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Miniatures Adventure => The Conflicts that came in from the Cold => Topic started by: robh on 23 May 2025, 01:16:16 AM
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How were the limited amount of night vision sets allocated within Infantry units during the early 1980s?
Did that vary for Special Forces units?
Both sides seem to have been so equipped during the Falklands War, but I can't find details of how they were distributed. Has anyone got a reference they could point me to?
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The only thing I know for sure is that the Argentine forces complained bitterly about the British fighting at night as they obviously had far more night vision devices. This is actually untrue; both sides had similar numbers of night vision devices - it's the distribution of those that became key - as far as I'm aware (and please, as always, tell me when I'm wrong - I can take it!) Argentine forces tended to centralise the NV kit with command and observation teams, whereas British forces distributed theirs to GPMG and marksmen/snipers, on the whole. This may have been a contributing factor but also British troops have been trained for night fighting since at least WW2 and were facing troops that hadn't been trained to that high a standard.
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My memory is hazy but back in 83 on exercise we would occasionally be given the cumbersome starlite scope thing... I was told at the time one per platoon with snipers etc also getting one. I didnt like it as it was a faff.... having said that I am sure it was a very handy piece of kit in an actual shooting situation.
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The SF elements of the task force had access to AN/PVS 4 (scope) and AN/PVS 5 (goggles) These were second generation passive, image intensifier scopes. These provided a better image quality than the earlier 1st gen 'Starlight Scopes' like the IWS. Much of this kit was wrangled by the SAS dealing directly with contacts in the USSF at the outbreak of the war.
The infantry battalions had the IWS in small quantities. Probably enough for 1 or 2 per platoon. I've read an account of 42 Commando at Mount Harriet which had them centralising the NVE and providing most of it to the snipers. There was a small element of SF attached during the attack and apparently 42 Commando had some access to their night vision kit.
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Good blow by blow account of night fighting during 3 Para's battle for Mount Longdon, recorded three years after the action, so fresh in the mind of the officers recounting it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-j40X9ouA8
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Thanks, we seem to be finding the same references.
Unless playing 1 to 1, when tracking who does or does not have night vision is feasible, I don't think the distribution was wide enough to make any impact rules wise.
One less thing to consider!
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Possibly apocryphal but infantry night vision was supposedly vulnerable to overload when exposed to bright light (not so the night vision on the Scorpions and Scimitars).
Tactics included British troops not using their NVG initially, using flares to blind/neutralise the Argentine NVG, then assaulting with NVG. The vehicle NVG being used to maintain surveillance on the Argentinians.
Of course it might have been from the Falklands supplement for Command Decision (GDW).
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In theory, a very bright light source could damage the receptors of the first gen scopes and will certainly fuck with your night vision. I was given a Vietnam era Starlight Scope for a patrol on Ex K89 with no other instructions than not to break it and in typical overexagerrated form told that I would go blind if I pointed it at a vehicles headlights, blah, blah, blah. Bright light sources will cause the scope to bloom and you'll get poor image quality as well as degrading your normal night vision.
The bigger problem for those old first gen scopes is that they need a decent bit of ambient light to work in the first place. The moonlight or starlight they rely upon must be visible for them to be worthwhile. Such conditions were not a reliable factor in the Falklands, so to that end para flares would probably have been required to use the early kit.
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Interesting topic.
I was researching the same subject related, principally, to the allocation of such devices to the Argentinian Army. I can confirm very few ones were available..which, as a wargamer aiming to most detailed historical reconstruction , is not so bad cause as i'm building up armies in 1/72 or 20mm, principally plastic conversions, such small and fiddly to scratchbuilt piece of equipment would have been a pain to make in great numbers.
I can contribute, for the Argentinian, whit what i find, trough my sources in Spanish or thanks to Argentinian veterans forums, but, at a glance, comparing what i had collected from Argentinian sources and if the statement from Carlos referring to British forces is reliable :
"The infantry battalions had the IWS in small quantities. Probably enough for 1 or 2 per platoon.", the Bristih forces seems to have been lavishly provided with night vision equipment if compared to the Argentine ones.
what i did found so far:
- Admiral Busser who lead the conquest of the Island during "Operation Rosario" 1st April 1982, had distributed to his troops around 12 night visors some of which had been previously reconverted to be used on FALS and Machineguns . As you can also detect in the famous picture of the surrendering Royal Marines in Port Stanley, the comando anfibio Jacinto Batista who is shepherding them, sports, on his chest (see white circle), a night vision goggles. The model is , probably , the US one coded "AN/PVS-5 de segunda generación" AN/PVS stands for "Army Navy /Portable Visual Search" used BY US Army since 1972
- Major Castagneto, of the Compania Commandos 601, also used a privatly purchased night visor.
- Another SF operator, from the Grupo de Operaciones Especiales, Primero cabo Walter Abal , had his privatly purchased night visor.
- Few ones where allocated to conscript infantry units and, generally , assigned to soldiers on night guard duty
- According to an account from a Marine Infantry sector commander,
"night visors where of 3 types ..head type one from a brand named "Goggles" (i think they mistake the actual name of the device with what they supposed to be was a brand) , the type for the SLR (FAL) from the brand "Litton" and a model to be used with 12, 7 HMG called "Mizza".
The 12,7 HMG Company (Marine Infantry) was allocated :
- 1a Sección; BIM 5 (Marine Inf Battaillon) : 3 night visors for HMGs and 6 head googles
-2a Sección operating in Mt Longdon): 3 visors for HMGs, 5 visors for FALS
and 12 head visors
-3a Sección (attached to Infantry Regiment RI 25): 3 HMG visors, 2 for the FALS and 11 head visors"
The whole infantry Regiment nr. 7: received just a few obsolete ones (3) of the eve of 11 june
According to my extremely detailed Argentinian sources (books ecc) about the Battle of Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso, the commando trained 25 Inf. regiment half company that valliantly fought at there, including the Lt Esteban section/platoon which was the best equipped and trained one (they even used some LAWs captured from the Royal Marines during the conquest of Port Stanley) despite being being heavily engaged in the night defense of Darwin lamented to had not been provided with any night device to see , in time, the coming British paratroopers ; so i suppose that the full garrison of Goose Green had no night visors at all.
According to a book from a veteran belonging to the Pebble Island Marine Inf. garrison that put just a token defence against the SAS succesful raid, the author tells that they had been, without any doubt, observed troughout the fight by an ennemy (SAS soldiers) equipped with night visors.."every movement we made where met with a hail of bullets"
Lt Lautaro Jiménez Corvalan, who defended Mount Harriet with a platoon of B Comp., 4 Inf. reg. and also author of an excellent book that i own (probably the most detailed among Argentinian sources and a must for wargamers with plenty of maps ecc) said that his unit received:
B Company : 2 night visors type "Litton" (head googles) allocated just before the battle. During the night , with one more visor borrowed from another company NCO, he succeeded in executed the counterattack. . In general he can remenber that his maximum allowance of night devices for his unit was 2 visors (head type) among 120 men. which, according to him, was totally inadecuate for night fighting. In short, just one or two officers could enjoy a night visor for observation purposes.
From another source of which i cannot find the author, it seems that:
" in addition to having a larger number of rifle-mounted night vision devices (distributed among the defenders' five rifle companies, most of which were new and operational), the Argentines also had two AN/TVS4 (GEN2) long-range observation sights, which allowed them to spot the British at over 1,200 m in less than ideal conditions (2,000 m in moonlight). Even so, the British managed—using what they had at their disposal as blinding means, such as flares, machine-gun fire, and MILAN missiles—to deny the Argentines' superiority in night vision equipment and take the position".
"If I remember correctly, six 12.7mm Browning M2B heavy machine guns were captured in the fortified positions of R.I.7 (Marine Infantry weapons and crews attached to the conscript inf. units) on Mt. Longdon, all fitted with passive night sights, half a dozen individual sights and 3 FAL-mounted NV sights (with which the Argentinian riflemen were able to fire so accurately that the British thought they were snipers). The Argentinians also had more 2nd generation individual NVGs (AN/PVS4 and PVS5) at their disposal than the British (in the case of the British, these were mostly allocated to special units, while the Argentinians even distributed them among engineer companies)"
A pair of type AN/TVS 4 tripod mounted Argentinian long distance night visors where, effectivly, captured by British troops in Longdon.
In conclusion, according to a post war interview to an egineer captain , it seems that no more that 1 in 100/200 soldiers in Malvinas where provided with night visors and, above all, according to various sources it seems that the only units that received quite a few night visors were the Marine Infantry ones..,it s also seems that those few night visors that where allocated to Army Units came, again , from the Navy stocks.
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So the conclusion appears, Italwars, that both the British and Argentine SF similarly both went out of their way to acquire (privately) the latest NV gear from the US and, despite the untrue rumours that the British forces were universally 'lavishly' equipped with NVG, the devices were thinly spread amongst both forces with only 1 or 2 per company?
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Great info!
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So the conclusion appears, Italwars, that both the British and Argentine SF similarly both went out of their way to acquire (privately) the latest NV gear from the US and, despite the untrue rumours that the British forces were universally 'lavishly' equipped with NVG, the devices were thinly spread amongst both forces with only 1 or 2 per company?
Obviously i cannot claim better knowledge if compared to expert and British wargamers , here in the forum, as concern UK armed forces and military doctrine ..but from what I understand if a British platoon , that’s to say , in wartime , around 25 men , was equipped with about two night vision devices ..plus their SF forces were probably equipped with more than that ..I remenber accounts of Pebble Island and Fanning Head for example ..while the Argentinians , according to the scant infos I collected , enjoyed around 1 night vision per 100/200 men ..the SF that invested Port Stanley , on the 2 of April, had some 12 devices, major CAstaneto from company commandos 601 had one visor that he kindly borrowed to an helicopter pilot while the other SF operator from a unit that never fought had another one ..that s all ..I think that if we compare the numbers involved in the two forces , we can say that the British were “lavishly “ provided with such visors and , as you rightly underlined, they where well trained in night warfare and, in my opinion, they , consequently, carefully planned, in advance , the execution of night offensives ;consequently their land troops (if not all specials at least all elites ) had been equipped accordingly.
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TBH, I think for most purposes NVE played a fairly minor role.
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Thanks Pier, that is an excellent summary of the Argentine forces. :)
I think there could be a good 1 to 1 night patrol skirmish scenario for the 20/28mm guys set in this era using something like the RPGinc "Recon" or Bennet Lacey's incredible "Final Combat" rules as they are designed to incorporate such detail.
I have only researched Pebble Island in any depth but did see anecdotal reference to at least some of the D Squadron SAS guys from the Support Group having Night Vision Equipment. Which coupled with the surprisingly bright moonlight would give their suppressing fire an accuracy the Argentinian garrison could not match.
We actually played through the final version of my 10mm scenario for the raid yesterday, I hope to post it to the Piquet iO group eventually.
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Obviously i cannot claim better knowledge if compared to expert and British wargamers , here in the forum, as concern UK armed forces and military doctrine ..but from what I understand if a British platoon , that’s to say , in wartime , around 25 men , was equipped with about two night vision devices ..plus their SF forces were probably equipped with more than that ..I remenber accounts of Pebble Island and Fanning Head for example ..while the Argentinians , according to the scant infos I collected , enjoyed around 1 night vision per 100/200 men ..the SF that invested Port Stanley , on the 2 of April, had some 12 devices, major CAstaneto from company commandos 601 had one visor that he kindly borrowed to an helicopter pilot while the other SF operator from a unit that never fought had another one ..that s all ..I think that if we compare the numbers involved in the two forces , we can say that the British were “lavishly “ provided with such visors and , as you rightly underlined, they where well trained in night warfare and, in my opinion, they , consequently, carefully planned, in advance , the execution of night offensives ;consequently their land troops (if not all specials at least all elites ) had been equipped accordingly.
No, British forces had nowhere near that amount of NVG in the regulars. It seems to be a tired and untrue cliche that the British were 'lavishly equipped' with NVG (or many other things for that matter) which simply isn't borne out by the facts - both sides had minimal access to early NVG (which appears to have little impact) but the British had a huge advantage in terms of training and combat experience in night fighting. Repeating an oft-repeated untruth will not magically turn it into truth, however hard some might wish it so.
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To be honest, I've never heard of any myth or trope that the British had scads of NVE. Rather the trope has always been that the Argentines had generally better kit.
I'd say that on the whole, that's probably true(ish) they probably did have access to more of the second gen scopes and goggles but neither side had very much of it, at least spread across their infantry battalions.
For their part the British Army focussed on fighting 24/7 and as ever were to prove competent at fighting night engagements. Just as well, there was no other viable option given the terrain advantage offered by the Argentine defences around Stanley.
I doubt the Argentine Army did much in the way of training for night fighting. Their previous main enemy, the civil populace of Argentina, was usually tucked up in bed of a night.
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Rick, indeed, quite amusing to read your slouching reactions…so, probably, thanks also to that , we can gather a further evidence (even from you) that also GB regular forces, not only SF ones, where partially equipped with NV .. …which , in any case, seems obvious, and takes away nothing from their recognized top training , night warfare knowledge and brave behavior to carry out full battalion s an attacks in open terrain
…said that , better equipment such as MILAN missiles, Naval gun fire support, and, contrary to Argentinians, sufficient NV availability where the most important factors to tactically win the battles..I also read a detail, from Argentine sources, that amazed me : the short range airborne Argentine howitzers who supported the first line troops were guided by very few observers belonging to the artillery ..infantry officers were not trained to cooperate with artillery but where just trained to call fire from their battaillon or regiment mortars..and even those artillery men trained for forward observation were few ..not even one for each battery
About what Carlos rightly tell us, concerning the "trope" of supposed Argentine superiority of equipment, the reality seems to confirm that ..with the only exception of boots (of which, in any case, the Argentine infantryman lamented )..The British land forces had , in general, better cloting, double allocation of LMGs, MILAN ATGMs, LAWs (many), light commando type mortars , laser aiming devices (not for rifles), NV ecc..all weapons not even known by Argentine military...even Argentine SF commandos ( coming from no more than 2 months training) had to do with smgs and , worst of that, with rifle grenades to counter M16 and M203 during their clashes with British SF..from accounts that i read the fire power of Argentine forces could not stand that of their ennemies.
Carlos .are nt .we just talking about Falklands/Makvinas war? ..I don’t think that the civil population of Argentina was "their main enemy" also because, if you know something of Latin America, you re probably aware that , in 1982, they totally supported the Malvinas cause (including the Monteneros terrorists who offered and gave help to the Junta) and they still do so up today …so Argentinians have my full sympathy and total respect
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Even in Commonwealth armies, infantry platoon commanders are not the primary callers of supporting artillery, except perhaps where the platoon is detached as a fighting patrol. They are trained to do it as are their NCOs but the primary responsibility usually sits with an attached FO from the battery that is providing the supporting fire. The FO and his sig travel with company headquarters. Similarly an MFC (Mortar Fire Controller), an NCO from the mortar platoon will be attched to each supported company to call and adjust mortar fire.
Nobody is arguing that the British Army didn't have NVE. They did but it's not like every soldier or even JNCO was kitted out with it, more ike one held within the platoon and the quality of that NVE was fairly indifferent, especially in the climactic conditions encountered. Most of the accounts I have read are peppered with descriptions of aiming at enemy muzzle flashes, which is pretty much the norm.
Your knowledge of Latin America seems somewhat er... limited old boy. There wasn't some sort of monolithic bloc of support at a popular level. Most of the Spanish speaking proffered words of support, Peru even provided some material support, most of which had no impact during the war itself. For most folk as elsewhere life went on, there were bigger issues in the 1980s. Chile meanwhile was pretty much cheering on the British, not much love lost there vis a vis Argentina and its well known that they provided material support to British intelligence gathering.
Brazil leased a pair of Bandeirante patrol aircraft to Argentina and the ditadura made some vaguely soothing noises about continental solidarity. That was it. They also hosted the diverted Black Buck 6 Vulcan crew on most hospitable terms. Brazil makes up over 50% of the population of South America. For various reasons, historical and linguistic, Brazil tends to be fairly insular. The average Brazilian gives less than a flying fuck about Argentina or most of its other neighbours for that matter. About the only time argentinos rate a mention is around the topic of football or as the butt of a joke.
By 1982, the very worst of the Junta's war on its own people was on the wane but the reality was that it was still a repressive, fascistic regime, still given to murdering and torturing its citizens. It basically launched the war to take the attention off an imploding economy. That proved to be a pretty short term success, about the lifespan of a lettuce, to use the modern metric. Argentina's combat experience before that was wholly centered on repressing internal dissent both real and imagined. They hadn't fought a war since The War of the Triple Aliance, if you leave out their genocidal campaigns on the pampas against their indigenous population or their involvement in various coups and failed coups.
By the by, when using terms like Montoneros, it pays to have a little knowledge of what such an all encompassing term suggests. Not unlike the Peronistas, who have both left and right wings and thosse were sharply divided in the 1970s to the point of lethal violence, the Montoneros had a similarly sharp internal ideological divide. Some of their supposed members had their political antecedents in fascist/ falangist parties and quite frankly, it's hard to characterise a group whose one near constant core belief was Catholic nationalism as being essentially leftist. A few of their number were almost certainly stooges and provacateurs under the NRP. Argentine politics is a very murky pond my friend. It probably makes sense for upwards of an hour after any political act or statement is made.
There's a joke that Brazilians like to make about themselves. 'O Brasil é o país do futuro e sempre será' (Brazil, the country of the future and it always will be). It's doubly or triply true of Argentina.
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I was talking about full support of Argentinian population to the cause..including from the leftist union representatives, leftist intellectuals and montoneros...you can even read , as you probably speak Spanish better than me, negative comments from former Montoneros/leftist terrorists or corrupted leftist kirtchneristas that recently critisized President Milei defeatist stance as concern Malvinas cause..and for once i cannot avoid to side with the left :-)))
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There is no doubt that the Argentine invasion was widely welcomed by the broader Argentine population, quite correct. I suspect we are of a similar vintage so I'm sure you recall the footage of the ectastic crowds in the Plaza de Republica and outside the Casa Rosada. Life was pretty dire in Argentina so the long held goal* of possessing the Malvinas was met with near universal acclaim. At last the military were doing something for the nation. Of course when it proved that the military wasn't even particularly good at its core business, all that positive energy rebounded.
Even here though I do need to provide a caveat. Unions in much of mid to late 20th C Latin America fell into two broad camps. There were officially sanctioned labour unions, often merely organs of the state. Some of these existed before the then current dictatorships. In both Brazil and Argentina there were co-opted labour unions associated with the Vargas and first Peron regimes respectively. Both leaders were essentially populist right wingers. Most of the genuinely leftist union leaders were in prison, on the run or disappeared. I have friends and colleagues who lived through that. Oddly enough there are the occasional vestigal rumps to be found of the official unions still in existence, so sometimes it's wise to mind your P's & Q's when calling someone comrade. ;)
If you ever feel like travelling down the rabbit hole of South American labour relations, have a look at the very unhealthy relationship that companies like Ford and Volkswagen entered into with the military regimes. They supplied lists of 'leftists', the military arrested union 'troublemakers' and then Ford and VW sold their vehicles on to the regimes at attractive rates having forestalled any labour unrest. The Ford Falcon, typically painted green, became the official vehicle of the death squads in Argentina.
I've travelled to Argentina on a number of occasions and to be honest, at least among younger folk I've detected no real enthusiasm for another military attempt on the Falklands. They'd accept it if it was offered on a plate but the more intelligent types realise it's just a distraction that's dragged out every time there's another economic crisis.
* In reality the claim that lays any real hold on the Argentine popular imagination dates back to the 1940s.
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As usual very interesting informations from Carlos
I just do not, totally, agree with the idea that the invasion of Falklands Islands and, in general, the Falklands/Malvinas cause was just a last resort way from the Junta to distract people from economic crisis and, in general, from the internal political situation.
Probably you ve, also read about the fate of some menbers (leftist peronistas) that attempted the "Operativo Condor"; That so called hijacking over Stanley Airport, which took place in 1966, was the first attempt to show attention over Malvinas cause and it was carried out by people from a totally different political side, during a totally different period and, subsequently, they even where persecuted by the Junta during the Seventies?
Anyway i agree with all the rest you wrote.
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A wargaming friend, who served on the intelligence staff of 5 Bde HQ is adamant that there was very little kit available and they certainly didn't have any at 5 Bde HQ. He's very much of the impression that the Argentines had far more. His abiding memory is of enormous amounts of illum rounds being fired by the artillery during night attacks, which would seem to be fairly pointless if the British forces were replete with night vision kit.
Another two wargaming mates, who served with 42 RM Cdo tell me that they ate a lot of carrots on the way down... Aside from that, they had very little; maybe one IWS per Troop, which was regarded as a very heavy waste of time and was only good to around 50 yards. They were quickly binned after landing, primarily as it 'prevented bayonet-fighting and effective trench-clearance' (!). Their MILAN also had no night-vision capability and they didn't even see a set of NVGs until 1987.
The difference was constant and intensive training to fight at night and effective leadership and respect at all levels.
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My own theory is the coffee. Between the late 19th century and the 1960s, millions of Italians emigrated to the US, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Australia. There are so many people of Italian descent in Argentina it's easy to think of the country as Italy on an extended holiday, save for the food and drink.
Sadly, and to the everlasting shame of all Italians who take pride in their traditions, the only ones who understood how to make a cup of coffee all seem to have emigrated to Australia. Italian coffee culture is supremely well established in Australia. In Argentina and the US you get offered something brown, watery and invariably foul tasting if you order coffee.
In Australia, Starbucks failed as business because there was an abundance of better coffee available and an established culture of coffee drinking almost wholly due to post war Italian migrants. In the US they needed to invent something like Starbucks because even their dire offerings best what else is on offer. In Melbourne even in the most humble abode of folk who emigrated as Calabrian peasants, you'll find a macchinetta and someone who knows how to use it. In Argentina, not so much. It's why they all drink fucking mate (something they share with the dickheads in the south of Brazil).
Now someone who can't understand the vital essence of making a decent brew at the drop of a hat, be that tea or coffee will never grasp the essentials of soldiering. :D
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My own theory is the coffee. Between the late 19th century and the 1960s, millions of Italians emigrated to the US, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Australia. There are so many people of Italian descent in Argentina it's easy to think of the country as Italy on an extended holiday, save for the food and drink.
Sadly, and to the everlasting shame of all Italians who take pride in their traditions, the only ones who understood how to make a cup of coffee all seem to have emigrated to Australia. Italian coffee culture is supremely well established in Australia. In Argentina and the US you get offered something brown, watery and invariably foul tasting if you order coffee.
In Australia, Starbucks failed as business because there was an abundance of better coffee available and an established culture of coffee drinking almost wholly due to post war Italian migrants. In the US they needed to invent something like Starbucks because even their dire offerings best what else is on offer. In Melbourne even in the most humble abode of folk who emigrated as Calabrian peasants, you'll find a macchinetta and someone who knows how to use it. In Argentina, not so much. It's why they all drink fucking mate (something they share with the dickheads in the south of Brazil).
Now someone who can't understand the vital essence of making a decent brew at the drop of a hat, be that tea or coffee will never grasp the essentials of soldiering. :D
Then how do you explain compo coffee...? :-X
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I try not to, although I always understood ration pack coffee to be the floor sweepings of Maxwell House. Most thrifty.
There were more troubling things to contemplate in ration packs anyway, like the 'will not dissolve even under nuclear fission' mashed potato/wallpaper mix. Turned out the equally baffling tube of grease known as 'butter concentrate', usually ditched upon issue, was the vital emulsifying ingredient.
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As Italian and from the South , where coffee time is something to be taken very seriously , and to be honest, i must say that when I travelled abroad ..the worst ever coffee i was treated with was in France ..really something comparable to dirty water..even their caffé au lait is something better to avoid
on the other hand i was absolutely amazed that I was treated with acceptable and even absolutly good coffee in UK and with very good cappuccino which is even more difficult to prepare properly.
I agree that their horrible mate drink is something shocking ..probably worst than their invasion of Falklands , right wing ideology ecc .. :)
Argentinians , after the war, were enraged to see a picture , from the British press, of an Argentinian soldier drinking hot “mate”from his traditional “ bombilla “ (metal straw) and gourd , cause the original caption , probably from the sun or other similar media , once translated in Spanish , said “ Miserable soldado argentino muere de frío tomando agua de un coco”. ..in practice depicting the average Argentinian soldier as a stereotyped Indio who could nt afford to separate himself , even in the antartic , from his exotic, tropical favored coconut …I suppose you may agree with the fact that was certainly not the best way from the British to make new friends lol
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I try not to, although I always understood ration pack coffee to be the floor sweepings of Maxwell House. Most thrifty.
There were more troubling things to contemplate in ration packs anyway, like the 'will not dissolve even under nuclear fission' mashed potato/wallpaper mix. Turned out the equally baffling tube of grease known as 'butter concentrate', usually ditched upon issue, was the vital emulsifying ingredient.
Cue the Cabury Emwsh robots....