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Miniatures Adventure => Age of Myths, Gods and Empires => Topic started by: brasidas19004 on May 27, 2025, 05:21:19 PM
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I've been thinking about pre-gunpowder ancient and medieval "generals" [in quotes, b/c many of them were heads of state and / or had other roles]. Came up indirectly in a lively blog we all know.
If we are being strictly historical, in "large battles" of the ancient world, what did generals do, consistently?
-- for those that are famously skillful, what did *they* do that others failed to do?
---- these are likely actions that turned battles in their favor against their opponents.
If we are playing an historical game, or designing one:
- what are the "musts" for generals to be able to do in game terms?
- what are the abilities for "great" generals to be able to do in game terms?
Appreciate your thoughts.
It seems like generally, there are two schools of thought on history and in game design:
1) "Operational General" Generals should prepare the army before battle, deploy well, then go fight in a unit.
2) "Great General" Generals should be heavily involved in command decisions, maneuver, etc throughout the battle managing every situation possible to achieve a stunning victory.
Overall, I'm inclined to say it is more in-between.
For example, DBA uses the general as an enhancement to combat power: his unit gets a +1.
The general also makes it easier to move units.
If lost, the general is an additional penalty.
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Many of the attributes/decisions of the great generals are removed from them by the nature of gaming. Where to fight, when to fight, and maintaining army moral outside of combat are not factors in games. Pre-battle decisions such as deployment and choice of first target are given to the player.
This leaves:
- Movement of units: in games with a command and control system, a great general will be able to easily move units. Either their own, or whole army components. Alexander is famous for his surgical strikes with cavalry. Many other battles have examples of units moving from one wing to another to take advantage/fix a situation.
- Fighting Prowess: generals often have a picked unit with them, giving them a strong battle field impact. This could be Companions, Huscarls, or other veteran & well equipped units.
- Leadership and Moral: armies stay motivated to fight because of the general. This could be Hannibal holding the line at Cannae or William showing his face at Hastings.
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Perhaps an alternative question could be: what could they do? Could they do anything at all? Battles could be fairly large, although not all. Being able to do something first of all means being able to see it. And then, given the absence of mobile phones, somebody, which could be the great man himself, needed to get up there and tell them… and one man can’t be everywhere at the same time. Yes, there were aides and the likes, but mostly not something like a proper staff.
In all honesty, I think the real generals more often than not weren’t able to do much. Take one of the greatest at his greatest battle: Alexander at Gaugamela. What did he really do during the battle?
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As others have said, most generalship in ancient battles happened before the battle. Moving and supplying the army, appointing good subcommanders, training the troops, outthinking the enemy, fighting on ground of your own choosing, setting up ambushes.
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Perhaps an alternative question could be: what could they do? Could they do anything at all?
In all honesty, I think the real generals more often than not weren’t able to do much.
Take one of the greatest at his greatest battle: Alexander at Gaugamela. What did he really do during the battle?
Fair question.
One source I'm using is Goldsworthy's "The Roman Army at War". He quotes [many] primary sources that state the general had things to do in a battle, should do them, and cites historical examples of generals doing them.
Next, I have to get to my copy of Sabin's "Lost Battles" as he has a chapter on Command. Since he's using the 30-ish best documented battles of the ancient world, it's a likely source of "could, should, did" as well.
So, I don't think the history supports the "generals weren't able to do much" theory. If they did 2-3 things that turned the tide of the battle, that's 2-3 things a wargamer should be able to do.
How the mechanics work is another question entirely.
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Not really my area of history but my understanding is that the biggest decision a general made throughout the time period was to be willing to fight at all. This because it was 'easy enough' to choose not to fight and just march away from battle. Took two commanders both willing to fight for a battle to happen.
After that, it is how the commander of the army arrayed his forces and utilized any advantages of terrain.
Beyond that, I don't think commanders yielded a lot of influence though perhaps committing any reserve if one existed might have a large impact.
Once 'swords were crossed', not much influence at all - down to the spirit and willingness of the men.
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So, I don't think the history supports the "generals weren't able to do much" theory. If they did 2-3 things that turned the tide of the battle, that's 2-3 things a wargamer should be able to do.
How the mechanics work is another question entirely.
Methinks we may be suggesting the same thing, but from a different angle… glass halve full versus halve empty sort of thing.
Indeed if a general does the few things that need to be done… and that turns the battle… of course, that’s not nothing. And rules should allow for it. But is it much? In terms of effect, absolutely! And I think Gaugamela is again a good example. Alexander may, from my humble point of view, not have done much, but the few things he did gave him victory… and ever lasting fame… and many a miniature painting and wargaming enthusiasts having collected him…
Nevertheless, when I compare it to the typical to-do list of a general in most rules than I do think to see a large gap… indeed mechanics is an entirely different question, but also in interesting one.
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I've always assumed the reason the general's unit gets that bonus in a fight is not due to the general's fighting prowess (the blind king of Bohemia, despite his willingness and ardour, was unlikely to be the most formidable opponent in a 1-on-1 fight) but due to the fact that he was likely surrounded by a loyal bodyguard - they are really the ones providing that +1.
As for the general's purpose? I suspect that once battle was joined then his role was limited. The strength of the general was in the pre-battle preparation - planning, deployment, ruses, and that sort of thing. Simple lack of efficient communications would make it impractical for the ancient general to react in any timely manner. That said, there are accounts of generals entering the fray (again, once you commit yourself to joining in hand-to-hand combat, then your ability to command troops on the field becomes non-existent) and making a difference, probably by inspiring troops in the area local to his presence.
But, overall, once battle commences, my suspicions are that the role of the general in ancient and medieval warfare was probably very limited beyond the immediate location he found himself in.
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Not really my area of history but my understanding is that the biggest decision a general made throughout the time period was to be willing to fight at all. This because it was 'easy enough' to choose not to fight and just march away from battle. Took two commanders both willing to fight for a battle to happen.
After that, it is how the commander of the army arrayed his forces and utilized any advantages of terrain.
Beyond that, I don't think commanders yielded a lot of influence though perhaps committing any reserve if one existed might have a large impact.
Once 'swords were crossed', not much influence at all - down to the spirit and willingness of the men.
Interestingly, Goldsworthy not only disagrees with that, but provides loads of historical data about it. He indicates that being "near the fighting but not fighting" was crucial to the generals success, as they supported their men with their presence, committed reserves as needed, and rallied troops. So his findings are in complete opposition to this. I intend to read Sabin's "Lost Battles" section on commanders next, and see what his conclusions are.
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Nice essay on what generals might do: https://acoup.blog/2022/06/03/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-ii-commands/
Essentially they could send messengers to tell unit commanders (of cohorts etc) to do stuff and hopefully the messengers got through and the right stuff happened.
It mentions that some battles can be over in an hour or so so orders which take several minutes to arrive and then get carried out may not be as effective as you'd want.
So in game where an order gets ignored by a unit, you could see it as a result of the lack of preparation by the general in not having a good messenger system - ie the order never arrives for whatever reason rather than the unit simply refuses to move.
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Many of the attributes/decisions of the great generals are removed from them by the nature of gaming. Where to fight, when to fight, and maintaining army moral outside of combat are not factors in games. Pre-battle decisions such as deployment and choice of first target are given to the player.
This. Most of the ways a general would swing the outcome of the battle happen before the actual fighting gets underway. Accounts often describe generals inspiring or rallying the troops, so in gaming terms I'd have the general grant bonuses to units within a certain radius- precisely what those bonuses entail would depend on the gaming system and scenario.
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I am a great fan how Hail Caesar and the other Warlord systems handle it:
-the general gives orders the troops follow. It is an abstraction of all the morale, leadership, organization and going into the war with a good plan properly explained. And only really elite units are able to operate to some degree without clear orders. (Being able to do so is a big bonus)
-the general also gives a bonus to one unit he joins to: as previously mentioned, this is not just a boost of morale but also the effect of the retinue. But the morale effect is real, Caesar letting his horse go was really appreciated by his soldiers for example (as a mark of not running away, at least not faster than the soldiers.)
Another effect of the good general is that in the ancient times they also were politicans convincing potential allies to their cause, so the amount of auxiliaries also depends on the general.
To simulate the out-of-battle effects in a system like Hail Caesar, you could simply roll a couple of leadership tests and give random bonuses/maluses for some units based on the outcome. Representing bad morale, no supplies, etc.
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There is a reason why the military symbolism of the classical era appealed so much to Renaissance Europe and Enlightenment France. Augustan Rome was probably the ideal but Sparta and Darian Persia were also studied as far as sources allowed. It's a matter of blood. The classical general assumed responsibility, sometimes at forfeit of life, for the success or failure of the campaign his he was contemplating. So what he did is give his government a lamb to be thrown to the wolves if it went tits up.
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On the battlefield, the most important thing a commander did was setup his battle line and decide who comprised the reserves, then decide when and where to commit those reserves and give the command. Coupe l’oiel.
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Great question so here's my 1 rupee comment.
Its a game that bears 0-1& of what warfare is. It may look similar but there is zero er ''feeling'' so give this a thought.
1.A unit in combat that needs to be ''ordered'' to do something has much less chance of doing what YOU the commander wants them to do.
2 A reserve has much more chance to be ordered as its no where near the enemy and can will hear the order clearly.
so with command points this can happen
The first unit (1 Above) will need more command points to move. The unit (2) in reserve will need a lot less command points to move.
So lets put this in perspective with said command points needing a unit to move .
In contact 5CP, ''Near'' the enemy 3 CP , Far from the enemy 1CP
Some mods
General is higher up in view of friendly unit -2 CP
This is very basic but a generl on a hill can command better and a unit out of combat is easier to command.
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Yes, a few of the commentators note that a wise place for a general is a place where the battle can be seen, but close enough that a reasonably quick OODA loop can be executed, whether a repositioning or commitment of reserves.
I have often thought wargames make it too easy to maneuver troops in contact with the enemy. Especially in firepower eras, the noise is deafening.
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Yes, a few of the commentators note that a wise place for a general is a place where the battle can be seen, but close enough that a reasonably quick OODA loop can be executed, whether a repositioning or commitment of reserves.
I have often thought wargames make it too easy to maneuver troops in contact with the enemy. Especially in firepower eras, the noise is deafening.
I fully agree with this. Observing and Orienting, the two O’s, in such an environment is way different than the “helicopter” view we wargamers have… Then there is the D and hierarchy, intellect, the man’s experience of actual battle, paralysis is just around the corner for him… and finally Acting… they’d need to physically get over there… When one adds up the time this might take… those brave men of old may well have been too late over and over again…
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Well you would think, wouldn't you?
The classical Greek hoplite-era general was the commander of one of the phalanxes - as such, once he'd issued his orders and taken his place in the phalanx, his view and ability to influence the overall battle was limited. Later on in the period, some bright spark must've realised that if he sat back behind the battle line he could direct the battle a lot better.
And this is the problem - a general that stays back can direct his troops and reserves more effectively (think of Wellington), whilst a 'fighting' general that gets stuck in loses that capability.
Gaugemela is an interesting case study - Alexander was a superb cavalry 'fighting' general but his genius was in setting up a battle and in delegating to superb sub-generals who would control each section of the battle, leaving him free to do his trademark surgical strike. Phillip was similarly gifted, but an Infantry general more than anything - although both he and Alexander knew how to field a combined arms army well.
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In the LBA (Late Bronze Age), it appears from the Hittite archive that at least one Hittite general was killed in combat against Ahhiyawa and one Ahhiyawan general was killed as well in the same battle. It's hard to know what is meant by 'general' in this context. My guess is that in wargame rules, they would be termed 'heroes' or warband leaders.
In the Hittite context, 'generals' were appointed by the king and was something like a chief of staff. The King was the head of the military and would campaign; however, generals would command wings (chariot forces) and infantry (mostly in the center).
It's an interesting question, especially in the LBA and early Iron Age - we know so little about the era, regardless of the Hittite archives, that it's hard to say exactly what 'generals' did.
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I'd recommend a read of "Mask of Command" by John Keegan ... will definitely provide some food for thought :)
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I'd recommend a read of "Mask of Command" by John Keegan ... will definitely provide some food for thought :)
Great book. I also would add on the Price of Admiralty for you Naval enthusiasts.
A lot of the General's job has to do with before the battle and after the battle and focus a lot on logistics and getting troops paid for morale reasons.
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I suspect that one thing we are consistently getting wrong is that, Macedonian phalanxes aside, most battle lines were probably much more 'open' than the close-order rectangles we wargamers love. Read Hans Van Week' book about phalanx warfare and any of the more up-to-date theories on the Republican Roman army and its enemies, and suddenly the tales of Generals (or their sub-generals or equivalents) moving about the battlefield, commanding reserves, and engaging in heroic acts, etc, seem rather more plausible.
Personally I think that any wargame rules that just allows troops to move as you like or manoeuvre in fancy ways with little penalty as if the general is a 'god' have it very wrong - it's VERY hard to get even well-drilled and practised soldiers to move in tight formations and maintain full coherency. Look how much they have to practise for Trooping the Colour etc then imagine doing that on the battlefield under stress! Reacting to surprise threats such as flank attacks, etc, would be very difficult and manoeuvring onto flanks to deliver such a charge would be even harder.
I therefore agree with the points made about a General's role pre and post-battle. Deployment was a key role - get that wrong and the army would be in trouble from the off. Once combat was joined (whatever that actually looked like) and ebbing and flowing along the battle line, I can well imagine him riding around behind the main lines (again, whatever that actually looked like) encouraging the men, being visible by his presence, rallying tired men and exhorting them to greater things, etc, with his subordinates doing the same. I can also imagine that in heroic societies and their warfare, he'd be expected to lead by example in the battle line. Just look how many kings died in battle in Britain in the 7th century - I think from memory it's at least seven! So, part of the question must surely also focus on the style of warfare being practised, the size of the forces involved and the expectation of the society and its warfare norms, as these will all have impacted massively on the leader's role and his actions during battle.
It's a fascinating debate and we'll never actually 'know'. All we can hope for are sets of rules that align with our own beliefs and ideas about it all.
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It's a fascinating debate and we'll never actually 'know'. All we can hope for are sets of rules that align with our own beliefs and ideas about it all.
An excellent post. Thanks for sharing some of the more modern scholarship on how things likely worked in ancient battles.