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Author Topic: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare  (Read 13760 times)

Offline armchairgeneral

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I am trying to find out information on the tactics used on the Western Front in 1914 before trench warfare began. I am aware of accounts of infantry attacking in close order and taking heavy casualties but I am really after more of a view of what was typical. So far the impression I get is that both side deployed in extended order lines for fire and advance/attack with close artillery and MG support where possible. Cavalry seems to engage cavalry either mounted or dismounted. I can’t help thinking it was similar to the ACW but with greater firepower and MGs in use?

Offline katie

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #1 on: July 24, 2017, 02:23:21 PM »
Well, the obvious book to recommend is "Infantry Attacks" by Erwin Rommel. It covers the initial phases of the German advance into France; Infantry manoeuvre skirmishing, short battles. Spoiler; he gets to have another war two decades later...

It does indeed seem to closely resemble late ACW or FPW with the added firepower of machine guns -- noting that unlike the ACW, early WW1 is between two well-equipped, well-trained and fairly well supplied, modern-structured, professional armies. They have different theories of warfare and different organisations, but their weapons are roughly comparable[1] and they're all fairly efficient in their use of them.

There's an account of the BEF's experiences through 1914 in "Fire and Movement" which is fairly recent and a decent read.

Again, the impression is of skirmishes in and around shelled villages. Lots of movement, rifle and machine-gun fire dominates the field.


[1] Certainly more so than the South's inferiority of arms and numbers from the ACW.

Offline Leman

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #2 on: July 24, 2017, 02:35:09 PM »
On the western Front the British tended to deploy and fight based on their Boer War experience, i.e. troops were pretty well shaken out, taking advantage of cover. By the time of the Aisne though they were attempting to take German trenches frontally, with little success, thus sparking the Race to the Sea, First Ypres and the reliance on digging in.

The Belgians tended to make the most of cover and fortified positions, although they were not averse to attacking. There are accounts of cavalry actions where the Belgians were supported by Minerva armoured cars. It is interesting to note that during the first few days of hostilities tourist trains were still running in Belgium.

The French tended to attack en masse, the doctrine of the time being that of élan. This led to massive casualties when coming up against dug in Germans with machine guns and heavy artillery.

The Germans were committed to fighting a defensive battle in Alsace and Lorraine, but in the drive through Belgium and into northern France they too often attacked in relatively close order, sustaining massive casualties.

The overall approach on both sides on the Western Front seems to have been dictated by "let's get this over with as quickly as possible," with scant regard paid to the advances in weapons technology since the Franco-Prussian War.
If it’s too hard, I can’t do it

Offline monk2002uk

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #3 on: July 24, 2017, 03:40:55 PM »
Trench warfare was a feature of the war from the outset. It was already known that the best way to defend and to minimise the effects of artillery and MG fire was entrenching. The British did it at Mons and Le Cateau; Rommel mentions it in his book; etc.

The tactics were similar across the major nations. Troops advanced in columns, preceded by advanced guards and independent cavalry formations. Aerial reconnaissance, including Zeppelins, other airships, and fixed wing aircraft made significant contributions to understanding the enemy's dispositions before contact was made. As the number and strengths of contacts increased, manoeuvre units became smaller and were more dispersed. From the outset of the war, for example, the smallest infantry manoeuvre units when in close range of small arms fire were sections or even a few individuals within a section. It is rare to see this level described in detail in the literature but there are lots of examples when you look for the information. The ideal was for these sub-units to manoeuvre under the protection of suppressing fire, supported by MGs and artillery in direct fire mode if possible. In practice it was very hard to build up a firing line that carried sufficient weight of fire to achieve superiority. Furthermore, if the enemy had excellent fire discipline then it was very hard to know if the enemy had stopped returning fire because he was suppressed or because he was holding fire. Blöem learned this lesson the hard way when his company came up against the BEF defending the Condé Canal near Tertre in the Battle of Mons

Ignore the descriptions of massed formations being mown down by 'mad minute' rifle fire. These are not accurate.

Robert


Offline armchairgeneral

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #4 on: July 25, 2017, 03:54:36 AM »
Thanks for the replies so far. Interesting reading. So was this the tail end of the era of armies "formally" deploying from columns into firing lines albeit more dispersed ones, before facing each other to exchange fire or close for melee?

Offline monk2002uk

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #5 on: July 25, 2017, 06:49:10 AM »
No, the tactics were significantly different from the 'formal' process in the previous era. The shaking out of dense movement columns was to take place prior to coming into artillery range, which was recognised as being several miles if defilade cover was not available. There were two, at times three, layers of reconnaissance on the ground that enabled this distance to be judged. If independent cavalry were operating, as with BEF 1st Cavalry Division prior to Mons, then the main body of cavalry would be at least 10 miles ahead of the main infantry body following. The independent cavalry would have several squadrons operating further forward and on the flanks, with each squadron projecting several officer patrols further ahead still. This meant the enemy (recon units) could be detected at least one day's march (about 30 miles) ahead. Each division would have its own integral cavalry recon support, typically a squadron at least. Once independent cavalry had made contact then the divisional cavalry recon was meant to take the role of keeping contact with the advancing enemy, while the independent cavalry moved to the flanks.  Scouts and small recon units (viz. Rommel's description of a recon in his book, using cycles) of infantry followed the divisional cavalry. These infantry recon elements typically extended out a relatively short distance from the combined arms advanced guards.

The layers of recon meant that infantry units were more dispersed by the time contact was made with the main enemy. As the distance closed, the manoeuvre element became ever smaller - battalion -> company -> platoon -> section -> small groups of individuals within the section. Here are a couple of examples. The first is from Ludwig Renn and describes an action in the opening weeks of the war:

"'To your rifles!' came a shout from outside. Two shrapnels burst over the next house. We ran for our rifles and baggage.
'Platoons advance in open formation!' cried the Lieutenant.
We deployed over a bright green field. Zip! Zip! it went past us.
'Lie down!' shouted Sergeant Ernst.
We flung ourselves down on the wet grass. To the right there was a tree behind whose thick trunk Corporal Pferl, our section commander, threw himself."

Renn now describes the disconcerting effects of being under sustained shrapnel fire, then:

"'Ernst's platoon! Up! At the double!' bellowed the sergeant.
I tore myself to my feet and advanced. We came to a slope falling abruptly.
'Lie down!' bellowed Ernst.
I looked round me. Where were the shells falling now? A few rifle bullets whizzed from the hollow.
'The French are straight in front there in the bushes! At nine hundred yards - fire!' barked Ernst.
'Advance by sections!' bellowed Ernst.
'Lamm's section!' cried the one year's man on my left. 'Ready! Up! At the double!'
We ran forward, Lamm in front. A stone wall with a thin line of bushes lay before us.
'Halt!' shouted Lamm. 'At eight hundred yards!'
We threw ourselves behind the wall. He was a lad, the one year's man! And in the garrison he had not even become a lance-corporal, because he could not give an order.
'On the retreating Frenchmen!' cried Lamm. 'At a thousand yards - fire!'
Right enough! Small bands were popping out of the bushes and sneaking back. We fired hurriedly, but we did not seem to hit anyone.
The French soldiers disappeared into a wood. Our firing ceased."

The following is from Blöem and relates to the Battle of Mons:

"Here we were advancing as if on a parade ground...." [having received recon intel from the German divisional cavalry that a BEF patrol had been contacted ahead].

Blöem does not give more detail of what this means, although Blöem was with a section that was advancing and there is a further description later in this account that gives a strong indication. After a brief altercation with an officer patrol of the British 19th Hussars (a British officer patrol from a divisional cavalry unit), Bloem ordered the advance to be resumed.

"As we left the buildings and were extending out again, another shower of bullets came across the meadow [probably fired at a range in excess of 1000 yards based on the map] and rattled against the walls and all about us. More cries, more men fell. In front a farm track on a slightly raised embankment crossed our direction.

Line the bank in front,' I ordered, and in a few short rushes we were there, lying flat against the grass bank and looking cautiously over the top. Where was the enemy? I searched through my glasses. Yes, there among the buildings away at the far end of the meadow was a faint haze of smoke. Then... let us get closer.

'Forward again - at the double!' We crossed the track, jumped the broad dyke full of stagnant water on the far side, and then on across the squelching meadow. Tack, tack, tack... - cries - more lads falling.

'Down! Open fire - far end of the meadow - range 1000 yards!'"

At this point, Blöem's small unit has come under fire again, which causes him to order them to ground.

"And so we went on, gradually working forwards by rushes of a hundred, later fifty and then about thirty yards towards the invisible enemy...

Blöem talks about how difficult the advance was, including the "broad water-logged drains and barbed wire fences that had to be cut
through."

The next quote is extremely interesting, IMHO. As Blöem is crossing the meadow in short rushes, he notes:

"Where was the rest of the battalion? Nothing to be seen of them. Yes, there... a hundred yards to our left a section [of Grenadiers] was working forwards like us by short rushes.

Its leader, in front at every rush, taking giant strides... Now they were down again, this time along another broad water-drain with a barbed wire fence along the enemy's side of it. And what was [the NCO] doing? Sure enough, he was running along the whole front of his section cutting the wire fence himself, in the middle of a burst of rifle and machine-gun fire.

I looked again all round. The enemy was still invisible. [The NCO] was off again with his section, another long rush. He was now level
with us, if anything slightly ahead.

'Lads!' I called out, 'Did you see that? A Company is getting ahead of us. Can we allow it?

'No 1 Section - rush!' And so another thirty yards nearer the enemy, and about twelve in front of Graeser's section."

At this point, Graeser brought his section over to join up with Blöem, who picks up the account:

"I shouted down the line: 'Advance by groups from the right, in short rushes.' And then I heard Holder-Egger's voice as he led on forward.

From our new line I again searched the front through my glasses. Still no sign of the enemy. To the right and left, a cry there: 'I'm
hit, sir!'

Behind us the whole meadow was dotted with little gray heaps. The hundred and sixty men that left the wood with me had shrunk to less than a hundred. But Grabert's section at my signal had now worked forward and prolonged our line.'

At this point, about 500 yds from the canal bank (ie 2/3 of the way across the meadow), Blöem and his men hugged the ground. The officers shared some champagne before attempting to resume the advance. Blöem noted that the British enfilade MG fire (the East Surrey's MG section) from the right had died down.

"Looking down the line I shouted; "Advance by short rushes from the right!" and the order was passed along.

From now on the English fire gradually weakened, almost ceased. No hail of bullets greeted each rush forward, and we were able to get within 150 yds of the canal bank. I said to Graeser: 'Now we'll do one more 30-yard rush, all together, then fix bayonets and charge the houses and the canal banks.'"

Blöem has mistaken the fall off in English fire for the equivalent of the effect of German rifle fire superiority. He was very wrong.

"The enemy must have been waiting for this moment to get us all together at close range, for immediately the line rose it was as if
the hounds of hell had been loosed at us, yelling, barking, hammering, as the mass of lead swept in among us.

'Down!' I shouted... Voluntarily and in many cases involuntarily, we all collapsed flat on the grass as if swept by a scythe.

Now Blöem's unit came under heavy fire "from the strip of wood that jutted out into the meadow to our right rear". Blöem assumed this was friendly fire but signalling with the red communication flag and frantic whistle blowing by the NCOs did not diminish the fire. In fact it was coming from the MG section and part of C Company, East Surrey Regiment, BEF. Bloem and the remnants of his unit were pinned until nightfall, suffering further casualties during that time.

Robert

Offline monk2002uk

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #6 on: July 25, 2017, 07:07:01 AM »
Be prepared - if you continue down this line of enquiry (which I would encourage) then you will never look on 28mm games in the same way again ;-). Based on Blöem's account for example, combined with a study of a contemporary map and the British records, neither the BEF infantry nor the East Surrey MG section would have appeared on table up to and including the point at which Blöem's unit was brought to a halt. Only the British officer patrol would have featured on table. I am not arguing against the scale, far from it. Games at this scale can be great fun but lines of men advancing across the open and evicting the enemy from cover...

Robert

Offline marianas_gamer

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #7 on: July 25, 2017, 07:26:15 AM »
monk2002uk,
Thanks, I really appreciate the first hand accounts and your perspective on this.
LB
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Offline monk2002uk

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #8 on: July 25, 2017, 09:34:46 AM »
My pleasure. I will dig out the reference to a pre-1914 film of the British army on field manoeuvres. It contains an example of infantry bounding by sections.

Robert

Offline armchairgeneral

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #9 on: July 25, 2017, 12:22:43 PM »
Be prepared - if you continue down this line of enquiry (which I would encourage) then you will never look on 28mm games in the same way again ;-). Based on Blöem's account for example, combined with a study of a contemporary map and the British records, neither the BEF infantry nor the East Surrey MG section would have appeared on table up to and including the point at which Blöem's unit was brought to a halt. Only the British officer patrol would have featured on table. I am not arguing against the scale, far from it. Games at this scale can be great fun but lines of men advancing across the open and evicting the enemy from cover...

Robert

I game in 28mm Late WW1 at 1:1 platoon level using amended Bolt Action which works really well. In contrast I was thinking of trying the Early War period at brigade level using Black Powder (as I know them and like them), albeit with a good few house rules. Battalions still seem to deploy as units with your above examples of smaller actions taking place across their frontage so using these rules would be averaging them out to get a representation of these section/platoon level actions for the battalion as a whole?
« Last Edit: July 25, 2017, 01:43:33 PM by armchairgeneral »

Offline monk2002uk

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #10 on: July 25, 2017, 08:43:27 PM »
Yes, Bolt Action is my choice for 28mm too.

Can't comment on Black Powder as I play larger scale games in Great War Spearhead.

Robert

Offline armchairgeneral

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #11 on: July 25, 2017, 09:04:56 PM »
Okay thanks for all your help Robert  :)

Offline madman

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #12 on: July 26, 2017, 01:06:09 PM »
Robert

Thank you for the long posting but in my case it brings more questions. What little I have read indicates bolt action rifles had no effect until 300 meters or so. This post says the unit lost something like 30% of its men as they advanced from 1200 to 500 meters. This begs the questions.

Were riflemen so much better in WWI? Doubtful (unless they were Australian in which case they could choose to shoot through the right or left wing of the fly on the general's moustache at 2000 meters over iron sights).

Were the advancing units exposed for a long enough time that at ranges beyond effective the occasional 'lucky' hit added up?

Was the estimate of range off by a factor of.. say 4? Again doubtful to me.

Were the units advancing in some form of formation which kept them grouped so closely together that they were a valid target even at such ranges?

I have developed an interest in WWI, RCW, and Soviet Polish war so am wondering how valid my prefered WWII rules would apply or have to be modified. They are squad based (units are squads or weapons teams) with very low chance to hit until under 300 meters and 50 meters is optimal. Allowing multiple shots while the unit advances for 300 meters over open ground (max rifle range is 600 meters and would be exposed to fire for 6 rounds of fire) and with multiple targets in a confined area (each target unit within 50 meters get an attack roll against it) might work for similar results.

The other option which may make the above match my take would be the advancing units ignore available cover, there is none, or they were not trained or encouraged to use it. Opinions please. Thank you.

Stephen
« Last Edit: July 26, 2017, 04:57:25 PM by madman »

Offline monk2002uk

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #13 on: July 27, 2017, 05:28:13 AM »
Thanks for the extra questions, Stephen.

Riflemen in all major nations were trained in what the British called 'musketry'. This was the ability to apply coordinated rifle fire onto a beaten zone. Soldiers did not expect to aim at individual targets but to fire in a specific direction at a pre-specified range. There was a specialist role called rangefinder, typically at the platoon level at least. Scouts were also trained in range finding too. Dedicated infantry rangefinders were issued with stereoscopic rangefinding instruments, such as the Mk 2 Barr and Stroud Infantry Rangefinder:



When setting up a defensive position, such as the BEF did at Mons, it was the job of the NCOs and rangefinders to calculate ranges before the enemy was engaged if possible. Small white markers were laid out at regular intervals, typically every few hundred yards. Alternatively diagrams were drawn up with key terrain features marked up and tagged with the ranges. As the enemy advanced then the NCOs would call out the range, the rate of fire, and the direction of fire (if needed). The infantry would fire in the direction, having set the sights for the required range. Firing would continue until the NCOs called a halt. The bullets fell into an elliptical zone known as a beaten zone. The longer the range then the broader the beaten zone. At longer ranges the bullets tended to fall onto the enemy, so you will see descriptions of soldiers being hit in the upper torso or head.

As to the grouping of the enemy forces, beaten zones were quite large. Even though Blöem's unit was relatively spread out, it still suffered significant casualties from the BEF musketry. As I mentioned earlier in this post, it did not require each soldier to aim his rifle at a specific enemy soldier.

Robert

Offline monk2002uk

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Re: WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare
« Reply #14 on: July 27, 2017, 05:51:34 AM »
It took me a while to find the video archive footage - the website had changed. Here is the link:

http://www.eafa.org.uk/catalogue/543

The film covers the 1912 British army manoeuvres. At 1:57 into the film, you can see a short segment that shows how the infantry were trained to advance when in close proximity to the enemy. A section bounds forward and forms a firing line. A second section then bounds forward and joins them. The first section continues to provide covering fire while the second section digs scrapes for protection then joins in. The NCOs can be seen lying behind their men, directing the firefight.

It is not the case that the company was the smallest unit of manoeuvre before the war.

Robert

 

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