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Miniatures Adventure => Colonial Adventures => Topic started by: former user on 04 May 2014, 06:45:06 PM
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found this one on Youtube
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ryWkDAo7CNA
I would agree that it visualises the argumentation in a bit of a simplistic way, but the points are made, and, hey,
it's Ian Knight narrating
enjoy
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Any chance you could summarise? I don't really have 48mins to spare.
The Mike Snooks book 'How Can man Die Better', that I read recently, was probably the most enlightening book I've read on Isandlwana ... and I've read a few. He uses an exhaustive time and motion study, pieced together from survivor accounts (from both sides) and standard military doctrines and tactics of the day.
It paints the battle in a very different light and argues that, far from fleeing a lost battle, nearly all the non-Zulu Isandlwana survivors actually legged it while the result was still in doubt (much earlier than most of them claimed) and the actual fighting continued for some time afterwards. He doesn't judge them too harshly, because these were mostly volunteers, non-regulars and men with families to protect in Natal, but he does quite clearly draw a line between them (and the decisions they were likely to make) and the hardened veteran regulars.
Is this similar to what the programme discusses?
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Was this the doco where they found lots of bent screws from ammo boxes with metal detectors and showed that you could open one with a rap from the butt of a rifle - not the difficult task requiring a special spanner or screwdriver?
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Is this similar to what the programme discusses?
no, not actually
the result is not disputed, but actually how it happened.
it is a puzzle of circumstantial evidence, from what damage Martini Henrys cause versus Zulu weapons, cartridges found way in front of the assumed firing line, dispelling the myth of the unissued ammo, psychological and neurotoxicological analysis of Zulu preparations and battle medicine, etc.
basically historical source criticism and reevaluation, but in a highly instructive manner.
You can listen to it while painting, because the visuals are not that captivating ;)
Was this the doco where they found lots of bent screws from ammo boxes with metal detectors and showed that you could open one with a rap from the butt of a rifle - not the difficult task requiring a special spanner or screwdriver?
yes, that one
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Cool!
Many thanks!
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Ah, thanks. Sounds like more of a 'mythbuster' for the casual enthusiast than anything new as such.
And no, the result is not in doubt, I'm not sure where that came from!
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IIRC, the docu refuted the traditional view that the battle was lost because the commissary wallahs muffed up ammo distribution. Instead, it suggested that the real plonker was inappropriate British tactics which relied on a dispersed skirmish line to drive back the Zulus. As it happened, the Zulus didn't easily lose heart and the British skirmish lines were too dispersed to deliver the volume of fire necessary to either break the Zulu's morale or annihilate their charge. So the Zulus closed to hand-to-hand where their numerical advantage and better cut and thrust weapons made short work of Tommy.
I found it very convincing. Thereafter, the British reverted to Napoleonic close-order firepower to break native charges, be they Zulu or Fuzzy-wuzzy. Extended skirmish lines probably worked very well on the NW Frontier, but in Africa they were suicidal.
And blaming anyone but your own officers - i.e. in this case, the ammo wallahs - is politically pretty handy.
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Extended skirmish lines probably worked very well on the NW Frontier, but in Africa they were suicidal.
And yet at Gingindlovu they won the battle.
It's a complex issue and I've been studying the battle for decades now. Our ideas of the 'truth' about the battle are so deeply ingrained it is really hard to shake off the hindsight and look at things from the point of view of the officers on the ground and the information they had at their disposal. The skirmish line was an absolute killer that was able to inflict serious casualties from 400yds, allowing every member of the company to take aimed shots and put down their man. No skirmish line was overrun that day from the front.
Personally, I think that Chelmsford made so many serious errors from day one, by the time the battle started, the British camp at Isandlwana was doomed. From then on, it was just a case of how long they could hold out.
Had they rallied into a square around the ammo, they'd have held out longer perhaps, but without the wagons in laager it would just have been a matter of time. Don't forget that in square, you drastically reduce the amount of rifles that can be brought to bear in any single direction, thus negating the main advantage of a British infantryman behind a Martini Henry. The Zulus had an awful lot of firearms as well and even a rusty, obsolete musket will kill at close range, especially a huddled group of men you can't miss.
Anyhoo, it's all speculation - mine, yours, everyone else's. Luckily it's one of those discussions that can't be proved wrong or right, so it's good for flapping the gums.
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It's a fascinating example of Victorian reporting as much as anything, with mis-information starting almost the day after the battle as the 'survivors' accounts were tailored to deflect criticism of those who left the battle long before the final hours. A heady mix of face-saving, blame deflection and detailed 'accounts' of events written by people who weren't there to see what they were describing all produced within days.
Mike's book is by far my favourite attempt to make sense of the mess and was written with the benefit of significant time and study on the battlefield itself.
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And yet at Gingindlovu they won the battle.
It's a complex issue and I've been studying the battle for decades now. Our ideas of the 'truth' about the battle are so deeply ingrained it is really hard to shake off the hindsight and look at things from the point of view of the officers on the ground and the information they had at their disposal. The skirmish line was an absolute killer that was able to inflict serious casualties from 400yds, allowing every member of the company to take aimed shots and put down their man. No skirmish line was overrun that day from the front.
Personally, I think that Chelmsford made so many serious errors from day one, by the time the battle started, the British camp at Isandlwana was doomed. From then on, it was just a case of how long they could hold out.
Had they rallied into a square around the ammo, they'd have held out longer perhaps, but without the wagons in laager it would just have been a matter of time. Don't forget that in square, you drastically reduce the amount of rifles that can be brought to bear in any single direction, thus negating the main advantage of a British infantryman behind a Martini Henry. The Zulus had an awful lot of firearms as well and even a rusty, obsolete musket will kill at close range, especially a huddled group of men you can't miss.
Anyhoo, it's all speculation - mine, yours, everyone else's. Luckily it's one of those discussions that can't be proved wrong or right, so it's good for flapping the gums.
Interested to read your point of view. I must admit my own info was restricted to listening to the program and reading "Washing of the Spears" decades ago.
In your opinion, what was the major cause of the defeat?
With the skirmish line, wouldn't a lot depend on just HOW extended it was and also upon whether there was any dead ground in front where the Zulus could mass?
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Interested to read your point of view. I must admit my own info was restricted to listening to the program and reading "Washing of the Spears" decades ago.
In your opinion, what was the major cause of the defeat?
With the skirmish line, wouldn't a lot depend on just HOW extended it was and also upon whether there was any dead ground in front where the Zulus could mass?
Proviso: All this is my own opinion, and I understand there are many diverse opinions regarding the battles of the Anglo-Zulu War.
If you want to know what went wrong for the British at Isandlwana (and to a lesser extent other battles and skirmishes of the first invasion), you just have to look at how their behaviour changed during the second invasion: 1) they instituted meticulous scouting and 2) and they laagered every night, with no exceptions.
Interestingly, local historians have pointed out the Chelmsford received three pieces of advice from the leaders of the Transvaal Boers (who were well-versed in fighting Zulus, unlike Chelmsford whose only local experience was of fighting Xhosa): 1) Laager whenever you camp; 2) The Zulus will use decoy fires to divert your attention; and 3) The Zulus will use decoy cattle herds to divert your attention. For whatever reasons, he didnt heed this advice at Isandlwana. Rather, he seemed to actively ignore it. If his entire force had been in camp, even in hasty defences, there would likely have been a very different outcome.
And while its clear Chelmsford made errors, what is also clear is that nTshingwayo must be given credit for 1) successfully diverting a healthy percentage of the available British force away from the camp, and 2) managing to get a huge army within striking force of the camp without the British being aware of it.
The blow by blow (as much as we know of it) is fascinating, but really of little consequence. The big picture had already determined the outcome.
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Interested to read your point of view. I must admit my own info was restricted to listening to the program and reading "Washing of the Spears" decades ago.
In your opinion, what was the major cause of the defeat?
With the skirmish line, wouldn't a lot depend on just HOW extended it was and also upon whether there was any dead ground in front where the Zulus could mass?
I think 'The Washing of the Spears' was a great piece of work in its time and helped to generate a lot of interest in the subject. However, Mr Morris has also been found out somewhat since then and it is clear his facts were patchy at best and in a lot of instances he seemed to have made stuff up!
In my own opinion I think what lay all the important groundwork for the defeat was -
1) Chelmsford's decision to completely bollox up his own command structure by taking de facto command of the column and leaving a lot of officers floating, unsure of their exact responsibilities. This splapdash staff work also extended to the written orders to Durnford regarding reinforcement of the camp and the question mark over whether he (as senior officer) then had command or whether Pulleine (as the 24th's acting commanding officer) did. Chelmsford had a habit of making rash, sudden decisions and then changing his mind. A more solid command structure or a less overbearing GOC might have allowed for some good advice to prevent the balls-up.
2) Chelmsford's decision to camp at Isandlwana. It was not a great camp site and quite why it was chosen is a mystery. It did not have great access to water, it did not have good fields of fire all round (the 'mountain' is in fact just a distinctive hill and blocked sight whilst being easy to climb), it was not condusive to Chelmsford's own standing orders of digging defences (ground was too hard). The site was well known, since people had been travelling in Zululand for decades, so exactly what was the purpose in camping there?
3) Chelmsford's decision to split his forces. He took half the defenders away on a wild goose chase, on the back of some sketchy reports of Zulu movements. It seems that having made the decision to do so, he then ignored all (admittedly also sketchy) reports that the main body of the Zulu Army was not in fact in front of him, but had circled past him and was heading towards the camp. Sadly everything I have read of him seems to reinforce the impression that he was one of those officers who felt it was more important to seem decisive than to take the time to make sure he was right. It is one of the prime military tenets that you do not split your forces, certainly not when you know neither the strength nor the location of the enemy. At best it was risky, at worst it was moronic, arrogant and unforgiveable.
From that point on, I don't really think there was much else that could have been done. A defeat was pretty much inevitable.
I agree with Sirius that we often disregard the Zulus. They played Chelmsford like a cheap violin and utilised the traditional Zulu strengths of concealment, swift movement and envelopment perfectly. They were wonderful tricksters and experts at fooling their enemy into doing what they wanted. Speed, misdirection, aggression ... classic.
Even so, in winning their greatest ever battle, and inflicting on the British their greatest ever colonial defeat, they also suffered devastating casualties that crippled them. Figures are hard to come by, but around 3,000 apppear to have been killed outright or mortally wounded, with many more sustaining serious injury. For a combined national military force totalling 40,000, this was a massive blow and Ceteswayo himself described it as a 'spear in the belly of the nation'.
I also agree that the skirmish lines were too far extended from the camp; this was a direct result of the fudged command and the fact that Pulleine appears to have been trying to support Durnford's men, who were way too far advanced. I think Durnford should have stayed in camp and used the superior movement of his mounted troops to keep tabs on the enemy without engaging. But it seems his own thirst for glory blinded him to his orders of 'reinforcing the camp'.
However, the advanced skirmish line was also an aggressive response to what appeared to be a few thousand Zulus hidden in the dead ground to their front. The skirmish line allowed fire to be poured in from a broad front, so an 80 man company could check an enemy many times its own size, which is what they managed to do for the first part of the battle. Sadly there were just too many, and even with that broad frontage, the Zulu wings were still able to outflank them. No-one knew at this stage they were facing the entire 20,000 strong army and, as you say, the hidden ground allowed the Zulus to manoeuvre unimpeded. By the time the real situation became apparent, it was all too late. When the irregular troops ran out of ammo and had to withdraw (they cannot have been expected to exercise the same fire discipline as the veterans of the 24th), the regulars had no time or chance to pull back in good order and organise a second defence on the camp.
That's my take on it.
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how would the aspects of gunpowder smoke and solar eclipse do come into play?
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how would the aspects of gunpowder smoke and solar eclipse do come into play?
I've never read anything that suggests they had any material effect one way or the other.
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asking 'cause Ian Knight brings this up on the documentary
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2) Chelmsford's decision to camp at Isandlwana. It was not a great camp site and quite why it was chosen is a mystery. It did not have great access to water, it did not have good fields of fire all round (the 'mountain' is in fact just a distinctive hill and blocked sight whilst being easy to climb), it was not condusive to Chelmsford's own standing orders of digging defences (ground was too hard). The site was well known, since people had been travelling in Zululand for decades, so exactly what was the purpose in camping there?
Absolutely agreed. A ready supply of firewood is one argument. The same coppices of trees obscured much of the left flank!
I have had the privilege of walking the battlesite a few times over the years, and once with a very well-studied local historian. Once you have gotten over the vast area covered with burial cairns (it really is a sombre site) the next thing that strikes you is how poor a defensive position it is. You can see nothing towards the Inzinyathi river on the right flank (assuming your back is to the hill) due to the broken ground and scrub, and nothing beyond the ridge of hills to the left. The nek and the hill itself obscures the rear, and short of the area directly in front of the camp stretching to the conical hill, there are no fields of fire. Even these were broken, with plenty of dead ground and dongas for any attacking force to exploit. Also note that it was a very wet summer, so the grass was probably long (as much as 2-3 feet tall if no cattle had grazed there), so easy for a target to "disappear".
@ Cubs: The mounted Irregular troops (who were pivotal in the battle) were only issued 70 rounds (like regular mounted infantry) and conducted a fighting retreat from the conical hill to the dongas in front of the camp. Thats a long way. A kilometer or two by my reckoning. Even with good fire discipline, they were doomed to run short of ammo.
how would the aspects of gunpowder smoke and solar eclipse do come into play?
Knight seems very fond of the Eclipse/Black Sun theory, but the historian I mentioned above dismissed it out of hand, suggesting if it occurred at all it was later in the day, after the battle had occurred. The records are unclear.
Gunpowder smoke... I dont buy it. The 24th were seasoned vets who had plenty of time to perfect their downwind to upwind platoon fire drills in the Eastern Cape.
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@ Cubs: The mounted Irregular troops (who were pivotal in the battle) were only issued 70 rounds (like regular mounted infantry) and conducted a fighting retreat from the conical hill to the dongas in front of the camp. Thats a long way. A kilometer or two by my reckoning. Even with good fire discipline, they were doomed to run short of ammo.
Didn't one of their ammo wagons get stuck on the road and no-one bothered to tell them or unstick it? Yeah, certainly the mounted irregulars seem to have done as much as could be expected in the battle - moreso in some cases - not a lot of blame can be directed their way. They weren't regular line infantry and shouldn't be expected to perform as such.
It doesn't sit well with me to ignore anything Ian Knight may say, because he really is the Daddy when it comes to the Zulu War, but in a skirmish line (not to be confused with skirmishing pairs selecting targets and firing at will), with good fire discipline, I don't see how an obscuring smoke cloud would come in to play at all.
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I have had the privilege of walking the battlesite a few times over the years, and once with a very well-studied local historian.
David Rattray perhaps?
I had the pleasure of seeing/walking around Rorkes Drift and Isandlwana courtesy of him. A great and sadly missed gentleman.
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David Rattray perhaps?
I had the pleasure of seeing/walking around Rorkes Drift and Isandlwana courtesy of him. A great and sadly missed gentleman.
No, unfortunately, (not to take anything away from the historian who showed me around) it wasnt the late David Rattray. I didnt ever get to meet him (dont think he had even moved to Fugitives Drift the first few times I went to the site - mid 80s - and the last time I went was 2012, which was after his death). Sadly missed indeed.
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Great find ( 8) 8)) and I'll be watching it tonight!
Finally I have a use for the notepad on my sidebar! lol
Darrell.