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Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.
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FramFramson:
--- Quote from: monk2002uk on December 25, 2018, 10:29:35 AM ---This is true. And it is also clear that some veterans wrote passionately about the seeming futility and waste. There were some veterans who loved being involved, who wanted to continue, who missed being in action. We see this today, for example, with some veterans taking up arms against ISIS. It seems to be a very small minority but there are WW1 memoirs that are full of these sentiments. The Master of Belhaven is one such book, about a British artillery officer who didn't survive the war but whose diaries were published.
Peter Jackson's film is full of comments from veterans that echo what my Grandfather spoke about when he was alive. He never glorified war, quite the opposite. In his view, however, the war was a terrible necessity. In the 1970s, he had no truck for the idea that the generals had little or no idea how to fight a modern war. My Grandfather was very clear that the Germans were an extremely formidable and determined enemy. We can see this echoed in the fact that Germany continued fighting for more than 4 years. There was no simple or 'easy' way to overcome such a determined enemy. Like the American Civil War, the Great War was a massive struggle between two enemies that would not give way or give in.
World War 2 was the same. Indeed, the only reason that we lament the casualties in WW1 is that we did not have to do what the USSR did in the Great Patriotic War. Had the Soviets not borne the brunt of the Germans in WW2 then we would be praising the ability of the WW1 generals to sustain so few casualties by comparison.
War is a terrible thing. It exacts a terrible toll when determined foes remained locked in battles for years. We miss the point, however, if we think that generals were to 'blame' for what happened in WW1. This approach leads to a desire to praise and admire generals who seem flamboyant and daring. Remember the gasps of admiration as 'smart' bombs struck buildings so precisely in the First Iraq War? And the 'daring' left hook through the desert? But the 'war' was not won. The enemy learned and adapted, just as the Germans (and British and French) did in WW1.
We need to stop wars happening the first place...
Robert
--- End quote ---
Well, I'd certainly agree that the best measure would be to stop wars happening in the first place.
I do disagree about the responsibility of command. While "Led by donkeys" is a common trope which is probably overstated, it is true that much of the senior allied leadership were older men, used to colonial wars or who leaned on the memories of the highly misleading Franco-Prussian war.
Obviously it's clearer in hindsight, but any war on even footing from the American Civil War to the Edwardian era showed the the dominance of defensive technology vs offensive technology at the time. Funny enough, three years was also roughly the amount of time it took the Union forces to elevate effective leadership to senior positions as well. The only times this paradigm broke apart in the Victorian era were between grossly overmatched participants (colonial wars again, or the various Balkan Wars directly preceding WWI), or when some serious failure of organization took place (I would classify the FPW under the latter).
So I do place blame on senior Allied commanders during WWI. As someone in such a position, higher standards ought to be expected than those of a middle manager of an everyday plodding business. The post-Crimean reforms DID do away with the outright purchase of offices, but the British army still grappled with the effects of class bias on their officer corps (as did many European armies of the age, to be fair). I also feel that the German army on the other hand was less likely to suffer the effects of non-military class distinctions and tended to allow more autonomy to junior officers, which generally led to more effective command at lower levels (a doctrine which they took much further in WWII of course).
Even without the shackles of past experience, the war went on long enough that unworkable tactics were pursued long after it became clear that pre-battle projections were consistently, repeatedly over-optimistic. There's certainly hay to be made arguing about how quickly a person in that position might be expected to learn, or about how much the allied leadership were let down by unknowable factors outside their control (such as the disastrous quality of British shells early in the war, the horrible French attempts at an early light machine gun, or the understandably protracted development period of mobile offensive weapons such as tanks), but it's also clear that there were many younger officers champing at the bit with new ideas who could have been given opportunities one or even two years sooner. Hell, the Americans demonstrated far too late it would have been possible to greatly increase the effectiveness of trench assaults with a mundane existing weapon - the shotgun - whose absence from earlier assaults was almost shocking in retrospect. Certainly it was clear after the first year that this was warfare on a completely unprecedented scale, requiring different thinking, but the response to this was muddled.
It's worth noting that the Central Powers, (well, mainly Germany in this case) managed to hold out with what was essentially half the military forces. As as percentage of mobilized men, of course the Central Powers were hit harder, being the losers, but in overall terms of casualties, the German figures are significantly lower year-over-year. There's an argument to be made that there was certainly room for improvement among the Allies even by contemporary standards, as the Central Powers clearly held their own with far fewer men. On the other hand, picking apart casualty figures can open a rather dangerous can of worms with many many caveats, so I wouldn't push that claim too hard.
It's also worth noting that, we're used to British sources which may have been negative, or which may have simply seen the effort involved as necessary, but French sources tend to be far more negative of their early leadership, given their losses drove them to the point of outright refusal en masse during the 1917 Mutiny. This is a personal bias, of course, but the French accounts I've seen are deeply bitter and cynical to a degree not typically seen even in English anti-war sources.
As for the very correct observation that it was largely Russia who bled Germany dry in WWII, I must point out that Russian casualties as a ratio to German ones were so high due to severe depletion of the officer corps, technology and tactics which fell far behind German operational technologies and tactics during the initial invasion (or poor implementation of good existing Russian technology and tactics - many early Russian tactical improvements were implemented by officers who outright disobeyed standing orders), and the simple circumstances of Eastern Front warfare taking place mostly on Russian territory. Had Tukachevsky and most of the officer corps not been purged and had the Russian 'Deep Battle' doctrine (far superior to German tactics, IMO) been allowed to fully develop PRIOR to the war, it's clear the Russians would have had significantly lower casualty figures. How much lower, well, that's another can of worms.
I'll happily concede though that - like the war itself - the whole thing is a massive, sprawling quagmire with room to stake out all manner of positions.
Metternich:
My kids just bought it for me on DVD (delivery second week in January).
monk2002uk:
--- Quote from: FramFramson on December 25, 2018, 08:11:48 PM ---While "Led by donkeys" is a common trope which is probably overstated, it is true that much of the senior allied leadership were older men, used to colonial wars or who leaned on the memories of the highly misleading Franco-Prussian war.
Obviously it's clearer in hindsight, but any war on even footing from the American Civil War to the Edwardian era showed the the dominance of defensive technology vs offensive technology at the time. Funny enough, three years was also roughly the amount of time it took the Union forces to elevate effective leadership to senior positions as well. --- End quote --- Thank you for your reply. I will discuss the various points in different posts.
All of the 'senior allied leadership' were familiar with the lessons of the Sino-Russian, Balkan, and South African wars. Observers from all of the major Western powers were present if their forces were not actively engaged. For example, lessons from aerial reconnaissance in the Italian invasion of Libya were applied during the British military manoeuvres before WW1. All of the major powers emphasised fire and manouevre, even down to the section/squad level prior to the Great War. This reflected a clear and oft-repeated analysis of the superiority of defence over attack, which could only be overcome by fire superiority and movement.
The American Civil War was studied extensively in the British, French and German military colleges or equivalent. A key lesson from all of these studies (and from Kitchener's personal involvement in the Franco-Prussian War) was that the Great War was likely to be protracted. This view was reinforced in the Great German General Staff by the Volkskrieg [People's War] of the Franco-Prussian War - the long period of guerrilla warfare that took place after the 'highly misleading', seemingly dramatic collapse of France in the first weeks of the war. The German Army strove hard to avoid a protracted war in 1914 but General von Moltke the Younger knew full well what the failure on the Marne meant.
It did take the Union several years to settle on General Grant as the most effective leader. His approach was to push and keep pushing, no matter what the cost. Grant's battles of attrition mirror what had to happen in the First World War too. The South was no more likely to collapse than the Germans - both were utterly determined adversaries.
Robert
FramFramson:
--- Quote from: monk2002uk on December 26, 2018, 09:20:47 PM ---Thank you for your reply. I will discuss the various points in different posts.
All of the 'senior allied leadership' were familiar with the lessons of the Sino-Russian, Balkan, and South African wars. Observers from all of the major Western powers were present if their forces were not actively engaged. For example, lessons from aerial reconnaissance in the Italian invasion of Libya were applied during the British military manoeuvres before WW1. All of the major powers emphasised fire and manouevre, even down to the section/squad level prior to the Great War. This reflected a clear and oft-repeated analysis of the superiority of defence over attack, which could only be overcome by fire superiority and movement.
The American Civil War was studied extensively in the British, French and German military colleges or equivalent. A key lesson from all of these studies (and from Kitchener's personal involvement in the Franco-Prussian War) was that the Great War was likely to be protracted. This view was reinforced in the Great German General Staff by the Volkskrieg [People's War] of the Franco-Prussian War - the long period of guerrilla warfare that took place after the 'highly misleading', seemingly dramatic collapse of France in the first weeks of the war. The German Army strove hard to avoid a protracted war in 1914 but General von Moltke the Younger knew full well what the failure on the Marne meant.
It did take the Union several years to settle on General Grant as the most effective leader. His approach was to push and keep pushing, no matter what the cost. Grant's battles of attrition mirror what had to happen in the First World War too. The South was no more likely to collapse than the Germans - both were utterly determined adversaries.
Robert
--- End quote --- In reverse order...
The Union did have the benefit of the blockade, as well as a massive advantage in manpower and materiel - basic math always had the Union winning unless foreign intervention tipped the scales and both sides realized that "sheer determination" alone would not be enough. Many, like Gen. Sherman, did recognize this quite clearly "Not a bolt of cloth or pair of shoes can you make", and the ACW essentially followed the Anaconda Plan laid down by Winfield Scott at the beginning of the war - another who all-but-predicted the exact course of the war.
At the same time, inexperience and a reluctance to accept casualties by inexperienced Union generals led to several famous misses where attacks were called off or not pressed, which could have shortened the war by one or two more years. So leadership was certainly an issue there as well, even if we accept stubborn resistance. As Lincoln said of Grant "He fights!", as a way of explaining that Grant clearly understood, as he did, that undue avoidance of casualties would only make the war more protracted and lethal in the long run anyway.
Now, looking at WWI, we see the reverse. Of course when you delve into the details of individual campaigns, we can acknowledge that the choices made were not blind, that legitimate efforts were made to secure meaningful advantage, but I think the generals were too eager to overcome resistance with stubborn Grant-like attrition strategies, when the same strategy did NOT apply in the Western Front where the sides were far more equal (especially as trench warfare mitigated numeric differences to a degree). The two sides were far more balanced in technological and industrial capacity, and both sides had various advantages and disadvantages throughout the war (the traded periods of air supremacy, for example). Too much hope was placed too frequently on minor, incremental advantage, and too often battle plans were laid down which were only a minor change from those of the weeks and months prior, when it was very clear by 1915 (1916, if you're feeling generous) that only an overwhelming difference in force would have any real chance to break the western stalemate in the end. Both sides did eventually have their shot at such a campaign.
Strategic considerations which would produce a far bigger imbalance were required. The Germans did manage this in some ways - the Fleet In Being concept, Unrestricted Submarine warfare, the undermining of Russia as the political level, the East African shoestring campaign draining massive numbers of troops which might have gone to the Western Front and so on, and these did give them a significant advantage in holding their own against a larger foe. The Zimmerman telegram also represents an attempt, albeit a desperate one, which backfired spectacularly.
The Entente on the other hand mostly failed to follow similar high-level strategic plans which would have made a significant difference in manpower, and by continually engaging in battle, they simply depleted reserves which (in theory) they could have built up to a breaking point sooner (though to be fair, I recall the French WERE actually trying to formulate such a buildup, but were interrupted by the German strategic failure of the Verdun offensive). There were a few exceptions, such as Lawrence's infamous guerrilla wars which met a double goal of securing middle-eastern territory, while also tying down large amounts of Turkish troops with only a handful of British ones. For the most part however, the Entente could have explored many other options or bungled the ones they did pursue: Bulgaria was a complete disaster as the Entente did not do their research and completely failed to follow through with their promises; Greece was courted but at the same time her neutrality was repeatedly violated, leaving a divided and ultimately damaged Greece; Western help for the failing Russians came too little, too late (though to be fair, attempts WERE made and the logistics were terrible); attempts to destabilize a very vulnerable Austro-Hungary or support the Italians in their Austrian campaigns were essentially non-existent; the RN failed to lure the German fleet out more or to risk a direct attack on German naval bases, and the SIS (MI6) completely failed to develop a network of ANY sort whatsoever in Germany, when better information was so crucial. Ultimately the one major success of Entente strategic diplomacy - the entry of America into the war - would have been enough to make the difference on its own (given a few more months). Yet even there, this was not so much an Entente success as it was a German failure.
Meanwhile command on the front lines was lacking - I still find the repetition of failures due to campaigns repeatedly made with only minor tweaks or comparatively small increases in manpower to be nearly criminal in their negligence. The Allies, especially the British continually underestimated the depth of German defences and reserves (a famous case was that Haig was noteworthy for only accepting intel reports from Charteris, who tended to tell Haig what he liked to hear), and while the Germans did the same on occasion, they did so far less often and were usually not as far off as the Entente were in their estimations - Verdun came fairly close to succeeding, for example and might very well have come off (or been avoided) had the French buildup been known to them.
While we could go back and forth all day about mid-level Entente leadership and western combat operations, there's certainly enough material out there centring on the excessive, even obsessive political activities of the senior Entente military leadership, the exact sort of leaders for whom larger strategic concerns should have been paramount. Yet instead of cooperating, the British and French often clashed harshly (at minimum through to mid-late 1917), failed to share information and resources, tried to stick each other with poor sections of the front, and in Haig's case specifically, literally spent more time engaged in domestic political manoeuvring against real and imagined enemies within the military and political leadership, than in actually formulating military operations.
Ah Haig. Even if you think Haig was a skilled leader (and I obviously don't, ha), or accept that some amount of politics is unavoidable at the highest levels of military leadership (debatable), this was grossly irresponsible. The war and millions of men's lives were far less important than butting heads with the CIGS of the moment, intriguing against Lloyd George, playing revolving door with his subordinates, or grousing about Wilson, the French, or whoever else had irritated him or made him fear he was about to be sacked that week (I seem to recall that Napoleon supposedly had a witticism about second-rate men hiring third-rate men...). One is struck by how profound Haig's insecurity was, hell, he almost gave up and wanted to retreat to the channel during Blucher! And wanted the French to sacrifice themselves to cover a British retreat! Even his great "success" of the Hundred Days is cannot be clearly attributed to him. First off, he was locked into the cavalryman's mindset, so I feel that this is at least partially the result of the stopped clock being right twice a day, and in any case this was right after the Germans had conveniently exhausted themselves on their "Gambler's throw". Plus it's very arguable how much direct operational command he had at that time, as subordinates like Plumer, Byng, Currie, Monash, etc. and allies like Foch were arguably were more important in actual combat operations (certainly the French credited Foch and not Haig... though of course this would be natural in any case).
monk2002uk:
--- Quote from: FramFramson on December 25, 2018, 08:11:48 PM ---The post-Crimean reforms DID do away with the outright purchase of offices, but the British army still grappled with the effects of class bias on their officer corps (as did many European armies of the age, to be fair). I also feel that the German army on the other hand was less likely to suffer the effects of non-military class distinctions and tended to allow more autonomy to junior officers, which generally led to more effective command at lower levels (a doctrine which they took much further in WWII of course). --- End quote --- Class bias was an issue in the British and German armies alike; much less so with the Republican French army. Within the German army, there were the biases at the equivalent of the state level. Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers, etc often wrote about being treated as inferior by Prussians. The biggest problem within the German army, however, was the relationship between the General Staff and the other senior commanders. Writers like Jack Sheldon have clearly shown how the role of the General Staff created significant friction within the German army. The concept also saw men like von Loßberg and Bruchmüller elevated to positions of great influence, without having climbed the normal chain of command. The latter officer planned the artillery barrages for Operation Michael. One German army chose to follow his 'advice'; the other did not. The latter did not succeed anywhere near as well on the first day, despite however well the junior officers were trained and exercised command at the tactical level.
Robert
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