Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.

[jon_1066]

It seems we are in agreement that exhaustion, particularly in manpower and morale, was going to determine the end result. The issue lies with the means.

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From a counter-attritional perspective, you can argue that Britain should not have committed so many men to the attack on such a wide frontage. This would have saved British lives on July 1st. In essence, this was the approach that Belgium adopted after the heavy losses of the opening months of the war. They supported the British and French forces through holding operations but were not heavily involved in offensive operations until the last weeks of the war, when the German resistance in Belgium all but collapsed. Fewer British soldiers would have been killed or wounded if the Somme had been a very limited attack (or none at all). Conversely, fewer German soldiers would have been killed or wounded - freeing them up to continue pressuring the French and/or countering the Brusilov offensive in the East (the Somme was part of a much larger strategic effort that combined the Eastern and Western Fronts). At some time point, however, Britain would have been forced to participate in a very large battle. Either politically, through pressure from France, or because the Germans would not hold back (hence Operation Michael and the related Spring offensives when they were able). At which time, the 'saved' lives would have been lost.
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If the war was truly attritional then it is perfectly possible to critique the performance of the high command in that respect and the Somme still has to come down as an abject failure.  Whilst an offensive had to be made did it have to be made then with such deficient tactics and inexperienced troops?  Saying these lives would have been lost in 1917 is not correct since the troops would have had an additional 12 months of experience and allowed the development and training to do something other than a human wave full frontal attack.

What caused the bulk of casualties on the Western front was artillery therefore fighting an attritional war should have focused on how best to expose the German troops to our artillery fire out of their dug outs.  Yet we see emphasis on capturing bits of ground and sections of woods rather than how we could force Germans to be exposed to artillery.  The High Command did not have a strategy to attrit the German Army and developed operations accordingly.  The attrition was a side effect of the wasteful offensives that were launched in an effort to liberate occupied France and Belgium.  ie the offensives still had geographical objectives rather than attritional ones.

[monk2002uk]

If the war was truly attritional then it is perfectly possible to critique the performance of the high command in that respect and the Somme still has to come down as an abject failure.  Whilst an offensive had to be made did it have to be made then with such deficient tactics and inexperienced troops?  Saying these lives would have been lost in 1917 is not correct since the troops would have had an additional 12 months of experience and allowed the development and training to do something other than a human wave full frontal attack.

How were the British to know that the tactics were deficient? No-one on the British side had every planned or been involved in such a major attack on such a wide frontage. It was known from previous attacks that limited barrages due to shell shortages would lead to heavy casualties for the infantry. There was an unprecedented level of artillery munitions available to the British army in the lead up to the first day of the Somme. It was also known that narrow frontage attacks could be defeated with enfilade fire from the flanking enemy units and batteries. Hence the very wide frontage (by comparison to Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, etc, etc). The issue was not about the training of the men themselves. Twelve months extra training would not have compensated for the lack of experience in coordinating and maintaining attacks on wide frontages. Meanwhile, the Germans would have been 12 months ahead in understanding how to launch such attacks and would have inflicted the casualties on the British.

I will discuss the issue of artillery fire in another post.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

What caused the bulk of casualties on the Western front was artillery therefore fighting an attritional war should have focused on how best to expose the German troops to our artillery fire out of their dug outs.  Yet we see emphasis on capturing bits of ground and sections of woods rather than how we could force Germans to be exposed to artillery.  The High Command did not have a strategy to attrit the German Army and developed operations accordingly.  The attrition was a side effect of the wasteful offensives that were launched in an effort to liberate occupied France and Belgium.  ie the offensives still had geographical objectives rather than attritional ones.

Here is the nub of the debate. On the one hand, there is the view that offensives were wasteful. This is usually taken to mean that the highest level commanders planned and executed badly, leading to wasted lives as a result. The implication is that if operations had been planned more effectively then fewer lives would have been wasted.

The alternative view, which I have attempted to elucidate, is that no matter what tactics were tried at any one time the enemy adapted in order to reduce lives lost on their side whilst the attackers adapted to reduce lives lost in the assault. There was a constant process of innovation and leap-frogging/catch-up that meant no single innovation would be the 'magic bullet' as it were - ending the war with massive casualties inflicted on the enemy and few with the attacker.

Before discussing the issue of artillery fire, the High Command on the Entente side categorically had a strategy to attrit the German army. From the British perspective, Haig and Kitchener both recognised on day one that the war would be prolonged for years and would ultimately be determined by a wearing down process. There were major efforts on all sides to develop the next breakthrough in technology, such as the development that went into tanks for example. These efforts were planned and executed over long periods of time, reflecting the difficulties in the industrial manufacturing capabilities as much as the planning process. It takes time for peace-time military production capacity to increase to cover the dramatic escalation in standard munitions and weapons demanded by full-scale modern war, let alone expand sufficiently to enable new innovations.

At one point the war, shortly after the Battles of Verdun and the Somme, General Nivelle managed to convince French and British politicians that, as a result of the tactics he purported to have developed in the late stages of the Verdun battle, he could deliver a massive one-time offensive that would end the war. He ended his military career and the lives of many Frenchmen (and Germans) but never came close to ending the war.

With respect to forcing the Germans to be exposed to artillery, there was no way that a continuous bombardment of the type reflected in the lead up to the Somme could have inflicted significant casualties on the Germans without being accompanied by attacks on the ground. The several days of bombardments against the German dug-outs had virtually no effect on manpower. There is no reason to believe that this would have been any different had the bombardment simply continued and there were no infantry attacks. The numbers of German defenders were a minute fraction of the total German army. Lodged deep underground, they were practically immune from shelling when in the pre-prepared positions (based on the learnings from the previous years of the war in that area, as Ralph Whitehead's excellent book 'The Other Side of the Wire Volume 1' sets out). Once ground was captured, the Germans were forced to counter. This led to greater casualties as the artillery was then able to take greater numbers under fire in less well or not protected situations, such as moving across open ground to counter-attack. But, in the endless sequence of taking a step forward and that step being negated, the Germans began to adapt to the killing power of the artillery. The defense-in-depth was refined further, with defenders being more spread out and less vulnerable to the types of artillery barrages that were being used at that time. And so it went on, until eventually the combined industrial might of the Entente, the addition of the American army, the effects of 4 years of fighting, and the effects of the blockade (plus other factors) finally brought Germany to the point of collapse.

Robert

[huevans]

Side note, Robert.

What was the composition of the artillery munitions fired? Was it mainly shrapnel, with little penetrating power? Or was there a preponderance of HE?

One image that sticks in my mind was something I once read about trying to snap strands of barbed wire with shrapnel and that being the reason that barrages in WW1 took weeks.

[monk2002uk]

What was the composition of the artillery munitions fired? Was it mainly shrapnel, with little penetrating power? Or was there a preponderance of HE?

It very much depended on the year and the nature of the artillery plan. Until 1916, 18 pounders could not fire HE. Shrapnel was very much the order of the day, with the heavy and super-heavy artillery supplying the HE.

With the introduction of the instantaneous fuze, 18 pounders would fire one or other or both shell types, interspersed with smoke shells too. As it became clearer that artillery fire should suppress rather than destroy, shrapnel was still useful. Creeping or lifting barrages were extended to cover the shell holes before and in-between trench lines, as German defenders often used to abandon the trench lines because they were death traps. Shrapnel would help spray the shell holes, keeping MG teams and other defenders sheltering for cover until the assault troops were upon them.

Wire-cutting was a major factor in the build-up to some assaults but not because shrapnel was ineffective. There was a lot of wire to cut later in the war, so it took time.

Robert

[Donkeymilkman]

Well, this is a very interesting topic to have read through. Now, I might just be retreading already spoken ground but, WW1 I would say was probably one of the biggest (I can't think of a better way of putting this, so here goes)  shocks to both the countries militaries and navies. No war had really been fought on this scale with such deadly equipment thus increase casualties extremely in such an abnormal way. I don't believe (correct me if I am wrong) any of the generals or the field marshalls etc had ever had to cope whit such grand scale war. A good example possibly might be the battle of the Somme where British forces suffered just under 60,000 which is fairly close casualties to the battle of Waterloo and I believe this cemented a good amount of the generals like Haig tactics, which had previously been successful, were cemented as disasters for example cavalry. This most likely and the higher usage of Imperial troops lead way for more fresh commanders that had a better ground understanding on how to win a war of such chaos and devastation a newer approach like  Currie.

I think I do think I went off at a tangent however what I'm trying to highlight is I think it's hard to pin the deaths of so many people on one or a couple of people. However, I think the break down of communication between countries and unfortunate events should have at least taught us that no matter what we should always keep on talking to try and resolve the problems.

I do hope they shut that sandwich shop though. I appreciate anyone who read my ramblings. Thank you.

[monk2002uk]

There was a significant difference between the percentage of casualties at Waterloo versus the first day of the Somme. In the latter battle, there were at least 300,000 British men involved, possibly more if you take into account all of the men who could have been hit by artillery well behind the rear lines.

While it is true that no war had been fought on the scale of the Great War previously, it was clear to many both before and at the start of the war that the cost would be high. The proportion of casualties was lower than many previous wars because all sides had already adapted to the massive increase in firepower represented by smokeless rifles, machine guns, and quick-firing artillery. The number of casualties was higher because the sheer number of men and weapons was much greater. As the war progressed, the levels of firepower increased exponentially but the casualty rate did not. Take machine guns for example - they went from 2 per battalion to more than 10 times this number as more MGs were distributed down to the section level eventually. But the casualty did not increase 10-fold, hence my point about the war being a constant series of new developments and counter-measures to negate their effects.

Respectfully, therefore, it cannot be said that tactics were 'cemented [for] a good amount of generals like Haig...'. The converse was true.

Robert