and, more importantly, munitions prevented anything like the impact of 1918 from occurring in 1914. By 1918, the combination of massive manufacturing capabilities, extensive rail networks and other logistics improvements, American reinforcements, heavily depleted and over-extended German forces plus enormous Entente firepower finally brought the war to an end. These factors were not in place in 1916 or 1917. The combined efforts of Russia (Brusilov's offensive), Verdun, and the Somme did not have the same effects as the last 100 Days because, in part, the German forces were not depleted to anything like the same degree as 1918.

Note the parallel to the length of time it took before the Soviets could mount the same type of rolling offensive actions in the latter stages of the Great Patriotic War.

Robert

Right. We both know this.

What I'm saying is that had the Entente pursued strategic goals in a better fashion after the war had clearly stalled out by early-mid 1915, they would likely have developed those advantages in manpower and material much sooner. The Allied powers had so many unforced errors on the wider strategic front (many of which I've gone over or mentioned already and a few others we haven't, like the Dardanelles) which drained their resources and prevented them from reaching the point where they decisively outnumbered the Germans on the Western Front until much later.

Britain never successfully installed anyone akin to WWII's George Marshall to focus on a wider picture or to elevate the more competent officers (and sideline the innumerable mediocrities), instead muddling through with a series of men who probably should never been promoted above Brigadier, if that. France did have a few who could have potentially filled this role, but they were in conflict sometimes and even when they did work in concert, things were still muddled as no one had clear overall authority until Foch was proclaimed Generalissimo.

Now, if you want to argue that all that was inevitable due to existing cultural preconditions (class structures, Victorian worldviews, etc.)  in the British Empire and Edwardian Europe in general, well, that's something I can entertain, but that doesn't contradict my opinion that WWI deserves its reputation as a futile, wasteful, catastrophe.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on January 08, 2019, 11:20:37 AM
As we have noted throughout this discussion, the war had not stalled in 1915. It was in a constant state of flux, with new measures and counter-measures occurring in a leapfrog pattern. I deliberately chose the Neuve Chapelle example because it was from early 1915, leading to the German adaptations by mid 1915. The Allied commanders had a very good understanding of what was needed at a strategic level. It was clear that a major all-out offensive, as witnessed with the so-called Schlieffen Plan, could not work. Offensive manoeuvre operations in any sort of depth simply could not out-manoeuvre internal lines of communication and transport. Neuve Chapelle illustrated the sort of artillery requirements were needed going forward, as well as the need for much wider attack frontages. The problem was that Great Britain still required significantly more manufacturing capability to just keep up with the existing demand for shells and guns, let alone create the levels of stockpiling needed to fulfil what the commanders knew was needed.

I respectfully disagree with your view about senior commanders 'muddling through'.

War is always 'futile, wasteful, catastrophe'. WW1 was no more nor less problematic in this regard. To view WW1 as somehow different because the senior players 'muddled' can lead to false assumptions. If only we can find the 'right' person then war will not be futile, wasteful, or catastrophic... The reason I have studied the Great War in some detail is to demonstrate that the problems with the Great War were problems associated with the prosecution of total war between utterly determined combatants, at all levels.

Robert
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: FramFramson on January 09, 2019, 06:32:50 PM
I don't mean to imply that it wouldn't have been futile or wasteful at all with better leadership, but there are degrees of such things. We can take an overall anti-war stance while still making meaningful analysis of military strategies and leadership, or the overall political aims and outcomes, of specific wars. I too have studied the Great War in some detail and obviously I have come away with a different perspective than you.

It seems we're talking past each other again, where I'm judging and speaking of higher levels of strategic planning and leadership than you are, and even beyond that to the causes and results of the war as a whole. Increases in artillery shell production (and reliability of the product!) were a real supply issue for Britain, but British shell production was hardly the be-all, end-all of the war.

Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: FramFramson on January 10, 2019, 02:30:56 AM
Incidentally, I did finally see the film which sparked this discussion off. Excellently done, as others have said.

While it's working entirely with existing resources and clearly has no intention of turning WWI scholarship on it's head, it polishes these resources up and presents them in a superb manner. No doubt this was exactly what the Imperial War Museum intends, as this should form an excellent teaching aid and starting point for those in future who wish to learn about the Great War.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on January 10, 2019, 08:24:38 AM
It seems we're talking past each other again, where I'm judging and speaking of higher levels of strategic planning and leadership than you are, and even beyond that to the causes and results of the war as a whole. Increases in artillery shell production (and reliability of the product!) were a real supply issue for Britain, but British shell production was hardly the be-all, end-all of the war.
I used British shell production as one example of a key strategic element of the war. The same issue affected all major participants in the war and was part of a wider strategic consideration around the up-scaling of production for all types of weapons, munitions, transport, etc, etc. It took years to ramp up production across all aspects of war-related materials. My point was that the first phase of ramping up was just to keep pace with the requirements of the time, ie catching up from a standing start to deal with the gaps in production and frontline needs due to the unexpected consumption/utilisation as well as the increased requirements imposed by the leap-frogging of new measures and counter-measures. It took 3-4 years before there was sufficient production capability across all aspects, not just shells, in order to outfit the Americans, maintain a constant rolling programme of attacks, etc, etc that resulted in the end of the war. Generals played a major part in demanding the expanded production but, until the war-time production reached the peaks that it did, there was no quick wins or easy fix to avoid casualties/shorten the war. You see the same pattern in the American Civil War and in World War 2.

Robert
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: FramFramson on January 10, 2019, 06:33:27 PM
I used British shell production as one example of a key strategic element of the war. The same issue affected all major participants in the war and was part of a wider strategic consideration around the up-scaling of production for all types of weapons, munitions, transport, etc, etc. It took years to ramp up production across all aspects of war-related materials. My point was that the first phase of ramping up was just to keep pace with the requirements of the time, ie catching up from a standing start to deal with the gaps in production and frontline needs due to the unexpected consumption/utilisation as well as the increased requirements imposed by the leap-frogging of new measures and counter-measures. It took 3-4 years before there was sufficient production capability across all aspects, not just shells, in order to outfit the Americans, maintain a constant rolling programme of attacks, etc, etc that resulted in the end of the war. Generals played a major part in demanding the expanded production but, until the war-time production reached the peaks that it did, there was no quick wins or easy fix to avoid casualties/shorten the war. You see the same pattern in the American Civil War and in World War 2.

Robert

But if we're looking at that as an overall factor, we can see that all participants suffered from the same issues and all ramped up munitions production. True, the Germans began to fall behind in production by 1917, but they still were not all that far off in terms of production and Germany eventually went much further with total industrial nationalization for wartime production than any allied nation. In practical terms, I would take it as a wash.

Indeed, Germany held a massive advantage in munitions production in 1915 (triple the British output, and the divide is even starker if we factor in the quality of output) and still possessed a dominant lead through 1916, yet this did not lead to victory for the Central powers by 1916.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on January 12, 2019, 02:33:22 PM
But if we're looking at that as an overall factor, we can see that all participants suffered from the same issues and all ramped up munitions production... Indeed, Germany held a massive advantage in munitions production in 1915 (triple the British output, and the divide is even starker if we factor in the quality of output) and still possessed a dominant lead through 1916, yet this did not lead to victory for the Central powers by 1916.
It was precisely because all participants suffered from the same issues and all ramped up production (across munitions, etc) that the war did not end quickly. The strategic blockade (executed mainly by the British) took several years to fully kick-in, steadily hampering German production through increasing scarcity of resources like copper for driving bands on shells and nickel for example. But it was the effect of attrition on manpower and morale, combined with the blockade's effect on German civilians back home in the Fatherland, that proved the final decisive factor in the end. Ziemann's superb analysis, published in his book 'War Experiences in Rural Germany', provides a detailed account of how the determination of the German soldiers was inexorably undermined until it reached the nadir of November 1918. The major combined effects of the strategic blockade and the Materialschlacht, ie the massive impact of industrialisation on the battlefield, wore down the numbers and the morale of the German army. This was never a war about a set of incompetent muddling generals. Britain, France and Germany faced the same problems, pushed for decisive advantage albeit at slightly different rates, found any advantage nullified, and refused to give way. Germany tried to match the strategic blockade but could not. Indeed, the U-boat campaign resulted in the full might of America being brought to bear.

I respectively disagree with the significance you place on the comparison between British and German shell production in 1915. Britain had 3 times fewer forces in the field in any case; it was France that was the dominant player on the Western Front in 1915 as in the rest of the war. My point is that not even the combined production of Britain and France, alongside with the increase in German war production, resulted in anything like the impact of 1916, let alone the last two years of the war. As Ziemann notes, the first significant signs of decline in the German army began in late 1916. The Battles of Verdun and the Somme featured heavily in triggering these changes. These were archetypal attritional battles on a massive scale (up to that point in the war) but, just like the American Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, many more had to happen before one side finally collapsed from exhaustion.

Robert
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: FramFramson on January 12, 2019, 10:25:15 PM
It was precisely because all participants suffered from the same issues and all ramped up production (across munitions, etc) that the war did not end quickly. The strategic blockade (executed mainly by the British) took several years to fully kick-in, steadily hampering German production through increasing scarcity of resources like copper for driving bands on shells and nickel for example. But it was the effect of attrition on manpower and morale, combined with the blockade's effect on German civilians back home in the Fatherland, that proved the final decisive factor in the end. Ziemann's superb analysis, published in his book 'War Experiences in Rural Germany', provides a detailed account of how the determination of the German soldiers was inexorably undermined until it reached the nadir of November 1918. The major combined effects of the strategic blockade and the Materialschlacht, ie the massive impact of industrialisation on the battlefield, wore down the numbers and the morale of the German army. This was never a war about a set of incompetent muddling generals. Britain, France and Germany faced the same problems, pushed for decisive advantage albeit at slightly different rates, found any advantage nullified, and refused to give way. Germany tried to match the strategic blockade but could not. Indeed, the U-boat campaign resulted in the full might of America being brought to bear.

I respectively disagree with the significance you place on the comparison between British and German shell production in 1915. Britain had 3 times fewer forces in the field in any case; it was France that was the dominant player on the Western Front in 1915 as in the rest of the war. My point is that not even the combined production of Britain and France, alongside with the increase in German war production, resulted in anything like the impact of 1916, let alone the last two years of the war. As Ziemann notes, the first significant signs of decline in the German army began in late 1916. The Battles of Verdun and the Somme featured heavily in triggering these changes. These were archetypal attritional battles on a massive scale (up to that point in the war) but, just like the American Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, many more had to happen before one side finally collapsed from exhaustion.

Robert

Well, I'm afraid I think we've reached the point where we're just going to go on disagreeing.

Of course the war was going to come to a point where one side was exhausted, but my opinion is still that the Allies, Britain in particular, failed to capitalize on their significant strategic advantages while myopically participating in said attritional battles, some of which had a point, but many of which were of very dubious value. If the only possible method of winning the war was pure attrition - a debatable theory which I feel focuses excessively on the Western Front - the allies continually earned poor value for their attempts.

You mention the Somme, but that's a battle emblematic of the debate over the attritional character of the war as a whole.

The allies suffered more than 30% higher casualty rate than the enemy, who was numerically inferior, and which failed to achieve any significant tactical gains, with few major objectives taken and no way of sustaining reinforcement of attacks where they did break through. The offensive was also mounted in spite of losses at Verdun significantly depleting expected forces, and was pressed on with despite the tank rapidly demonstrating it would not be a decisive factor at that time. The political fallout and losses from this battle hampered subsequent operations in the mid-term and, with Verdun, was a significant causative effect of the later French mutiny in 1917 (indicating the French reaching a breaking point earlier than the Germans). I might also add that the Allies had near-total air-superiority at this time, yet failed to make decisive use of this dominance in artillery observation and intelligence. The only indisputable point in favour of attrition effects of the Somme was the significant depletion of experienced peacetime-trained German officers, but I simply don't think that game was worth the candle in this case.

There were better ways to bleed the Central powers and to give valuable battlefield experience to Kitchener's army, rather than losing so many of them straight away. This dullard - yes, I am going to keep using that word - thinking seems to have also caught on with English historians who seek to retroactively justify the Somme (I by no means mean you by that), as most of the arguments I've read from the ones who try to justify the offensive boils down to there "simply not being any alternative", a claim I find to be so ridiculously absurd that it is downright offensive. Frankly, there also seems to be a chauvinistic streak as I've repeatedly seen English writers complain about or offhandedly mention a lack of translated accounts from other nations, which is a downright embarrassing excuse to hear from supposed professional historians.

I can read French just fine and what French accounts I've read are quite scathing, especially of Joffre's conduct. One of the rare times I fully support a decision made by Haig is when he broke off from the disastrous northern road attacks to instead try and reinforces successes further south, directly disobeying Joffre to do so - in that case the cavalryman's instinct was the correct one.

Of course the French too can be chauvinistic, claiming the French army reached their objectives but could not press on due to British failures leaving them unsupported. But in general I find that French histories are generally much more settled on the treatment of the war as a pointless, wasteful ordeal and this quite obviously colours my feelings. More specifically, French writers generally do not feel that the battle of the Somme was crucial, instead claiming the reduced aims following the losses at Verdun made it pointless (an assessment I agree with) and was of only modest importance to the war overall. They also tend to note quite specifically that the Battle seems to carry an outsize importance to British historians and to the British psyche in general.

At any rate, I do not feel we're going to sway each other on this, which is sapping my interest in carrying on. If anyone else is still following at this point, I'm sure they can take what they like from here or do further research on their own.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on January 27, 2019, 08:06:06 AM
It seems we are in agreement that exhaustion, particularly in manpower and morale, was going to determine the end result. The issue lies with the means.

I have focused mainly on the Western Front to illustrate certain principles that underpin the nature of warfare as a whole. The other major theatre was the Eastern Front. Apart from this front, the history of all other theatres of operations that were opened up to break the seeming deadlock on the Western Front demonstrated why the Western Front was always going to be the decisive front. It should be noted that some of the other fronts were prompted/supported by Germany in an attempt to do the very opposite - take pressure away from the Western Front and push some of the attritional cost onto the likes of the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, these other theatres had little impact on the Western and Eastern Fronts.

The Somme was chosen deliberately, precisely because it is emblematic of the issues from a British perspective (it hardly ranks in the minds of our French and German neighbours). The significant depletion of peace-time trained German officers (and NCOs) occurred through the combined effects of Verdun and the Somme but it was not the only 'attritional effect'. The impact of the tactical gains was so significant that Germany poured an enormous number of resources and manpower efforts into building and then falling back to the Hindenberg Line. Sheldon charts the details of this impact in his excellent series, particularly the book on the German Army at Cambrai and his recent book on the impact of the Somme on the wider German General Staff.

The tactical gains, limited as they might appear to be on the ground, were only possible because of the very wide frontage (with respect to earlier battles) that was attacked. As early as the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the British realised that the frontage had to be as wide as possible to negate the defensive benefit of flanking fire. At some point, the British had to deliver such an attack - if not on July 1, 1916 then at some later time. The width of the attack drew German defenders north, strengthening the positions about Serre and Beaumont Hamel for example. In turn, this weakened the German defenses in the areas where the British and French attack was successful on the first day.

From a counter-attritional perspective, you can argue that Britain should not have committed so many men to the attack on such a wide frontage. This would have saved British lives on July 1st. In essence, this was the approach that Belgium adopted after the heavy losses of the opening months of the war. They supported the British and French forces through holding operations but were not heavily involved in offensive operations until the last weeks of the war, when the German resistance in Belgium all but collapsed. Fewer British soldiers would have been killed or wounded if the Somme had been a very limited attack (or none at all). Conversely, fewer German soldiers would have been killed or wounded - freeing them up to continue pressuring the French and/or countering the Brusilov offensive in the East (the Somme was part of a much larger strategic effort that combined the Eastern and Western Fronts). At some time point, however, Britain would have been forced to participate in a very large battle. Either politically, through pressure from France, or because the Germans would not hold back (hence Operation Michael and the related Spring offensives when they were able). At which time, the 'saved' lives would have been lost.

All the while, the occupied territories of Belgium and northern France remained under German control. The former was a major strategic problem for the British, due to the naval/submarine bases on the Flanders coast. More importantly, the Entente had to wrest the occupied territories back. This was a war of liberation, not just a stand-off in some part of northern Europe that was not part of Britain - hence British forces could just sit back and let the French suffer a greater proportion of casualties before collapsing exhausted before the Germans.

I never set out on this discussion with the intent to 'sway' your views. I hope that the debate has surfaced some perspectives that other readers may have found interesting and, perhaps, surprising. Happy to debate further or not, as you wish.

Robert
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: Baron von Wreckedoften on January 31, 2019, 05:43:42 AM
I hope that the debate has surfaced some perspectives that other readers may have found interesting and, perhaps, surprising.

I think both those who agree with your views (me being one of them) and those who disagree with them, can at least concur that you have done that.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to get people who have been force-fed the "donkeys" myth (and only taught about WW1 at all via a highly selective set of "war poets") to view WW1 as anything but senseless slaughter that could so easily have been avoided by adopting some "alternative strategy".  That nobody in the past 100 years has managed to identify that strategy, much less articulate it, seems to carry no weight in the argument, for some reason.  On a recent trip to London, a friend of mine reported that he had heard a street tour guide in Whitehall telling a group of schoolchildren that Haig "had killed millions".  When "teachers" display that level of ignorance, it is difficult not to despair - it is reading arguments such as yours that prevent me from doing so.  Thank you.
 
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: Etranger on January 31, 2019, 09:22:16 AM
Millions of Germans maybe. Unfortunately subtle and reasoned discourse gets lost in the 'righteous indignation' of those who weren't there.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: jon_1066 on January 31, 2019, 01:02:45 PM
It seems we are in agreement that exhaustion, particularly in manpower and morale, was going to determine the end result. The issue lies with the means.

...


From a counter-attritional perspective, you can argue that Britain should not have committed so many men to the attack on such a wide frontage. This would have saved British lives on July 1st. In essence, this was the approach that Belgium adopted after the heavy losses of the opening months of the war. They supported the British and French forces through holding operations but were not heavily involved in offensive operations until the last weeks of the war, when the German resistance in Belgium all but collapsed. Fewer British soldiers would have been killed or wounded if the Somme had been a very limited attack (or none at all). Conversely, fewer German soldiers would have been killed or wounded - freeing them up to continue pressuring the French and/or countering the Brusilov offensive in the East (the Somme was part of a much larger strategic effort that combined the Eastern and Western Fronts). At some time point, however, Britain would have been forced to participate in a very large battle. Either politically, through pressure from France, or because the Germans would not hold back (hence Operation Michael and the related Spring offensives when they were able). At which time, the 'saved' lives would have been lost.
...


If the war was truly attritional then it is perfectly possible to critique the performance of the high command in that respect and the Somme still has to come down as an abject failure.  Whilst an offensive had to be made did it have to be made then with such deficient tactics and inexperienced troops?  Saying these lives would have been lost in 1917 is not correct since the troops would have had an additional 12 months of experience and allowed the development and training to do something other than a human wave full frontal attack.

What caused the bulk of casualties on the Western front was artillery therefore fighting an attritional war should have focused on how best to expose the German troops to our artillery fire out of their dug outs.  Yet we see emphasis on capturing bits of ground and sections of woods rather than how we could force Germans to be exposed to artillery.  The High Command did not have a strategy to attrit the German Army and developed operations accordingly.  The attrition was a side effect of the wasteful offensives that were launched in an effort to liberate occupied France and Belgium.  ie the offensives still had geographical objectives rather than attritional ones.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on February 01, 2019, 09:37:52 PM
If the war was truly attritional then it is perfectly possible to critique the performance of the high command in that respect and the Somme still has to come down as an abject failure.  Whilst an offensive had to be made did it have to be made then with such deficient tactics and inexperienced troops?  Saying these lives would have been lost in 1917 is not correct since the troops would have had an additional 12 months of experience and allowed the development and training to do something other than a human wave full frontal attack.
How were the British to know that the tactics were deficient? No-one on the British side had every planned or been involved in such a major attack on such a wide frontage. It was known from previous attacks that limited barrages due to shell shortages would lead to heavy casualties for the infantry. There was an unprecedented level of artillery munitions available to the British army in the lead up to the first day of the Somme. It was also known that narrow frontage attacks could be defeated with enfilade fire from the flanking enemy units and batteries. Hence the very wide frontage (by comparison to Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, etc, etc). The issue was not about the training of the men themselves. Twelve months extra training would not have compensated for the lack of experience in coordinating and maintaining attacks on wide frontages. Meanwhile, the Germans would have been 12 months ahead in understanding how to launch such attacks and would have inflicted the casualties on the British.

I will discuss the issue of artillery fire in another post.

Robert
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on February 02, 2019, 07:28:05 AM
What caused the bulk of casualties on the Western front was artillery therefore fighting an attritional war should have focused on how best to expose the German troops to our artillery fire out of their dug outs.  Yet we see emphasis on capturing bits of ground and sections of woods rather than how we could force Germans to be exposed to artillery.  The High Command did not have a strategy to attrit the German Army and developed operations accordingly.  The attrition was a side effect of the wasteful offensives that were launched in an effort to liberate occupied France and Belgium.  ie the offensives still had geographical objectives rather than attritional ones.
Here is the nub of the debate. On the one hand, there is the view that offensives were wasteful. This is usually taken to mean that the highest level commanders planned and executed badly, leading to wasted lives as a result. The implication is that if operations had been planned more effectively then fewer lives would have been wasted.

The alternative view, which I have attempted to elucidate, is that no matter what tactics were tried at any one time the enemy adapted in order to reduce lives lost on their side whilst the attackers adapted to reduce lives lost in the assault. There was a constant process of innovation and leap-frogging/catch-up that meant no single innovation would be the 'magic bullet' as it were - ending the war with massive casualties inflicted on the enemy and few with the attacker.

Before discussing the issue of artillery fire, the High Command on the Entente side categorically had a strategy to attrit the German army. From the British perspective, Haig and Kitchener both recognised on day one that the war would be prolonged for years and would ultimately be determined by a wearing down process. There were major efforts on all sides to develop the next breakthrough in technology, such as the development that went into tanks for example. These efforts were planned and executed over long periods of time, reflecting the difficulties in the industrial manufacturing capabilities as much as the planning process. It takes time for peace-time military production capacity to increase to cover the dramatic escalation in standard munitions and weapons demanded by full-scale modern war, let alone expand sufficiently to enable new innovations.

At one point the war, shortly after the Battles of Verdun and the Somme, General Nivelle managed to convince French and British politicians that, as a result of the tactics he purported to have developed in the late stages of the Verdun battle, he could deliver a massive one-time offensive that would end the war. He ended his military career and the lives of many Frenchmen (and Germans) but never came close to ending the war.

With respect to forcing the Germans to be exposed to artillery, there was no way that a continuous bombardment of the type reflected in the lead up to the Somme could have inflicted significant casualties on the Germans without being accompanied by attacks on the ground. The several days of bombardments against the German dug-outs had virtually no effect on manpower. There is no reason to believe that this would have been any different had the bombardment simply continued and there were no infantry attacks. The numbers of German defenders were a minute fraction of the total German army. Lodged deep underground, they were practically immune from shelling when in the pre-prepared positions (based on the learnings from the previous years of the war in that area, as Ralph Whitehead's excellent book 'The Other Side of the Wire Volume 1' sets out). Once ground was captured, the Germans were forced to counter. This led to greater casualties as the artillery was then able to take greater numbers under fire in less well or not protected situations, such as moving across open ground to counter-attack. But, in the endless sequence of taking a step forward and that step being negated, the Germans began to adapt to the killing power of the artillery. The defense-in-depth was refined further, with defenders being more spread out and less vulnerable to the types of artillery barrages that were being used at that time. And so it went on, until eventually the combined industrial might of the Entente, the addition of the American army, the effects of 4 years of fighting, and the effects of the blockade (plus other factors) finally brought Germany to the point of collapse.

Robert
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: huevans on February 22, 2019, 11:48:05 PM
Side note, Robert.

What was the composition of the artillery munitions fired? Was it mainly shrapnel, with little penetrating power? Or was there a preponderance of HE?

One image that sticks in my mind was something I once read about trying to snap strands of barbed wire with shrapnel and that being the reason that barrages in WW1 took weeks.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on February 23, 2019, 03:27:02 PM
What was the composition of the artillery munitions fired? Was it mainly shrapnel, with little penetrating power? Or was there a preponderance of HE?
It very much depended on the year and the nature of the artillery plan. Until 1916, 18 pounders could not fire HE. Shrapnel was very much the order of the day, with the heavy and super-heavy artillery supplying the HE.

With the introduction of the instantaneous fuze, 18 pounders would fire one or other or both shell types, interspersed with smoke shells too. As it became clearer that artillery fire should suppress rather than destroy, shrapnel was still useful. Creeping or lifting barrages were extended to cover the shell holes before and in-between trench lines, as German defenders often used to abandon the trench lines because they were death traps. Shrapnel would help spray the shell holes, keeping MG teams and other defenders sheltering for cover until the assault troops were upon them.

Wire-cutting was a major factor in the build-up to some assaults but not because shrapnel was ineffective. There was a lot of wire to cut later in the war, so it took time.

Robert
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: Donkeymilkman on February 23, 2019, 07:10:29 PM
Well, this is a very interesting topic to have read through. Now, I might just be retreading already spoken ground but, WW1 I would say was probably one of the biggest (I can't think of a better way of putting this, so here goes)  shocks to both the countries militaries and navies. No war had really been fought on this scale with such deadly equipment thus increase casualties extremely in such an abnormal way. I don't believe (correct me if I am wrong) any of the generals or the field marshalls etc had ever had to cope whit such grand scale war. A good example possibly might be the battle of the Somme where British forces suffered just under 60,000 which is fairly close casualties to the battle of Waterloo and I believe this cemented a good amount of the generals like Haig tactics, which had previously been successful, were cemented as disasters for example cavalry. This most likely and the higher usage of Imperial troops lead way for more fresh commanders that had a better ground understanding on how to win a war of such chaos and devastation a newer approach like  Currie.

I think I do think I went off at a tangent however what I'm trying to highlight is I think it's hard to pin the deaths of so many people on one or a couple of people. However, I think the break down of communication between countries and unfortunate events should have at least taught us that no matter what we should always keep on talking to try and resolve the problems.

I do hope they shut that sandwich shop though. I appreciate anyone who read my ramblings. Thank you.
Title: Re: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
Post by: monk2002uk on March 03, 2019, 08:43:22 AM
There was a significant difference between the percentage of casualties at Waterloo versus the first day of the Somme. In the latter battle, there were at least 300,000 British men involved, possibly more if you take into account all of the men who could have been hit by artillery well behind the rear lines.

While it is true that no war had been fought on the scale of the Great War previously, it was clear to many both before and at the start of the war that the cost would be high. The proportion of casualties was lower than many previous wars because all sides had already adapted to the massive increase in firepower represented by smokeless rifles, machine guns, and quick-firing artillery. The number of casualties was higher because the sheer number of men and weapons was much greater. As the war progressed, the levels of firepower increased exponentially but the casualty rate did not. Take machine guns for example - they went from 2 per battalion to more than 10 times this number as more MGs were distributed down to the section level eventually. But the casualty did not increase 10-fold, hence my point about the war being a constant series of new developments and counter-measures to negate their effects.

Respectfully, therefore, it cannot be said that tactics were 'cemented [for] a good amount of generals like Haig...'. The converse was true.

Robert