Looking for Bolt Action WW1 rules

[monk2002uk]

It is important to be cautious about interpreting the combat effectiveness of a weapon, which was widely used, upon references to design flaws and technical specifications. It is hard to find decent information in English. Most authors have focused on the Lewis gun. Few have taken the time and effort to look at the Chauchat, other than reproduce comments about its technical limitations.

Pétain's survey was conducted in May 1917. Questionnaires were sent out to all French units. The weapons covered included: M1907 St-Etienne MG, M1914 Hotchkiss MG, M1915 Chauchat, Modèle 1917 RSC autoloading rifle, the V-B rifle grenade, hand grenades, and the 37mm Puteaux cannon. The responses on the Chauchat included:

"16th Infantry Regiment:
...The CSRGs have been used to defend conquered trenches and have made a major contribution in breaking counter-attacks; walking fire was not used.

Several guns functioned normally and gave excellent service; a few had stoppages what were nearly all caused by deformations of the magazines at the lips."

"19th Infantry Regiment:
...The CSRG has been used in the offensive, where its handling is difficult, and in the defensive where it very effectively played the role of machine guns.

...Obtained results were very satisfactory, particularly in the defensive. Observed problems: when it is raining and the terrain is muddy, the CSRG becomes dirty and fouled and a certain number of these guns are put out of action."

"34th and 49th Regiments:
...After having given excellent results during the actions of May 4 and 5, by intense flanking fire, these weapons were less effective because of stoppages, in spite of all the precautions. It is necessary that this weapon should be cleaned and oiled during combat...

Also, since the Assistant Gunners are overloaded, one of the riflemen should help transport the ammunition."

"62nd Infantry Regiment:
The CSRG teams are overloaded; the men have difficulty keeping up. The Backpacks and the ammunition should be carried by carts or mules.

The CSRGs magazine is not solid enough and often malfunctions."

"64th Infantry Regiment:
Very effective in the defensive, for flanking and direct fire.

In the offensive, walking fire is used in approaching the position.

The weapon has given entire satisfaction; several thousand rounds have been fired between April 19 and 30, 1917.

The following two problems have been observed: the lips of the magazine become deformed, giving feeding stoppages, and the cartridge guide rod breaks at its rear extremity."

"65th Infantry Regiment
...The magazine spring often fails... A protection system is needed to keep dirt out of the radiator ventilation holes on the barrel housing.
The current gun cover does not protect the gun sufficiently against rain and dust."

"93rd Infantry Regiment
Excellent weapon in the hands of well-trained men. Nevertheless the magazines need to be improved, for the lips are too weak and are the source of stoppages."

"98th Infantry Regiment
It has been used by the assault companies during the April 13 attack. A company that progressed through the hamlet of La Biette brought down a lot of the enemy while firing on the walk..."

"105th Infantry Regiment:
These weapons gave full satisfaction. Only the magazines are defective."

"116th Infantry Regiment:
They are only exceptionally to be used as offensive weapons, but present considerable advantages for the stabilization of new lines that have just been conquered.

Too many stoppages during walking fire.

Carrying the CSRG and its Backpack are the source of much suffering by the men..."

"137th Infantry Regiment:
The CSRGs expand the action of the machinegun sections; they must be pushed forward as much as possible. Their deployment in combination with groups of V-B rifle and hand grenadiers, which provide them with cover, have given excellent results. From the material viewpoint, necessity of great care and cleanliness and of oiling after 5 or 6 magazines."

"9th Infantry Division:
Results: the CSRG has excelled in all circumstances of combat.

Disadvantages: becomes fouled and prone to stoppages in contact with mud and dirt projections."

"12th Infantry Division:
Excellent results were obtained. The fire of the CSRGs during the night counter-attack of May 5-6 has contributed to a large degree to the failure of the German assault.

All were convinved after repeatedly seeing whole enemy ranks brought down in front of our trenches by the fire of the CSRGs."

Forgive me for not quoting more. The other quotes are very similar. French General Headquarters sent the summary reports to the War Ministry. The following problems were addressed: magazine quality; protection against mud; standardization of the flash hider; equipment for walking fire; overloading of the Gunner and Carriers; and standardization of ammunition, which was fitted with stiffer, crimped-in primers to prevent 'popped' primers on automatic fire.

As to the German use of Chauchats, 2. Kompagnie, Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) for example used the Chauchat in combat at Verdun during the second half of 1916. The men were paid money from the company's welfare fund for each Chauchat brought in. This information comes from one of the members of the company who survived the war.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

Here is a further series of quotes, collated together by Demaison and Buffetaut. The latter is particularly well known for his work on French military history:

"There is an interesting contrast between the routine disparagement of the Chauchat rifle in modern times and the dearth of negative comment in vintage American military literature.

There are very many Chauchat rifle references sprinkled through virtually all World War I US Divisional Histories, and in veterans' memoirs. However, in none of these is to be found a reference derogatory to the 8mm Chauchat.

To the combat veteran writing his memoirs in the postwar 1920s or 30s, the Chauchat was a familiar fixture that helped him to get the job done.

Naturally, when the BAR appeared in limited numbers during September, 1918 it was preferred by the few who used it. Nevertheless, the 8mm M1915 'Chau-Chau', as the Doughboys called it, was a familiar presence everywhere in the AEF Infantry and Marine divisions in France, during 12 months of warfare.

The following excerpts are quoted from the History of the 26th Division:

..April 29, near Secheprey: McMahon, an automatic rifleman, stood off many attempts at the wire on his front. When he finally ran out of ammunition the wire was hung with dead Boches... Ryan fed an automatic rifle till every other man of the team had been killed, and then fought out his own way to the Company...

..June 1918, near Chateau Thierry: Alfred Hall, of Hingham, armed with an automatic rifle, stood on the railway track. He was a fair mark for the Boche snipers on the hill and their bullets kept singing around him, but they never got him. As the Boches ran out of the railway station, Hall would line them up as on running rabbits. His automatic rifle would briefly remark 'pup-pup-pup' and Mr Boche would go down.

On the same battlefield, Lawrence Stallings' Doughboys also describes the actions of Colonel McAlexander's 38th Regiment, 3rd Division, which gained the name 'Rock of the Marne' by successfully defending the river crossing at Mezy, east of Chateau Thierry, on July 15, 1918:
..Corporal Connors with his squad of two Chauchat teams and their buddies from three companies killed twenty boatloads of the boys in the new leather belts before all but Connors were killed or wounded. Connors had no more clips for his hiccupping Chauchats, but there were still some grenades...

Several further Chauchat testimonies can be found in Fixed Bayonets, written in 1925 by US Marine Captain W J Thomason Jr. The longest one recalls an event which took place near Belleau Wood in July, 1918:
..One lieutenant found himself behind a woodpile with a big auto rifleman. Just across from them, very near, a German machine gun behind another woodpile, was searching for them. He picked up the Chauchat [when the gunner was killed]... laid the gun across the woodpile and sighted three Boches... He gave them the whole clip and they appeared to wilt.

Incidents quoted from the History of the 42nd Division...
July 16, 1918: Pvt Michael Toody, automatic gunner, shot down an enemy plane later that afternoon.

Eight of the enemy approached a post which was occupied by Private Thomas Mead, who was alone. They approached with their hands up. Seeing that Mead was alone, one of the enemy reached for and threw a potato-masher [grenade] which overshot its mark. Mead opened up with his Chauchat and cleaned out the lot.

July 28: My attention was attacted by the reports of rapid fire on the left flank. It was one of C Company boys with a French chau-chau who had tumbled a German with a light Maxim...

Another quote, this time from the 28th Division:
July 28, 1918 near Sergy, north of Chateau Thierry: After an unsuccessful attack on Bois des Grimpettes, Mechanic Beer went out alone in front of our line, in plain view of the enemy, under heavy machinegun fire from the front and flank, and gathered up the Chauchat rifles and Musette Bags of ammunition that been abandoned by the men. He made several trips, distributing the badly needed equipment to the advanced elements of our line.

Other examples, from the 3rd Division, are reported by Colonel Butts in his famous account The Keypoint at the Marne. In July, 1918,
...Lieutenant Savage, a man among men, who had in an unusual degree the desire to serve his country, died at one end of the bridge, firing a Chauchat rifle after the Gunners were killed.

...The automatic rifle squads were making their Chauchats rattle like machineguns. Gunner Parson, when he could no longer see the enemy from the trench, climbed up on the parapet and fired his heavy Chauchat from his shoulder.

...On our side it was strictly rifles and Chauchat fire; machineguns were used by the Germans..."

Robert

[Metternich]

  Monk, by-and-large the quotes from the French regiments bear out the criticisms leveled at the weapons system (gun plus magazines).  Eleven out of twelve regiments polled had the same complaints regarding stoppages when the terrain is muddy (and how often was that not the case in the trenches ?) and flimsy magazines (if the rounds don't feed, regardless of cause, the system fails - likewise, I would grade down British artillery in games set in 1915 games because of the shell crisis; insufficient ammo leading to inability to fully support the infantry).  As for how these complaints were addressed - the French in late 1917 issued canvas covers for the magazines (which still let in water and mud, just not as much) and tested  fully-enclosed magazines in 1918 but too late for issuance.   The gun itself was probably about as good as most automatic weapons of the period (except for tripod mounted water-cooled Vickers and Maxims), but it is part of the entire system that includes the bad magazines.  For that, and for the need for frequent magazine changes, I would classify it (along with the BAR and Madsen) as more on the order of an automatic rifle (and use the Lewis, MG 08/15, and Hotchkiss M1909 as light machine guns) And the faults of the system were exacerbated when the Americans converted them to use   
   As for the German use of the Chauchat, you cite one company at Verdun (and a Pioneer flamethrower unit at that - which would have been less amply supplied with automatic weapons than the assault units it would have been supporting) in combat.  I can readily believe that they would have used anything they could get while in the close battle that could give them an edge.  But in contrast to expedient use, where is the equivalent to widespread systemic German use of the Lewis - to include dedicating factory resources to rechamber them for German ammunition ?   

[monk2002uk]

The gun itself was probably about as good as most automatic weapons of the period (except for tripod mounted water-cooled Vickers and Maxims), but it is part of the entire system that includes the bad magazines.  For that, and for the need for frequent magazine changes, I would classify it (along with the BAR and Madsen) as more on the order of an automatic rifle (and use the Lewis, MG 08/15, and Hotchkiss M1909 as light machine guns) And the faults of the system were exacerbated when the Americans converted them to use.

The key point that I have tried to emphasise throughout is that the Chauchat was 'about as good as most automatic weapons of the period'. I have never tried to argue that there wasn't a problem with the magazines or with jamming. You cannot judge the effectiveness of a weapon system by such characteristics though. You have to look at how it performed on the battlefield within the whole context. The French regimental and divisional feedback confirms that, despite the drawbacks:

"The CSRGs have been used to defend conquered trenches and have made a major contribution in breaking counter-attacks...

Several guns functioned normally and gave excellent service...

...The CSRG has been used in... the defensive where it very effectively played the role of machine guns.

...Obtained results were very satisfactory, particularly in the defensive.

...After having given excellent results during the actions of May 4 and 5, by intense flanking fire...

Very effective in the defensive, for flanking and direct fire.

In the offensive, walking fire is used in approaching the position.

The weapon has given entire satisfaction...

Excellent weapon in the hands of well-trained men.

It has been used by the assault companies during the April 13 attack. A company that progressed through the hamlet of La Biette brought down a lot of the enemy while firing on the walk...

These weapons gave full satisfaction.

They... present considerable advantages for the stabilization of new lines that have just been conquered.

The CSRGs expand the action of the machinegun sections; they must be pushed forward as much as possible. Their deployment in combination with groups of V-B rifle and hand grenadiers, which provide them with cover, have given excellent results

...the CSRG has excelled in all circumstances of combat.

Excellent results were obtained. The fire of the CSRGs during the night counter-attack of May 5-6 has contributed to a large degree to the failure of the German assault.

All were convinved after repeatedly seeing whole enemy ranks brought down in front of our trenches by the fire of the CSRGs."

I have watched live firing of Chauchats. It is not uncommon to see jams but these are usually easily cleared, just as they are with Lewis guns and MG08/15s. Many of the late war battles were not fought in muddy conditions. When mud was a major problem, Lewis guns and MG08/15s were prone to more frequent jamming as well.

Therefore I respectively resubmit my point that Chauchats should not be given a separate 'jam' penalty, different from Lewis guns and MG08/15s.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

As for the German use of the Chauchat, you cite one company at Verdun (and a Pioneer flamethrower unit at that - which would have been less amply supplied with automatic weapons than the assault units it would have been supporting) in combat.  I can readily believe that they would have used anything they could get while in the close battle that could give them an edge.  But in contrast to expedient use, where is the equivalent to widespread systemic German use of the Lewis - to include dedicating factory resources to rechamber them for German ammunition ?

At the time, the Pioneer Flammenwerfer unit was already armed with two MG08/15s. It was, if anything, better supplied but still the company was prepared to use welfare funds to reward the acquisition of more firepower in the form of Chauchats. This discussion is not centred around the preference for the Lewis gun. I have provided evidence that the Chauchat was not shunned by Germans, quite apart from the extensive training in its use by German assault troops.

Robert

[racm32]

Just a reminder that this post was a search for WW1 Bolt Action rules  

[monk2002uk]

Yes, the whole debate about Chauchat has stemmed from the Bolt Action WW1 supplement that penalises Chauchat more than other automatic rifles. By presenting as much evidence as possible, I hope that this will prompt a re-evaluation - not just for Bolt Action but for other rule sets as well, which almost always reproduce the same problem.

Robert

[Metternich]

  "At the time, the Pioneer Flammenwerfer unit was already armed with two MG08/15s. It was, if anything, better supplied ..."

Monk, regarding the provision of MG 08/15 machine guns to the German Guard Pioneer Flamethrower company at Verdun (flamethrower units made attacks at Verdun from 21 February 2016 to 27 April), other references (Thomas Wictor, author of "German Flamethrower Pioneers of World War I," writing in kaiserscross website) indicate that  flamethrower companies didn't receive their own integral machine guns until later  Before that, they had to make do with one machine gun detachment each on loan from the respective infantry units they were supporting.  Given that they didn't deploy in combat at Verdun as companies (but rather as platoons or teams), the additional firepower of a captured Chauchat for such units would have been welcome.

 http://www.kaiserscross.com/40029/76401.html

[monk2002uk]

Tom's books (on Flammenwerfer units specifically and Stosstruppen more generally) are excellent. He used some of the primary source material that I have. Tom has provided a very good high level overview. Clearly there were differences at the individual unit level. As you rightly say, individual soldiers or squads will take it upon themselves to beef up their capabilities. Australian sections were known for purloining as many automatic weapons as possible. Such activities and adjustments never appear in formal TO&Es ;-)

Robert

[racm32]

Well then, in regards to the direction the thred has gone. I will be using the rules for WW1 Eastern Front as my collection  only consists of Germans and Russians. In that context are there any aspects of the bolt action ww15 rules supliment that I should be particularly wary off for this theater?

[monk2002uk]

Are you thinking of early or late (ish - 1916 onwards) Eastern Front battles?

Robert

[racm32]

Early up until Russia pulled out of the war

[monk2002uk]

There are some differences between the earliest phase of the war and the period from 1916 to the end. These differences will affect the choice and composition of units. I will collate some suggestions together for you and post here.

The mechanics for weapons systems will likely to unaffected, as the Chauchat was not used by the Russians ;-) (although it was issued to the Romanians after their initial defeats upon entering the war).

Robert

[monk2002uk]

For the Russians in the early war, you should use the following options but without submachine guns:

• Officer
• Artillery Forward Observer (but not Air Force Forward Observer)
• Regular Infantry Squad
• Veteran Infantry Squad
• Inexperienced Infantry Squad
• Machine Gun Team
• Sniper Team
• Light Howitzer

Russian cavalry will be as per the Cavalry Squad in the Armies of the Soviet Union supplement:

• No submachine guns
• An LMG option from the start of the war (Madsen) would be historically correct, though not one per squad. This will unbalance otherwise equal size forces in the early war when the Germans did not have LMGs at all.

Anti-tank grenades and submachine guns are not available to any Russian infantry.

Later in the war, you can let the infantry have a Madsen LMG/s if you permit the Germans to take an MG08/15 LMG. It wouldn't have been an LMG per squad, more like one or two per company.

Robert

[Metternich]

Regarding the Germans, particularly from 1916 on, remember that the Western Front gets first call on equipment and that the provision of it there is more "generous" than for troops in the East.  Gudmundsson, in his seminal work Stormtroop Tactics, notes that by the end of 1917 some German infantry companies on the Western Front had six MG 08/15s per company (the initial provision was two), while "companies on the Eastern Front had to make do with one or two."  [contrast that with World War 2, where most German units had one LMG per squad]
  Gas was less often used in the East than the West, although German use of gas was a significant component of their artillery plan for their capture of Riga in September 1917.
 
A particular factor for the Russians was frequent shortages of artillery shells, which often hindered their operations (in game terms, you can limit Russian artillery to a set limit on turns firing).