Soviet, Cold War, Tank Company/Battalion Morale?

[Mako]

I need to go back and brush up on the rules I'm considering using for this, but am curious about how Cold War Soviet, and/or WARPAC tank and motor rifle units might react on the attack.

Perhaps a clue is in WWII Soviet tank unit performance vs. the Germans, and/or, though probably a much less reliable indicator, how Arab armored units fared against the Israelis, when on the attack, back in the day.

I can't say I've ever run across a set of morale rules for armored combat, that I really like, or that seems to be relatively easy to use, and I don't know how reliable they'd be, anyway, so I'm wondering if we should even bother with them.  Seems like at the very least, we might want to streamline them severely, to speed gameplay.

For battalion-level attacks, with multiple waves of companies stacked one behind the other, when attacking on a narrow frontage, it seems to me that it is probably unlikely that individual tank commanders, at least in the first two of three waves, would falter, no matter how many losses their unit suffered.

My reasoning is that:

1. losses in a high threat environment might/would occur so fast, that they'd be unaware of that, until it was too late;

2. even by radio, given most tanks under fire would be buttoned up, and could only see to their front, so I imagine most wouldn't know the status of their compatriots until after a lull in the shooting;

3. and, the first two waves know more "friends" are behind them and pushing forward, so perhaps they'd be more inclined to continue on, due to that belief.

Follow-on units would be more likely to have a better picture of what was going on, since they can see to their front, though that would probably be somewhat obscured by smoke, fires, explosions, and the general confusion of battle.

I imagine the third company would probably have the best situational awareness of how the attack is progressing, or failing, even given the smoke and burning hulks on the battlefield, based upon observation, radio reports, and a more clear head, if they aren't being fired upon directly yet, by the enemy, who are otherwise engaged in firing on the first wave or two of the attackers.

For line of battle attacks across a wide front, with each company next to one another, I suspect situational awareness would be severely limited, much like for the first company to attack in a wave formation, since everyone is in line, to each others' flanks, other than save for HQ units to the rear.

Given that, I'm not sure how much morale really impacts armored unit losses when on the attack, in reality, other than when losses are pretty dire.

Anyone have a clue into that, based upon historical battles with Soviet armored units in WWII, or for those units using Soviet doctrine during the Cold War's Middle Eastern battles?

I must say I don't have much knowledge in the way of first-hand reports of tank battles from either period, so can't really say.  My impression is that the Soviet tactics are generally to ignore losses, and continue on with the original plans, no matter what, from what I've read.

This strikes me a lot like the morale situations for large bomber formations of American and German units during WWII, when, from what I've read, most units conducting daylight attacks would continue grimly on, despite heavy losses to their units (some of which suffered horrendous losses, making Roman decimation look light by comparison).  While the occasional unit would drop their bombs, and turn tail and try to get home safely, from most accounts I've read, the latter seems to be a fairly rare occurrence too, but perhaps it is just not widely reported on, or known.

I want to try to speed gameplay as much as possible for large armored formations, so really don't want to be counting up points of how many units are rattled, demoralized, or knocked out, if I don't have to.  A very simplified morale status check/roll would go a long way, I suspect, to keeping games fun, and quick playing.

Thoughts?

[Ultravanillasmurf]

Interesting thoughts.

One point, decimation was a punishment of a unit, not the result of enemy action. Lots were drawn and the unlucky members of the unit were executed by the remainder of the unit. Ten percent (hence the name) were executed.

Not (thankfully) having been in the armed forces I have no personal knowledge of how anyone reacts, but I agree that Armoured force morale is going to be different to those of infantry.

Due to the nature of the vehicle, they react differently to infantry, hiding is not really an option, though their armour  should make them initially less likely to suffer the effects of failure of morale (confidence in their vehicles superiority will help or hinder). Once morale breaks they will either run or bale out, not much chance of hiding in a shell hole until either being pushed forward again or finally breaking.

The confidence factor will not be there for subsequent waves, they can see how effective their armour has been to protect earlier waves.

Sideways effects on morale will depend on the quality of communication systems available. The better the system, the more losses will downgrade morale.

A fictional example of how improved communication can break morale is the "The Battle of Yonkers" in World War Z by Max Brooks. The "Land Warrior" kit they had allowed everyone to see what was happening, reality ensued and it ends badly (not really a spoiler 93 pages in).

I have no idea, did the users of Soviet equipment think it was any good? If so, their limited communication would allow them to initially push on not knowing their losses.

Driving past burning wrecks of similar vehicles, especially if no enemy vehicles are found is not going to help morale.

More learned members of the forum  will have more valid observations.

[Hu Rhu]

From my distant memory of my BAOR days I can answer some factual questions.

Firstly most soviet tanks did not have radios or if they did then the junior leaders were only on receive not transmit.  They relied on on drills and flags (yes really) to indicate formations to be adopted. They received their main orders (such as attack) face to face from the battalion commander (out of contact) and then reacted to flags, signals and a few radio transmissions to carry out the attack.  They had set drills and distances to apply to change formation.

Secondly we believed that would soviets would continue to press home the attack until they were reduced to between 40% and 30% combat effectiveness.  At that point the tank formation would simply stay put in their positions but continue to fire in support of other echelons that would take over the battle.

Thus if a battalion (which had 31 tanks) was reduced to approx 10-12 tanks then the attack would no longer be pressed home.  There would of course be exceptions based on experience, training, fanatacism etc which might change those parameters from between 25-80% losses.

Hope that helps a little.

[Ultravanillasmurf]

Thanks, that is very interesting.

What period was this and what were you told you would be facing in terms of hardware?

[MartinR]

To keep it simple, maybe just set some sort breakpoint based on losses. Say 60% and the attack stalls, 75% and they pull back.

I did come across some stats around average armour losses in post WW2 warfare, and typically successful Armoured assaults suffer loses of around 20%, while failed ones lose around 65%. Armour losses are generally high in any sort of battle as they are prone to being taken out of action by even minor damage, bogging or mechanical problems.

Post 1991 and era of Chobham armour mega tanks, PGMs, and drones, things may be different, but the WW3 was going be fought with basically WW2 tactics and kit, plus missiles and slightly better radios.

[manchesterreg]

From my distant memory of my BAOR days I can answer some factual questions.

Firstly most soviet tanks did not have radios or if they did then the junior leaders were only on receive not transmit.  They relied on on drills and flags (yes really) to indicate formations to be adopted. They received their main orders (such as attack) face to face from the battalion commander (out of contact) and then reacted to flags, signals and a few radio transmissions to carry out the attack.  They had set drills and distances to apply to change formation.

Secondly we believed that would soviets would continue to press home the attack until they were reduced to between 40% and 30% combat effectiveness.  At that point the tank formation would simply stay put in their positions but continue to fire in support of other echelons that would take over the battle.

Thus if a battalion (which had 31 tanks) was reduced to approx 10-12 tanks then the attack would no longer be pressed home.  There would of course be exceptions based on experience, training, fanaticism etc which might change those parameters from between 25-80% losses.

Hope that helps a little.

I think if i recall a Threat presentation we were given about 1978, with snazzy Neil Diamond music and the less than 1 Hour survival rate (we were based at Wolfenbuttel near the IGB) That knocking out the tanks with an Aerial would cause the attack no difference, as they would act to the last orders given, what was more important was to destroy their Recce units as quick as possible, thus denying them the information to put in an attack.

[Hu Rhu]

Thanks, that is very interesting.

What period was this and what were you told you would be facing in terms of hardware?

Late 70's and early 80's against T-62, BTR 60 and BMP 1 then later in the 80's and early 90s against T-64 and BMP1/2.  The later generation tanks were better equipped, although we believed  that the training had not improved much.

Actually the greater threat was the soviet artillery since they had a lot more than we did.

I agree about the recce units - they were always a high priority.

[Mako]

Thanks for the replies, and info.  It is helpful.

Yea, I'm thinking about something like no morale checks until 50% or greater losses are suffered by a company, and then rolling based upon training level/esprit de corps, and any further losses over and above 50%, with a higher chance of failing, the more losses you have.

Perhaps, if there are follow-on units in waves, a negative bonus for losses against those, if/when they see heavy losses to preceding units in front of them, assuming they can see them - may not apply in heavy smoke, fog, rain, dust, and/or definitely not at night, unless the armor is equipped with thermal sights. 

[N.C.S.E]

Unfortunately, a great many misconceptions exist about Soviet tactics.

These myths have been informed by post war memoirs by German commanders, who often sought to hide that they'd been outmaneuvered and outfought in a particular battle and instead focused on how they'd been overcome by overwhelming numbers and similar factors that would relieve them of any responsibility for defeat. This has resulted in the mud being blamed for Germany's failure to reach Moscow in 1941 (the mud wasn't any worse than any other year, the Germans had simply stuffed up their logistics and the Soviets actually resisted - quite effectively too as it turns out) and the popular image of Stalingrad is the travesty that is Enemy at the Gates. Naturally, NATO, in attempting to form a picture of their new enemy, used the German experience to form their own assumptions, notably that Soviet commanders were all about wave assaults with little or no nuance - this attitude persists today.

They've then been compounded by the generally pitiful performance of Soviet equipped armies in the Middle-East in the past half century.

Knowledge of Soviet tactics during the Cold War period often derives from the 1984 FM-100-2-1 whose accuracy has been brought into question. I've been unable to trace the source, but there's a quote floating around by one of the authors of the planned 1990/91 replacement of the 1984 version (which was never released due to end of the Warsaw Pact, the manual was replaced by a general description of a generic enemy)  that states that the 1984 edition generally lacks any detailed understanding of the nuance of Soviet tactics.

These myths have been perpetuated by the media and many wargames. Flames of War and its offshoots are the most notable examples. I wish I had the sources on me, but the perception that Soviet officers would be too thick or too held back by orders to use initiative is regarded as false. Soviet commanders were expected to use their initiative in action and the Soviet doctrine of Deep Battle seems unlikely to work very well if their officers are mindless automatons. There was a large and often public discourse on tactics and strategy in the 70s and 80s that (I'm read) could be picked up in a public bookshop. Authors such as Glantz, writing during the period often based their work on those books.

I've found no reference to Soviet armour lacking radios post war. Of course in World War II the situation was often desperate (the radios themselves being of often poor quality), but towards the end of the war radios equipped the majority of tanks. Soviet commanders were however meant to wave their units forward with signal flags in order to maintain radio silence.

I think the book Red Army shows the situation off best. Despite all the technical differences (which Soviet commanders were very aware of, there were even fears that there might be superweapons that NATO had kept top secret), these battles would've been fought by human beings.

It's worth pointing out as well that Soviet commanders assumed that if it went hot, it was going to be very hot. The assumption was that evil NATO would attack first (seems familiar) and that they would be the ones to react. Declassified documents from the East German archives point to exercises where the assumption was that NATO attacked first where there would be a brief period of defensive warfare followed by the Warsaw Pact launching a counter-attack as early possible in order to preserve their cities. Tactical nuclear weapons were made available. In other places I've read that the plan of a Soviet attack would involve the immediate use of nuclear weapons to smash concentrations whilst conventional forces pressed through the "clean" areas.

Remember that Soviet tactics and perceptions of coming conflict (as well as NATO's beliefs about them) also changed throughout the Cold War. I don't have the time to expand on that, suffice to say that things change. Also remember that the Soviet threat was often exaggerated to increase defence spending. I've not yet been able to find a middle ground between "soviets incompetent" and "soviets are geniuses".

When analysing the experience of World War II, I think the best way of thinking of it is that both sides stuffed up equally (one that rarely comes through the "we killed 100 soviet tanks in a day" German memoirs). At Kursk for example, German reconnaissance of the battle was pitiful. So much so that some significant units on the Southern part of the battle got bogged down in swamps and minefields before they reached the battlefield. On the flipside, Soviet mythmaking often gets out of hand. The legendary battle of Prokhorovka where supposedly 1500 (or even 2000!) Soviet tanks clashed with outnumbered German forces is part propaganda, part Rotmistrov trying to cover himself for poor handling of his 500 tanks which resulted in the vast majority of them being knocked out for pitiful German losses (Off the top of my head the actual battle count is something closer to 500 Soviet tanks to 80 Germans).

With regard to unit compositions, let's look at what post Cold War Russian literature says about this stuff. This document (http://militera.lib.ru/h/0/pdf/feskov_vi02.pdf) was written in 2003 and I believe an updated one appeared in 2013. My Russian is very poor but the tables work well enough. The tables on page 51 provide the units attached to the armies in the various military districts, including the GSFG (which comprises pages 51 & 52). Page 112 provides a partial list of what units were equipped "during the 1980s" (according to my very limited Russian). I take it to mean the end of the 1980s given the preponderance of T-80s. According to the list however, pretty much every unit in the frontline divisions of the GSFG are equipped with T-80s and a (roughly) 50-50 mix of BMP-2s and BMP-1s (with of course BTRs for the BTR equipped units), with the odd unit composed to T-64s and and BMP-1s. Second line units however are more of a T-64, T-72 and T-62 mix with BMP-1s everywhere.

I trust this source more than (what I can find of) western sources and although I believe the work is from reputable historians I cannot fully confirm or deny that. I'm eager to see what others have to day on the matter.

Blimey, this got out of hand.

Hopefully this explains some of the weirdness of venturing into Soviet land.

[MartinR]

I'd be very dubious about a preponderance of T80s in the late 1980s, but certainly in the late 1970s and early 1980s the T64 was the predominant MBT among Cat 1 divisions (even if the BAOR kept insisting they'd be putting Chieftans up against T62s). T62 was very much a Motor Rifle Div type tank by then, and of course there were still large numbers of T55 around.

But yes, wrt Soviet tactics and lack of flexibility, there are indeed many misconceptions. Glantz's 'Spearhead of the Offensive: The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Manouvre' is an excellent primer on the development of deep battle trough the 1930s into the 1980s, and 'The Bear went over the Mountain' is an excellent look at the evolution of soviet tactics and force structures in Afghanistan.

   

 

[Mako]

Thanks for the info.

I've read that at the end of the Cold War (1989), the Soviets had 1,500 T-80s, 4,900+ T-64s (I think, and not the T-72s), and the rest a mix of less capable tanks, e.g. T-72s, T-62s, etc., out of a total of about 19,000 tanks in Western Europe, if I recall correctly.

Will need to double check on the T-64, but I'm pretty sure that was the 4,900+ vehicle.

There were a higher percentage of the newer vehicles allotted to the Western European Theater, than in the entire Soviet Army, as one would expect, due to the perceived threat there.

I'm sure the Soviets were capable of some tactical nuances, but it does seem pretty clear too, given their tactics in WWII, the composition of their armies, and the writings of their leaders, that they did intend to use massed numbers of troops, artillery, and vehicles to try to overwhelm their opponents who were fewer in number.  Given Soviet history, it does seem plausible that they'd be less concerned about losses than victory, as evidenced by some of their tactics, even today.