WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare

[monk2002uk]

Here is an extract from General Haking's book on infantry company training, published before the war. This example covers how to manoeuvre through a hedge or similar obstacle when in contact with the enemy:

"An attempt would then be made to obtain temporary superiority of fire over the enemy by rapid bursts [of fire], aided, if possible, by the artillery. A group from each [infantry] section [i.e. a manoeuvre unit that was smaller than a section] in the firing line would then rush forward, extended, to the edge; these men would commence immediately to work their way through the hedge, and once they had made holes big enough to wriggle through the non-commissioned officer would give the word or signal to advance, and the group [not the whole section] would rush forward and commence the establishment of a fire position about fifty yards beyond the hedge. The task in front of the next group [again not a whole section] would be easier, because many of the men would find the gaps made by the first group, who were the pioneers of the operation. Meanwhile an efficient covering fire would be maintained from the original fire position in rear..."

Robert

[monk2002uk]

Here is an English soldier's description of his pre-war training in the French army ('The French Army from Within (1914)', written by 'Ex-Trooper'):

"As an infantryman, his business is to entrench himself when ordered to do so; to advance by short rushes, squad alternating with squad, during the work of getting nearer to the enemy; to charge if bidden, or to retreat as he advanced, in the way that would produce least damage to the force of which he is a member if that force was exposed to actual fire."

Robert

[monk2002uk]

And from 'Règlement de Manoeuvre d'Infanterie, Avril 1914', published by GQG (French equivalent of GHQ) just before the war:

"[Rifle] Fire is controlled either by the platoon commander or the serre-file he has appointed, or by the half-platoon or squad leaders when smaller units provide fire."

Robert

[monk2002uk]

A German example, from the Battle of Longlier in August 1914:

"From the new position we opened fire at a range of 700 m on the top of the hill ahead, where there seemed to be movement from time to time. It still wasn't possible to make out the enemy. The company came under heavier enemy fire after our advance. We started taking casualties.

Almost with a sigh of relief, we suddenly realised where the fire was coming from. It was possible to make out individual French soliders breaking cover from behind haystacks and from a large wheat field on the hill about 700 yards ahead then running down the slope. They ran towards and then took cover behind the railway embankment halfway down the hill. At the same moment they were blanketed by our rifle fire.

The enemy ran across dry stubble in a field. This was perfect as we could see the small puffs of dust thrown up by the impact our bullets. Our beaten zone was excellent. Every Frenchman who got up and tried to push on through the cloud of dust was struck down immediately.

We were under heavy enemy fire though. The company didn't have any cover and its losses were increasing. I spotted that the railway line also ran through cuttings as well as on an embankment. These were likely to provide excellent cover. We had to get forward quickly!

I gave the order to advance. The company bounded forward by platoons and sections. The process was repeated over and over, in between the bursts of enemy fire. The distance came down. Four hundred meters from the railway line. Then 200 meters away. Suddenly we were there, just at the point where the railway ran through a cutting. The first dead Frenchmen were lying about. We were in a defilade position, hidden from the enemy and from our own troops. My men started to pick up French kepis. One took a French bugle. The situation could have become uncomfortable if the French, who were only a few meters above us, had pushed forward. They would have been able to shoot down on us from above."

Robert

[monk2002uk]

Another example from the Battle of Longlier, with mention of a German rangefinder at work:

"From the edge of the village, one-year volunteer Unteroffizier Otterbein spotted the dark line of firing enemy skirmishers on a small hill beyond an intervening hollow. He raced over to Oberleutnant Eger in order to gather together part of his 6th Company. The rangefinder enabled the new enemy to be brought under fire at 700 meters."

Robert

[Emir of Askaristan]

Just reading thru this...excellent posts chaps.

[carlos marighela]

"Were riflemen so much better in WWI? Doubtful (unless they were Australian in which case they could choose to shoot through the right or left wing of the fly on the general's moustache at 2000 meters over iron sights)."

In the British Army at the outset of the war, yes. Post the Boer war musketry was a virtual religion in the British Army, almost everything came second and it's one of the reasons for the relative paucity of machine guns at the outset. Endless hours were devoted to improving aim and firing on the ranges at Hythe, Bisley etc amd some fairly advanced training methods employed.. As they were all long service regulars and/or long service recalled reservists and it was a small army at the time, the British Army could afford to and did master musketry. There are accounts of the Germans being quite convinced they were facing MMGs due to the intensity, rapidity and accuracy of the rifle fire directed at them.

There probably has never been before or since a greater level of widespread proficiency in small arms in any army.  The AIF at the outset were mere rank amateurs by comparison, the myth of every man a bushman being just that, a myth.

[monk2002uk]

Thank you for the additional information about how the British infantry (and cavalry) were trained in musketry.

One minor point - there is one book that references German soldiers mistaking musketry for MG fire. This was a book translated into English as 'Ypres, 1914: An Official Account Published by Order of the German General Staff'. I'm afraid that this book, though published under the aegis of the German General Staff, is full of inaccuracies. Jack Sheldon has debunked this 'myth' in his book 'The German Army at Ypres 1914'. Having studied several of the German regimental histories from the battle, I agree with Jack's findings. German soldiers were clearly able to tell the difference between massed rifle fire and MG fire.

Robert

[Etranger]

...
In the British Army at the outset of the war, yes. Post the Boer war musketry was a virtual religion in the British Army, almost everything came second and it's one of the reasons for the relative paucity of machine guns at the outset. Endless hours were devoted to improving aim and firing on the ranges at Hythe, Bisley etc amd some fairly advanced training methods employed.. As they were all long service regulars and/or long service recalled reservists and it was a small army at the time, the British Army could afford to and did master musketry. .

Trivia point: Frank Bourne was one of the instructors (& later adjutant) at Hythe in pre WWI days. That is Colour Sergeant Bourne, of Rourkes Drift fame. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Bourne

Great discussion guys!

[madman]

So in game terms just let the troops come. The lower chance of a hit is offset by the greater duration while under fire. In the game system I use for each additional unit combining fire an increase in the to hit/to effect roll is given. So if an entire platoon is firing (3 to 4 squads) each target in the area of effect has a greater chance of being affected. Each unit (squad) in the area of effect gets its own attack against roll so either work in waves, spread out or be subject to effectively an increasing chance something will be hit. All this depends on the openness of the terrain.

Thank you.

[armchairgeneral]

So how would the style of warfare in this era differ from say the Franco-Prussian War?

[madman]

So how would the style of warfare in this era differ from say the Franco-Prussian War?

Personally I am looking at it in the lens of WWII squad level rules. IF you form up and start your advance at a long distance you are exposed that much longer. How much effect the training would have is hard to say or incorporate. If the advancing forces choose (or are forced) to remain in a close formation (more targets per area), not work forward in alternating bounds (ditto), or not employ cover such as smoke the effects can be devastating IN THE LONG RUN. If the defending troops can concentrate a, relatively, large number of units which combine their fire within a limited area they also raise the effectiveness of the attack. Again  if those units are closely spaced then they become prime targets for the same reason and in most of the same ways as the advancing troops.

That is how I see it.

[carlos marighela]

So how would the style of warfare in this era differ from say the Franco-Prussian War?

For starters it would a relatively empty battlefield. Dispersion of troops at least with the British was practised. More effective small arms fire and critically, vastly improved artillery and machine guns.

[Leman]

Initially I don't think the style differed markedly from the FPW (I am currently fighting a FPW battle using the WWI Square Bashing system, with some amendments), but the increased rates of fire from magazine rifles and machine guns, plus the much more powerful heavy artillery led to horrific casualties in the first few weeks resulting in the change of style to digging in in a much more comprehensive style.

[monk2002uk]

The Germans coined a special phrase for the difference - 'die Leere des Gefechtsfeldes', which translates literally as 'the emptiness of the battlefield'. Prior to WW1, the proposed changes in infantry tactics were very controversial in the German military. During the late 1800s and even into the early 1900s, there were huge debates carried out in private and in publicly accessible journals. The exponents of small group fire and manoeuvre tactics, with dispersal of troops and devolution of command and control, were subject to constant criticism by some of the now senior officers and commanders who had served in the FPW. The latter saw the new tactics as a recipe for disaster, encouraging anarchy on the battlefield instead of tight centralised control in FPW formations. What swayed the debate was the feedback from German military observers who reported back from the Sino-Japanese War, the Boer War, and the Balkans Wars, amongst others.

Robert