Lead Adventure Forum
Miniatures Adventure => The Great War => Topic started by: armchairgeneral on July 24, 2017, 01:22:08 PM
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I am trying to find out information on the tactics used on the Western Front in 1914 before trench warfare began. I am aware of accounts of infantry attacking in close order and taking heavy casualties but I am really after more of a view of what was typical. So far the impression I get is that both side deployed in extended order lines for fire and advance/attack with close artillery and MG support where possible. Cavalry seems to engage cavalry either mounted or dismounted. I can’t help thinking it was similar to the ACW but with greater firepower and MGs in use?
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Well, the obvious book to recommend is "Infantry Attacks" by Erwin Rommel. It covers the initial phases of the German advance into France; Infantry manoeuvre skirmishing, short battles. Spoiler; he gets to have another war two decades later...
It does indeed seem to closely resemble late ACW or FPW with the added firepower of machine guns -- noting that unlike the ACW, early WW1 is between two well-equipped, well-trained and fairly well supplied, modern-structured, professional armies. They have different theories of warfare and different organisations, but their weapons are roughly comparable[1] and they're all fairly efficient in their use of them.
There's an account of the BEF's experiences through 1914 in "Fire and Movement" which is fairly recent and a decent read.
Again, the impression is of skirmishes in and around shelled villages. Lots of movement, rifle and machine-gun fire dominates the field.
[1] Certainly more so than the South's inferiority of arms and numbers from the ACW.
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On the western Front the British tended to deploy and fight based on their Boer War experience, i.e. troops were pretty well shaken out, taking advantage of cover. By the time of the Aisne though they were attempting to take German trenches frontally, with little success, thus sparking the Race to the Sea, First Ypres and the reliance on digging in.
The Belgians tended to make the most of cover and fortified positions, although they were not averse to attacking. There are accounts of cavalry actions where the Belgians were supported by Minerva armoured cars. It is interesting to note that during the first few days of hostilities tourist trains were still running in Belgium.
The French tended to attack en masse, the doctrine of the time being that of élan. This led to massive casualties when coming up against dug in Germans with machine guns and heavy artillery.
The Germans were committed to fighting a defensive battle in Alsace and Lorraine, but in the drive through Belgium and into northern France they too often attacked in relatively close order, sustaining massive casualties.
The overall approach on both sides on the Western Front seems to have been dictated by "let's get this over with as quickly as possible," with scant regard paid to the advances in weapons technology since the Franco-Prussian War.
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Trench warfare was a feature of the war from the outset. It was already known that the best way to defend and to minimise the effects of artillery and MG fire was entrenching. The British did it at Mons and Le Cateau; Rommel mentions it in his book; etc.
The tactics were similar across the major nations. Troops advanced in columns, preceded by advanced guards and independent cavalry formations. Aerial reconnaissance, including Zeppelins, other airships, and fixed wing aircraft made significant contributions to understanding the enemy's dispositions before contact was made. As the number and strengths of contacts increased, manoeuvre units became smaller and were more dispersed. From the outset of the war, for example, the smallest infantry manoeuvre units when in close range of small arms fire were sections or even a few individuals within a section. It is rare to see this level described in detail in the literature but there are lots of examples when you look for the information. The ideal was for these sub-units to manoeuvre under the protection of suppressing fire, supported by MGs and artillery in direct fire mode if possible. In practice it was very hard to build up a firing line that carried sufficient weight of fire to achieve superiority. Furthermore, if the enemy had excellent fire discipline then it was very hard to know if the enemy had stopped returning fire because he was suppressed or because he was holding fire. Blöem learned this lesson the hard way when his company came up against the BEF defending the Condé Canal near Tertre in the Battle of Mons
Ignore the descriptions of massed formations being mown down by 'mad minute' rifle fire. These are not accurate.
Robert
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Thanks for the replies so far. Interesting reading. So was this the tail end of the era of armies "formally" deploying from columns into firing lines albeit more dispersed ones, before facing each other to exchange fire or close for melee?
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No, the tactics were significantly different from the 'formal' process in the previous era. The shaking out of dense movement columns was to take place prior to coming into artillery range, which was recognised as being several miles if defilade cover was not available. There were two, at times three, layers of reconnaissance on the ground that enabled this distance to be judged. If independent cavalry were operating, as with BEF 1st Cavalry Division prior to Mons, then the main body of cavalry would be at least 10 miles ahead of the main infantry body following. The independent cavalry would have several squadrons operating further forward and on the flanks, with each squadron projecting several officer patrols further ahead still. This meant the enemy (recon units) could be detected at least one day's march (about 30 miles) ahead. Each division would have its own integral cavalry recon support, typically a squadron at least. Once independent cavalry had made contact then the divisional cavalry recon was meant to take the role of keeping contact with the advancing enemy, while the independent cavalry moved to the flanks. Scouts and small recon units (viz. Rommel's description of a recon in his book, using cycles) of infantry followed the divisional cavalry. These infantry recon elements typically extended out a relatively short distance from the combined arms advanced guards.
The layers of recon meant that infantry units were more dispersed by the time contact was made with the main enemy. As the distance closed, the manoeuvre element became ever smaller - battalion -> company -> platoon -> section -> small groups of individuals within the section. Here are a couple of examples. The first is from Ludwig Renn and describes an action in the opening weeks of the war:
"'To your rifles!' came a shout from outside. Two shrapnels burst over the next house. We ran for our rifles and baggage.
'Platoons advance in open formation!' cried the Lieutenant.
We deployed over a bright green field. Zip! Zip! it went past us.
'Lie down!' shouted Sergeant Ernst.
We flung ourselves down on the wet grass. To the right there was a tree behind whose thick trunk Corporal Pferl, our section commander, threw himself."
Renn now describes the disconcerting effects of being under sustained shrapnel fire, then:
"'Ernst's platoon! Up! At the double!' bellowed the sergeant.
I tore myself to my feet and advanced. We came to a slope falling abruptly.
'Lie down!' bellowed Ernst.
I looked round me. Where were the shells falling now? A few rifle bullets whizzed from the hollow.
'The French are straight in front there in the bushes! At nine hundred yards - fire!' barked Ernst.
'Advance by sections!' bellowed Ernst.
'Lamm's section!' cried the one year's man on my left. 'Ready! Up! At the double!'
We ran forward, Lamm in front. A stone wall with a thin line of bushes lay before us.
'Halt!' shouted Lamm. 'At eight hundred yards!'
We threw ourselves behind the wall. He was a lad, the one year's man! And in the garrison he had not even become a lance-corporal, because he could not give an order.
'On the retreating Frenchmen!' cried Lamm. 'At a thousand yards - fire!'
Right enough! Small bands were popping out of the bushes and sneaking back. We fired hurriedly, but we did not seem to hit anyone.
The French soldiers disappeared into a wood. Our firing ceased."
The following is from Blöem and relates to the Battle of Mons:
"Here we were advancing as if on a parade ground...." [having received recon intel from the German divisional cavalry that a BEF patrol had been contacted ahead].
Blöem does not give more detail of what this means, although Blöem was with a section that was advancing and there is a further description later in this account that gives a strong indication. After a brief altercation with an officer patrol of the British 19th Hussars (a British officer patrol from a divisional cavalry unit), Bloem ordered the advance to be resumed.
"As we left the buildings and were extending out again, another shower of bullets came across the meadow [probably fired at a range in excess of 1000 yards based on the map] and rattled against the walls and all about us. More cries, more men fell. In front a farm track on a slightly raised embankment crossed our direction.
Line the bank in front,' I ordered, and in a few short rushes we were there, lying flat against the grass bank and looking cautiously over the top. Where was the enemy? I searched through my glasses. Yes, there among the buildings away at the far end of the meadow was a faint haze of smoke. Then... let us get closer.
'Forward again - at the double!' We crossed the track, jumped the broad dyke full of stagnant water on the far side, and then on across the squelching meadow. Tack, tack, tack... - cries - more lads falling.
'Down! Open fire - far end of the meadow - range 1000 yards!'"
At this point, Blöem's small unit has come under fire again, which causes him to order them to ground.
"And so we went on, gradually working forwards by rushes of a hundred, later fifty and then about thirty yards towards the invisible enemy...
Blöem talks about how difficult the advance was, including the "broad water-logged drains and barbed wire fences that had to be cut
through."
The next quote is extremely interesting, IMHO. As Blöem is crossing the meadow in short rushes, he notes:
"Where was the rest of the battalion? Nothing to be seen of them. Yes, there... a hundred yards to our left a section [of Grenadiers] was working forwards like us by short rushes.
Its leader, in front at every rush, taking giant strides... Now they were down again, this time along another broad water-drain with a barbed wire fence along the enemy's side of it. And what was [the NCO] doing? Sure enough, he was running along the whole front of his section cutting the wire fence himself, in the middle of a burst of rifle and machine-gun fire.
I looked again all round. The enemy was still invisible. [The NCO] was off again with his section, another long rush. He was now level
with us, if anything slightly ahead.
'Lads!' I called out, 'Did you see that? A Company is getting ahead of us. Can we allow it?
'No 1 Section - rush!' And so another thirty yards nearer the enemy, and about twelve in front of Graeser's section."
At this point, Graeser brought his section over to join up with Blöem, who picks up the account:
"I shouted down the line: 'Advance by groups from the right, in short rushes.' And then I heard Holder-Egger's voice as he led on forward.
From our new line I again searched the front through my glasses. Still no sign of the enemy. To the right and left, a cry there: 'I'm
hit, sir!'
Behind us the whole meadow was dotted with little gray heaps. The hundred and sixty men that left the wood with me had shrunk to less than a hundred. But Grabert's section at my signal had now worked forward and prolonged our line.'
At this point, about 500 yds from the canal bank (ie 2/3 of the way across the meadow), Blöem and his men hugged the ground. The officers shared some champagne before attempting to resume the advance. Blöem noted that the British enfilade MG fire (the East Surrey's MG section) from the right had died down.
"Looking down the line I shouted; "Advance by short rushes from the right!" and the order was passed along.
From now on the English fire gradually weakened, almost ceased. No hail of bullets greeted each rush forward, and we were able to get within 150 yds of the canal bank. I said to Graeser: 'Now we'll do one more 30-yard rush, all together, then fix bayonets and charge the houses and the canal banks.'"
Blöem has mistaken the fall off in English fire for the equivalent of the effect of German rifle fire superiority. He was very wrong.
"The enemy must have been waiting for this moment to get us all together at close range, for immediately the line rose it was as if
the hounds of hell had been loosed at us, yelling, barking, hammering, as the mass of lead swept in among us.
'Down!' I shouted... Voluntarily and in many cases involuntarily, we all collapsed flat on the grass as if swept by a scythe.
Now Blöem's unit came under heavy fire "from the strip of wood that jutted out into the meadow to our right rear". Blöem assumed this was friendly fire but signalling with the red communication flag and frantic whistle blowing by the NCOs did not diminish the fire. In fact it was coming from the MG section and part of C Company, East Surrey Regiment, BEF. Bloem and the remnants of his unit were pinned until nightfall, suffering further casualties during that time.
Robert
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Be prepared - if you continue down this line of enquiry (which I would encourage) then you will never look on 28mm games in the same way again ;-). Based on Blöem's account for example, combined with a study of a contemporary map and the British records, neither the BEF infantry nor the East Surrey MG section would have appeared on table up to and including the point at which Blöem's unit was brought to a halt. Only the British officer patrol would have featured on table. I am not arguing against the scale, far from it. Games at this scale can be great fun but lines of men advancing across the open and evicting the enemy from cover...
Robert
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monk2002uk,
Thanks, I really appreciate the first hand accounts and your perspective on this.
LB
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My pleasure. I will dig out the reference to a pre-1914 film of the British army on field manoeuvres. It contains an example of infantry bounding by sections.
Robert
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Be prepared - if you continue down this line of enquiry (which I would encourage) then you will never look on 28mm games in the same way again ;-). Based on Blöem's account for example, combined with a study of a contemporary map and the British records, neither the BEF infantry nor the East Surrey MG section would have appeared on table up to and including the point at which Blöem's unit was brought to a halt. Only the British officer patrol would have featured on table. I am not arguing against the scale, far from it. Games at this scale can be great fun but lines of men advancing across the open and evicting the enemy from cover...
Robert
I game in 28mm Late WW1 at 1:1 platoon level using amended Bolt Action which works really well. In contrast I was thinking of trying the Early War period at brigade level using Black Powder (as I know them and like them), albeit with a good few house rules. Battalions still seem to deploy as units with your above examples of smaller actions taking place across their frontage so using these rules would be averaging them out to get a representation of these section/platoon level actions for the battalion as a whole?
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Yes, Bolt Action is my choice for 28mm too.
Can't comment on Black Powder as I play larger scale games in Great War Spearhead.
Robert
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Okay thanks for all your help Robert :)
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Robert
Thank you for the long posting but in my case it brings more questions. What little I have read indicates bolt action rifles had no effect until 300 meters or so. This post says the unit lost something like 30% of its men as they advanced from 1200 to 500 meters. This begs the questions.
Were riflemen so much better in WWI? Doubtful (unless they were Australian in which case they could choose to shoot through the right or left wing of the fly on the general's moustache at 2000 meters over iron sights).
Were the advancing units exposed for a long enough time that at ranges beyond effective the occasional 'lucky' hit added up?
Was the estimate of range off by a factor of.. say 4? Again doubtful to me.
Were the units advancing in some form of formation which kept them grouped so closely together that they were a valid target even at such ranges?
I have developed an interest in WWI, RCW, and Soviet Polish war so am wondering how valid my prefered WWII rules would apply or have to be modified. They are squad based (units are squads or weapons teams) with very low chance to hit until under 300 meters and 50 meters is optimal. Allowing multiple shots while the unit advances for 300 meters over open ground (max rifle range is 600 meters and would be exposed to fire for 6 rounds of fire) and with multiple targets in a confined area (each target unit within 50 meters get an attack roll against it) might work for similar results.
The other option which may make the above match my take would be the advancing units ignore available cover, there is none, or they were not trained or encouraged to use it. Opinions please. Thank you.
Stephen
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Thanks for the extra questions, Stephen.
Riflemen in all major nations were trained in what the British called 'musketry'. This was the ability to apply coordinated rifle fire onto a beaten zone. Soldiers did not expect to aim at individual targets but to fire in a specific direction at a pre-specified range. There was a specialist role called rangefinder, typically at the platoon level at least. Scouts were also trained in range finding too. Dedicated infantry rangefinders were issued with stereoscopic rangefinding instruments, such as the Mk 2 Barr and Stroud Infantry Rangefinder:
(https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/lot-images.atgmedia.com/SR/35997/2903280/1293-201422813490_original.jpg)
When setting up a defensive position, such as the BEF did at Mons, it was the job of the NCOs and rangefinders to calculate ranges before the enemy was engaged if possible. Small white markers were laid out at regular intervals, typically every few hundred yards. Alternatively diagrams were drawn up with key terrain features marked up and tagged with the ranges. As the enemy advanced then the NCOs would call out the range, the rate of fire, and the direction of fire (if needed). The infantry would fire in the direction, having set the sights for the required range. Firing would continue until the NCOs called a halt. The bullets fell into an elliptical zone known as a beaten zone. The longer the range then the broader the beaten zone. At longer ranges the bullets tended to fall onto the enemy, so you will see descriptions of soldiers being hit in the upper torso or head.
As to the grouping of the enemy forces, beaten zones were quite large. Even though Blöem's unit was relatively spread out, it still suffered significant casualties from the BEF musketry. As I mentioned earlier in this post, it did not require each soldier to aim his rifle at a specific enemy soldier.
Robert
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It took me a while to find the video archive footage - the website had changed. Here is the link:
http://www.eafa.org.uk/catalogue/543
The film covers the 1912 British army manoeuvres. At 1:57 into the film, you can see a short segment that shows how the infantry were trained to advance when in close proximity to the enemy. A section bounds forward and forms a firing line. A second section then bounds forward and joins them. The first section continues to provide covering fire while the second section digs scrapes for protection then joins in. The NCOs can be seen lying behind their men, directing the firefight.
It is not the case that the company was the smallest unit of manoeuvre before the war.
Robert
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Here is an extract from General Haking's book on infantry company training, published before the war. This example covers how to manoeuvre through a hedge or similar obstacle when in contact with the enemy:
"An attempt would then be made to obtain temporary superiority of fire over the enemy by rapid bursts [of fire], aided, if possible, by the artillery. A group from each [infantry] section [i.e. a manoeuvre unit that was smaller than a section] in the firing line would then rush forward, extended, to the edge; these men would commence immediately to work their way through the hedge, and once they had made holes big enough to wriggle through the non-commissioned officer would give the word or signal to advance, and the group [not the whole section] would rush forward and commence the establishment of a fire position about fifty yards beyond the hedge. The task in front of the next group [again not a whole section] would be easier, because many of the men would find the gaps made by the first group, who were the pioneers of the operation. Meanwhile an efficient covering fire would be maintained from the original fire position in rear..."
Robert
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Here is an English soldier's description of his pre-war training in the French army ('The French Army from Within (1914)', written by 'Ex-Trooper'):
"As an infantryman, his business is to entrench himself when ordered to do so; to advance by short rushes, squad alternating with squad, during the work of getting nearer to the enemy; to charge if bidden, or to retreat as he advanced, in the way that would produce least damage to the force of which he is a member if that force was exposed to actual fire."
Robert
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And from 'Règlement de Manoeuvre d'Infanterie, Avril 1914', published by GQG (French equivalent of GHQ) just before the war:
"[Rifle] Fire is controlled either by the platoon commander or the serre-file he has appointed, or by the half-platoon or squad leaders when smaller units provide fire."
Robert
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A German example, from the Battle of Longlier in August 1914:
"From the new position we opened fire at a range of 700 m on the top of the hill ahead, where there seemed to be movement from time to time. It still wasn't possible to make out the enemy. The company came under heavier enemy fire after our advance. We started taking casualties.
Almost with a sigh of relief, we suddenly realised where the fire was coming from. It was possible to make out individual French soliders breaking cover from behind haystacks and from a large wheat field on the hill about 700 yards ahead then running down the slope. They ran towards and then took cover behind the railway embankment halfway down the hill. At the same moment they were blanketed by our rifle fire.
The enemy ran across dry stubble in a field. This was perfect as we could see the small puffs of dust thrown up by the impact our bullets. Our beaten zone was excellent. Every Frenchman who got up and tried to push on through the cloud of dust was struck down immediately.
We were under heavy enemy fire though. The company didn't have any cover and its losses were increasing. I spotted that the railway line also ran through cuttings as well as on an embankment. These were likely to provide excellent cover. We had to get forward quickly!
I gave the order to advance. The company bounded forward by platoons and sections. The process was repeated over and over, in between the bursts of enemy fire. The distance came down. Four hundred meters from the railway line. Then 200 meters away. Suddenly we were there, just at the point where the railway ran through a cutting. The first dead Frenchmen were lying about. We were in a defilade position, hidden from the enemy and from our own troops. My men started to pick up French kepis. One took a French bugle. The situation could have become uncomfortable if the French, who were only a few meters above us, had pushed forward. They would have been able to shoot down on us from above."
Robert
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Another example from the Battle of Longlier, with mention of a German rangefinder at work:
"From the edge of the village, one-year volunteer Unteroffizier Otterbein spotted the dark line of firing enemy skirmishers on a small hill beyond an intervening hollow. He raced over to Oberleutnant Eger in order to gather together part of his 6th Company. The rangefinder enabled the new enemy to be brought under fire at 700 meters."
Robert
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Just reading thru this...excellent posts chaps.
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"Were riflemen so much better in WWI? Doubtful (unless they were Australian in which case they could choose to shoot through the right or left wing of the fly on the general's moustache at 2000 meters over iron sights)."
In the British Army at the outset of the war, yes. Post the Boer war musketry was a virtual religion in the British Army, almost everything came second and it's one of the reasons for the relative paucity of machine guns at the outset. Endless hours were devoted to improving aim and firing on the ranges at Hythe, Bisley etc amd some fairly advanced training methods employed.. As they were all long service regulars and/or long service recalled reservists and it was a small army at the time, the British Army could afford to and did master musketry. There are accounts of the Germans being quite convinced they were facing MMGs due to the intensity, rapidity and accuracy of the rifle fire directed at them.
There probably has never been before or since a greater level of widespread proficiency in small arms in any army. The AIF at the outset were mere rank amateurs by comparison, the myth of every man a bushman being just that, a myth.
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Thank you for the additional information about how the British infantry (and cavalry) were trained in musketry.
One minor point - there is one book that references German soldiers mistaking musketry for MG fire. This was a book translated into English as 'Ypres, 1914: An Official Account Published by Order of the German General Staff'. I'm afraid that this book, though published under the aegis of the German General Staff, is full of inaccuracies. Jack Sheldon has debunked this 'myth' in his book 'The German Army at Ypres 1914'. Having studied several of the German regimental histories from the battle, I agree with Jack's findings. German soldiers were clearly able to tell the difference between massed rifle fire and MG fire.
Robert
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...
In the British Army at the outset of the war, yes. Post the Boer war musketry was a virtual religion in the British Army, almost everything came second and it's one of the reasons for the relative paucity of machine guns at the outset. Endless hours were devoted to improving aim and firing on the ranges at Hythe, Bisley etc amd some fairly advanced training methods employed.. As they were all long service regulars and/or long service recalled reservists and it was a small army at the time, the British Army could afford to and did master musketry. .
Trivia point: Frank Bourne was one of the instructors (& later adjutant) at Hythe in pre WWI days. That is Colour Sergeant Bourne, of Rourkes Drift fame. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Bourne
Great discussion guys! :)
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So in game terms just let the troops come. The lower chance of a hit is offset by the greater duration while under fire. In the game system I use for each additional unit combining fire an increase in the to hit/to effect roll is given. So if an entire platoon is firing (3 to 4 squads) each target in the area of effect has a greater chance of being affected. Each unit (squad) in the area of effect gets its own attack against roll so either work in waves, spread out or be subject to effectively an increasing chance something will be hit. All this depends on the openness of the terrain.
Thank you.
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So how would the style of warfare in this era differ from say the Franco-Prussian War?
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So how would the style of warfare in this era differ from say the Franco-Prussian War?
Personally I am looking at it in the lens of WWII squad level rules. IF you form up and start your advance at a long distance you are exposed that much longer. How much effect the training would have is hard to say or incorporate. If the advancing forces choose (or are forced) to remain in a close formation (more targets per area), not work forward in alternating bounds (ditto), or not employ cover such as smoke the effects can be devastating IN THE LONG RUN. If the defending troops can concentrate a, relatively, large number of units which combine their fire within a limited area they also raise the effectiveness of the attack. Again if those units are closely spaced then they become prime targets for the same reason and in most of the same ways as the advancing troops.
That is how I see it.
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So how would the style of warfare in this era differ from say the Franco-Prussian War?
For starters it would a relatively empty battlefield. Dispersion of troops at least with the British was practised. More effective small arms fire and critically, vastly improved artillery and machine guns.
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Initially I don't think the style differed markedly from the FPW (I am currently fighting a FPW battle using the WWI Square Bashing system, with some amendments), but the increased rates of fire from magazine rifles and machine guns, plus the much more powerful heavy artillery led to horrific casualties in the first few weeks resulting in the change of style to digging in in a much more comprehensive style.
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The Germans coined a special phrase for the difference - 'die Leere des Gefechtsfeldes', which translates literally as 'the emptiness of the battlefield'. Prior to WW1, the proposed changes in infantry tactics were very controversial in the German military. During the late 1800s and even into the early 1900s, there were huge debates carried out in private and in publicly accessible journals. The exponents of small group fire and manoeuvre tactics, with dispersal of troops and devolution of command and control, were subject to constant criticism by some of the now senior officers and commanders who had served in the FPW. The latter saw the new tactics as a recipe for disaster, encouraging anarchy on the battlefield instead of tight centralised control in FPW formations. What swayed the debate was the feedback from German military observers who reported back from the Sino-Japanese War, the Boer War, and the Balkans Wars, amongst others.
Robert
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I think an image is the easiest way to emphasise the difference. Attached is a Battle of Mons map, which covers BEF II Corps only (i.e. half of the British force, which totalled 80,000 roughly all up). Overlaid is the map of Mars-la-Tour (framed in red), which had 80,000 men per side. The maps are the same ground scale.
Robert
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As I mentioned before, I don't know rules like Black Powder. The Fire and Fury set are the only rules from mid-19th Century that I own and am reasonably familiar with. The quantum difference in dispersion is one of the reasons that I would not recommend such rules for WW1. On first impression, it would seem likely that rules covering earlier periods like FPW should work but, FWIIW, my preference is to go with dedicated rulesets for this scale, hence Great War Spearhead for example.
Robert
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Now to another really interesting video:
Here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FcoXi4uJiMU)
It shows Belgian and French troops on manoeuvres in 1913. There are some very good views of large troop formations on the move, dispersed as sections. You can also see somewhat stylised attack manoeuvres, with a firing line providing covering fire while sections bound up to join the line. The sections start from another line further back that is not firing, indeed many of the men are taking the time to pose for or look to the camera ;-). In practice, this 'line' would have been firing too, supporting the manoeuvre elements.
On first glance, the troops still look quite massed together. The section-based manoeuvre elements are clearly distinguishable but the whole thing seems very compressed. It is. The camera can only take in a certain maximum width, perhaps several hundred metres but not more than a kilometre at most. There was no way that a camera on the ground could illustrate the dispersion that was a feature of the Mons map above for example, where just one BEF division covered many kilometres in defense. Furthermore, the amount of land available for manoeuvres in France and Belgium was very limited. Germany, by way of contrast, set aside vast areas for corps manoeuvres. Finally, such films were designed to impress. A battalion or, worse still, a company advancing over the same territory would not impress militaristic neighbours ;-)
Robert
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Thanks for all the information Robert. As you probably gathered I am considering gaming this period in 28mm at brigade level. Just wondered what rules would be best if not BP.
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What is the smallest unit you are hoping to represent on table?
Robert
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What is the smallest unit you are hoping to represent on table?
Robert
A battalion represented by 12 - 16 figures. A gun model to represent a battery.
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So an individual figure would represent an infantry company essentially? A four battalion brigade or regiment would mean 64 figures in total, leaving out MGs, HQs, etc. Is that the sort of scale you are after?
Robert
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Over the Top by Frank Chadwick. That exact scale, one stand ( or infividually based figure in 28mm) represents a platoon, a gun represents a battery etc. Designed to be played at Brigade level, plays well and has a bathtub campaign for 1914.
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So an individual figure would represent an infantry company essentially? A four battalion brigade or regiment would mean 64 figures in total, leaving out MGs, HQs, etc. Is that the sort of scale you are after?
Robert
Yes though 1 figure would be about 40 men so representing a platoon if that's what you meant?
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Over the Top by Frank Chadwick. That exact scale, one stand ( or infividually based figure in 28mm) represents a platoon, a gun represents a battery etc. Designed to be played at Brigade level, plays well and has a bathtub campaign for 1914.
Thanks for the tip. Do you know where you can get hold of these rules? And did you mean the ones by Greg Novak?
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Yes though 1 figure would be about 40 men so representing a platoon if that's what you meant?
Yes, that's what I actually meant ;-) Crush the Kaiser is the other WW1 game that is specifically designed for this scale of unit command.
Robert
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Here is a map that shows how stretched out brigades/regiments were during an advance to contact. The map shows two German divisions (5 and 6 Infantry Divisions - the 'J' is a carryover from the older German script where a capital 'I' looks like a modern 'J'. You will see some translations that call these Jaeger divisions, which isn't correct as Jaeger only operated in battalions). If you follow 24 Infantry Regiment for example then you will see it track down through Ghlin, cross the canal near Jemappes, then down through Flenu, and on to the area around Frameries. This makes modelling a brigade/regiment quite hard in the context of an advance to contact and then exploitation of a break-in, which is what happened at Mons.
24 Infantry Regiment's advance was over 18 km at least, with more than 12 km in contact with the BEF. Contact was made just north of Jemappes, where the BEF was defending the crossings. The regiment was not advancing shoulder-to-shoulder throughout. Battalions were echeloned one after the other, giving depth but not width.
Robert
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Thanks for the tip. Do you know where you can get hold of these rules? And did you mean the ones by Greg Novak?
Yes, sorry I should have credited Greg. A sad loss to the gaming community. I always think of Frank, as they are part of the Command Decision rule series. If you want faster play you can always use the hit mechanism from Test of Battle, which is essentially CD version 4. There's a forum of the same name and you'll find some nice chaps who are incredibly helpful. It's no longer the shiny system de jour but it has stood the test of time. You'll find tables of organisation for all the main armies in your selected scale too. For 28mm I just used one figure per stand vs the two to three of 15 and 20mm.
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You need to make sure that these rules do not use a WW2 ground scale. Otherwise you run into the opposite problem from the FPW. By WW2, an infantry platoon covered the same frontage as a WW1 infantry company. This is an order of magnitude difference.
Robert
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Another photo, possibly taken in August 1914, that allegedly shows a British contingent moving towards Mons via Jemappes. Note how, when not within range of the enemy, movement was in denser columns. The pyramid shape in the background is consistent with one of the numerous slag heaps in the Mons area.
(https://greatwarphotos.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/gwp_0062.jpg)
Robert
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You need to make sure that these rules do not use a WW2 ground scale. Otherwise you run into the opposite problem from the FPW. By WW2, an infantry platoon covered the same frontage as a WW1 infantry company. This is an order of magnitude difference.
Robert
Well yes and no. In the first place the platoon stand or figure is a nominal marker that isn't deployed in any particular fashion, attack/ defend, open order/ closed, worms etc. It's effectively a datum point.
In the second, the game is aimed at battalion through to Brigade + actions. The smalkest command element is at Coy level. How you space the companies and battalion is more important in that regard.
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I totally understand the point about a stand or figure being a nominal marker. It can't be the case though that such nominal markers are then spaced at 5x the interval or more on the table compared to what would have happened historically. At one level it doesn't matter. If the game is fun then what the heck anyway... My point relates to the historical consistency though and there was a world of difference between the two wars (pardon any sense of pun). There are comments that late WW1 was like WW2 but this can't be taken too literally.
Robert
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My point relates to the historical consistency though and there was a world of difference between the two wars (pardon any sense of pun). There are comments that late WW1 was like WW2 but this can't be taken too literally.
Robert
My point (if it was my comment eliciting the above statement) is that the difference I see is in dispersement of forces. Leaving out support weapons (mgs) the primary infantry weapon's basic design (bolt action rifle) is same for WWI and WWII. As for all the above posts (for my application) WWII infantry fire rules would hold and the difference would be the dispersement of the troops. Between, say, the Franco Prussian war and WWI I don't know enough about the weapons to say if there is a significant (in game terms) difference there but it seems troop dispersement is greater in WWI then the F-P war. Would the training of troops (the extensive British rifle practice) be enough to change the attack factors? By the end (or middle) of the war would troop training have gone down to enough to remove this benefit? Or would the situation on the ground (in the trenches) have made such extreme training mute?
Not trying to beat a dead horse, just becoming interested in a new era (WWI, RCW, Soviet-Polish war) and thinking, mechanically at least, my favorite WWII system should hold given variations in tactics, etc.. Thank you.
Stephen
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Prior to the end of October 1914, and certainly in August and September, the continental powers were using the same, or very similar tactics to the early part of the Franco-Prussian War. Many German troops on the Western Front at this time were untried, enthusiastic volunteers and the tactic appears to have been the company column with fixed bayonets. Similarly the overriding French tactic at this point was the charge with élan. Both tactics resulted in horrific casualties: 3000 enthusiastic German students at Langemarck in Belgium, 250,000 French casualties within the first month of the war. As often happens in warfare, the initial tactics were dictated by the lessons of the previous war, in this case the Franco-Prussian War, where the French in particular had taken a defensive stand initially and lost every battle in the Imperial phase. The tactics were initially unsuited to the advances in weaponry. The British, however, had entered the war having learnt valuable lessons about dispersal and marksmanship in their previous war, the Boer War. Unfortunately they were still using a professional, small, colonial style army unsuitable for tackling the massive German army of 1914.
As to using WWII tactics, these would be much more suitable to the warfare of 1918, when the Germans had devised the successful use of small squad stormtrooper tactics, later copied by the Allies, who supported their troops with early tanks.
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Stephen, no it wasn't your comment that elicited my statement. I was referring to general comments about the similarities, which often appear in secondary sources. Rifle fire was very significantly different from mid-19th Century wars. The training in musketry was not unique to the BEF - all sides were trained to coordinate rifle fire against targets at multiple distances. Unlike marksmanship training, which used traditional targets, musketry involved groups of figures that were mechanically made to appear and disappear. The 'figures' were cutout shapes mounted on sleds and / or mechanical means of making the figures 'stand up'. They were placed at different ranges in order to simulate battlefield conditions where the enemy was manoeuvring with small unit bounds.
Later in the war, the focus on rifle fire was actually restored. This followed a relative lull during the static trench warfare period of 1915 through mid-1916. The introduction of automatic rifles and light machine guns made a big difference too, enabling smaller 'fire' units to put out equivalent levels of small arms fire to a standard section. The reason for the increased training was that almost all major attacks were associated with significant advances deeper into the enemy trench systems distributed in depth.
Robert
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Many German troops on the Western Front at this time were untried, enthusiastic volunteers and the tactic appears to have been the company column with fixed bayonets.
Leman, did you read the quotes from German attacks earlier in this thread? It was not the case that German infantry attacked in company column with fixed bayonets.
I have also quoted posts about how French soldiers were trained before the war and will dig out quotes that show how they fought once the war started. The notion of just charging with élan is not correct but it took hold in the literature soon after the earliest debacles in the Battle of the Frontiers. The notion has been perpetuated ever since, coupled with a misrepresentation of the concept of 'offensive à outrance'.
Robert
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In the Franco-Prussian War, German company columns were used to move troops into the combat zone quickly. They then tended to shake out into skirmish lines or more likely reinforce existing skirmish lines in an ongoing firefight. Some old-school colonels might lead their units into action like it was the Seven Years War but this was the exception. The heavy losses of the company columns early in the Great War were caused by the quick-fire French 75's shooting them up before they got into rifle range and deployed. Also, just attacking was sanguinary business, as all sides discovered.
By the end of the FPW Germans were using fire and movement tactics which then were rediscovered 40 odd years later through painful experience.
The company column was never intended to be a battering ram of bayonets. It was much more supple than a battalion column. It also forced tactical choices down the chain of command to the company level.
Further: the French Chassepot rifle was approaching being a modern rifle. The Needlegun was a very poor relation. The Germans were aided by their superior artillery - still a way from that available in 1914 - and the abysmal French staff work of 1870. This last was corrected by 1914.
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This quote is from the book 'In the Fire of the Furnace', which was authored by 'A Sergeant in the French Army'. Here the author is describing the first attack by his unit, as part of the Battle of the Frontiers. The unit fought near the Mangiennes, not far from Longwy, in August 1914. In preparation for the attack:
"...the captain said only a few words. He was nothing of an orator. I was afraid for a moment that his speech might end in gibbering. He recovered himself and concluded. And the men seemed moved by it.
The company formed up again, by platoons, in columns of four. I considered my companions, one by one, with passionate curiosity.
Once having left the wood, we reached the little hill-top...
In spite of having been told that the modern battlefield is empty, I had never imagined anything so desert-like as this. Not a man to be seen in these fields which sloped gently downwards: it was abandoned territory.
Down below us, yonder, there rose a puff of smoke, then another nearer; a third; all in a line. They might have been bonfires lit by an invisible hand.
The noise of the sharp reports reached us.
We had stopped, silent and non-plussed. The captain galloped along the line.
'To fifty paces - Extend!'
We had taken up an extended order and went on marching, but with rather broken ranks.
Our 'connecting file' [sic. - I think this is a mistranslation of serre-file - an officer who followed behind an advance] rushed up.
'Blob formation!'
[The unit then came under artillery fire and went to ground. When the fire subsided...] we raised ourselves up on our knees. Some aeroplanes were circling over us. Taubes, of course!
'Up you get!'
The neighbouring section had started off again. We advanced rapidly. Our serre-file came towards us at the double.
'By sections!'
Henriot repeated:
'Dreher, Guillaumin, by sections!'
We looked at each other, then I exclaimed:
'Come along, the 2nd [Section] with me!'
We covered a good bit of ground, two or three broad undulations. The bursts of firing grew less frequent. We advanced in rushes, for longer distances but not so fast. We felt comparatively safe."
Robert
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And here is a German cavalry regiment's account of a French infantry attack early in the war (1914):
"Once in its new position, 4th Squadron received orders to link up with a company of Bavarian Reserve Jaeger Battalion 1 on its right and Schwere Reiter Regiment 2 on its left and to hold the new position at all costs. The enemy, however, did not allow us sufficient time to provide cover from fire for the troopers. The move was directed at about 10 am and, only a short time after we reached the new position, enemy infantry detachments began bearing down on us from the direction of Merville, moving in tactical bounds and brilliantly supported by their field artillery. Shortly afterwards, rifle and machine gun fire was opened from the northwest. This had a very damaging enfilade effect on our troopers deployed to counter the threat from Merville. Despite everything, the courageous troopers of 4th Squadron exercised excellent fire discipline and made sure that every round found a worthwhile target."
Robert
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Robert, you are the man for Great War tactical info. Thank you. I have a book to read about the Eastern Front in 1916-1917 (after my current one). I shall undoubtedly have questions for you afterwards.
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No problem. Happy to help on the Eastern Front questions if I can, should any arise.
Robert
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Missed this thread up until now. Fascinating excerpts and some good sources to follow up on for the period.
I really should get back into my Russian Civil War 28mm project... or give in to the temptation to re-visit the RCW in 6mm or 10mm for the grand tactical scale...
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Here is an example of an infantry attack that was not handled well. It involved a French infantry company that attempted to outflank a German force that was occupying the town of Longlier.
"The men readied themselves on the commander’s signal; they rushed forward, singing. A small ridge lay ahead and our commander indicated that a German detachment was spread out 1400 meters behind it. Bounding forward, we reached the top of the hill that separated us from the enemy and finally came face-to-face with them.
We reached the edge of a potato field that provided the only cover and threw ourselves down. Immediately we came under murderous fire. Our men pressed themselves more deeply into the furrows; an officer gave the order to fire at a certain range, without estimating the distance and without ever seeing a target. Our shooting was pathetic! But the German bullets went over our heads! The enemy had the more advantageous position. They were able to take us under effective fire from well protected rifle pits. We did not, however, suffer any casualties at that time.
Risking death at any moment, the Major wandered very calmly back and forth to study the terrain. His face displayed a feisty disdain. 'We will wait until they have used up their ammunition,' he said; 'If we notice that their fire is subsiding then we can push forward.'
Soon afterwards the firing stopped completely. The moment seemed right. 'We have to advance,' the Major told us. We rushed forward, without the defilade cover of the furrow being available. As soon as we were on our feet, the enemy fire crackled into life again. We couldn’t reciprocate because our whole line was involved in the assault. Men went down straightaway, the wounded were groaning and the dead lay prostrate. Cohesion began to break down, then panic set in."
This is similar to the problem that afflicted Walter Blöem's company at Mons. A wrong interpretation was placed on the enemy fire dying away. Note, however, that the attack was not carried out as a blind rush on the enemy. The Major failed to appreciate that the Germans were positioned in strength because he couldn't see them. More seriously, he misinterpreted fire control by the enemy for loss of ammunition. This is why he pushed the whole infantry line forward, rather than use fire and manoeuvre.
Robert
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What an absolute joy of a thread to read. Many thanks.
If I may, once the move to contact was established was there much evidence of urban fighting?
Or did units retreat?
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Great stuff Robert.
One thing that strikes me is the importance of suppressing fire. When the troops are advancing in bounds they are able to put fire down on the enemy, reducing the volume and effectiveness of fire coming back at them.
Troops in cover are well protected from enemy fire. But can loose sight of the enemy, especially if they are using improvised cover.
In the last example when the charge is attempted, the enemy are able to be very effective in their shooting as they are shooting at targets in the clear, and are not under suppressing fire.
I'm not sure I've really seen a rule set factor in fire and movement that well (perhaps Chain of Command, but it tends to become a fire fight, rather than a suppress and manoeuvre)
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If I may, once the move to contact was established was there much evidence of urban fighting? Or did units retreat?
Thank you for your kind comments. There was very little evidence of urban fighting in large built-up areas. Cities like Lille, Reims, Soissons, etc were abandoned without any attempts to defend them. I do have the descriptions, both French and German, of the battle for the town of Longlier. I will post these as soon as I get a chance. Basically, all sides held the notion that small villages and towns should be defended from the edge closest to the enemy. Loopholing of buildings and barricades in the streets were the preferred methods of defense. I think there was a strong concern about being enveloped, given the relatively poor communications systems in the heat of battle.
Robert
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I notice both British and German forces had a lot of field artillery as part of their divisional organisations to the extent of a battery for every battalion. I appreciate some of this would be deployed at a distance from the front line to give "off table" fire support but I was wondering to what extent this artillery would be deployed in a front line direct fire support role?
I have read accounts at First Ypres of gun sections of two being deployed up at the front but less so entire batteries. I suppose what I am getting to is if one were to deploy a brigade of say 6 German battalions on the wargame table, it seems a bit ludicrous to also have 6 batteries going in with them as well. So how many batteries would be realistic?
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In the last example when the charge is attempted, the enemy are able to be very effective in their shooting as they are shooting at targets in the clear, and are not under suppressing fire.
I'm not sure I've really seen a rule set factor in fire and movement that well...
FWIIW, 'charge' might not be quite the right description. More like a rapid advance across several hundred metres to contact. The French forces were at least 700 metres from the Germans, probably more. This distance would be too far for what was normally referred to as a charge.
With fire and movement, my personal view is that it should not be modelled specifically but should flow from the basic mechanics of the game.
Robert
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...descriptions, both French and German, of the battle for the town of Longlier.
Here is the German description from the 88th Infantry Regiment's history:
"The attack by 5th and 8th Companies developed as if on the parade ground. Their advance was then partially held up by wire fences around the paddocks. The obstacles were overcome with a variety of implements, including wire cutters, spades, bayonets, and pickaxes. The leading riflemen could hear the incessant soft chirping sound of enemy bullets but they couldn't see their opponents. Captain Zickendraht, the commander of 8th Company / 88th IR, was seriously wounded by small arms fire. His company pushed ahead undeterred, with the 5th Company / 88th IR continuing to be further forward. Suddenly the air was filled with a shrill then eerily hollow whistling noise followed by a loud, metallic cracking sound. The battalion was under hostile artillery fire but this only accelerated the attack. When Major Schmidt detected an enemy position south of Longlier, he pushed the 6th Company to the left of the 8th.
Near the entrance to Longlier, a German cavalry patrol consisting of Jager zu Pferde and hussars was rescued. They had been bravely defending a farmstead against an enemy cyclist detachment after their horses had been shot down. German artillery had set Longlier on fire. The right flank platoon of 5th Company / 88th IR pushed forward as ordered to a wood that was lying half-right on a hill. There it made contact with the (left flank) Company von Hirschfeld (6th Company) from the Brigade Regiment (87th IR, the other regiment in the 41st Brigade of 21st Infantry Division). This meant that 5th Company was able to move left again, taking the two men wounded by artillery fire, and head towards Longlier to join in the battle. The enemy appeared to have machine guns because the automatic rapid rate of fire, which the German machine guns could not achieve, was clearly heard from certain directions above the din of the battle.
Having deployed, the companies now commenced the firefight. The air was rent with the loud German musketry. As the enemy's fire diminished, Oberleutnant Eger strained to get his 6th Company's skirmish line forward. The men at the front refused to get up. The "Fix bayonets!" signal rang out. Then the village was stormed! The leutnants rushed ahead of their platoons with swords drawn. The assault parties cheered as they entered the village. Savage house-to-house fighting broke out wherever the enemy resisted stubbornly. Individual fanatical civilians joined in, to whom no quarter was given. The cyclist battalion, which had defended Longlier, fell back. They pressed between the burning buildings in Longlier, rushing through our men. Enfilade fire then struck our left flank."
Robert
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And here is information from the French perspective. It comes from the war diary of the cyclist company attached to 9th Cavalry Division:
"The Advance Guard of the 9th Cavalry Division moved towards Neufchâteau via Straimont. A troop from 3rd Dragoons formed the point. At Straimont, the Captain learned that a squadron from the 2nd Hussars (4th Cavalry Division) had been engaged [earlier] in the morning in Neufchâteau against German cavalry, to the disadvantage of the latter. Once the northern exit of Neufchâteau was made secure, the company advanced towards Longlier. The company reached the town, following behind Squadrons Bossut and Pastourel that had been sent on ahead to reconnoitre with two cyclist sections under the commands of l’adjutant Vadel and l’adjutant en chef Leprince respectively.
On exiting Longlier, the men were stopped by fire from dismounted [German] uhlans; Squadron Bossut dismounted with Cyclist Section Sontay to the north of the road, facing the woods 1,500 m northwest of Longlier. The woods had been organised for defence by the enemy [which may be a reference to the triangular wood that was mentioned in the account of the German 87th Infantry Regiment]. Section Fertaud (2nd Platoon) prolonged the line to left with Lieutenant Filippi; 1st Platoon deployed to the right of 2nd Platoon south of the road, with part of a section on the road towards the bridge. The machine gun section from 1st Dragons came into the line north of the road with 2nd Platoon.
At 1230 hours the Officer Commanding (OC) cyclist group realised that he is was being strongly engaged and had some concerns about his left flank. Also the ... of the enemy infantry was progressing from Lahérie towards Hamipré [threatening to outflank Longlier to the south). An order was given to Brigade Séréville to push to the left of the cyclist group and the battalion of the 89th [Infantry Regiment] to filter along the railway line to counter-attack the enemy in his flank while he is trying to outflank Longlier by the south. A[n infantry] company was held back at Offaing. The 3rd Battery moved into position north of Hamipré, near Hamipré - Longlier road.
The unit continued to resist for some time but [it became impossible to hold on], 2 sections had run out of ammunition, and the group fell back towards the north exit out of Neufchâteau onto a hill overlooking the [Longlier] station. The Cyclist Engineers section created a barricade at the top of the road with an embankment of wood and earth. Only 3 sections were deployed on this narrow terrain feature; the other sections were positioned off to the side, ready to counter-attack."
The cyclists suffered minimal casualties. Their withdrawal from Longlier after a prolonged firefight was facilitated by the support from the 25th Dragoons Regiment:
At that moment, the Brigade was ordered to go back through Neufchâteau, then along the road to Semel and take up positions on the left flank of the chasseur cyclists, who had been overwhelmed [clearly not the case] trying to defend Longlier and were having great difficulty in falling back. The Brigade traversed Neufchâteau at the trot, with 24th Dragoons at the head, took the road to Semel and stopped at the turn in the road, near the cemetery.
2nd Squadron (Bellegarde)... dismounted behind hedges and advanced towards Longlier over the slope, which was exposed to the northwest, to get closer to the cyclists left flank. The squadron ended up about 5-600 meters from the horses. Having seen that there was a very large gap separating [2nd Squadron from] the neighbouring squadron, the General moved a squadron from the 25th (Poucher) in between; the horses were left with those of Squadron Bellegarde and [the men] advanced over the same slope, except that the troop on the left was at the bottom of the opposite slope. Once the line was established, the General reconnoitred the road in the direction of Recogne and found a troop from 4th Cavalry Division that was returning to the division. He ordered [the troop commander] to apprise GOC 4th Cavalry Division of the situation and to provide whatever help [4th Cavalry Division] could give to [16th Dragoon Brigade] left flank. The troop went off down the main road. Having seen that the troop got away without incident, the General concluded that it was possible to extend the left. The two sections behind our squadrons on the right and one to the east of the town were firing continuously. The cycling group, supported by our action, had managed to fall back from Longlier to the north side of Neufchâteau."
It goes to show how important it is to triangulate as many sources as possible with respect to any action.
Robert
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I have read accounts at First Ypres of gun sections of two being deployed up at the front but less so entire batteries. I suppose what I am getting to is if one were to deploy a brigade of say 6 German battalions on the wargame table, it seems a bit ludicrous to also have 6 batteries going in with them as well. So how many batteries would be realistic?
The answer depends on the type of battle being fought. Meeting engagements were relatively common in the lead up to First Ypres. Very often there would have been an all-arms advance guard, which would have included a battery of field guns. Once forces were engaged then as much artillery would be brought to bear as possible. In the lead up to Mons, for example, the two German divisions advancing on Nimy and Obourg discovered the BEF defenders. The artillery was ushered forward and set up on the higher ground north of these two towns. This included the heavy howitzers as well as the field artillery batteries.
By First Ypres, neither side was keen to push batteries forward. It did happen but mostly guns were kept in defilade cover. FOOs could not be far from their respective batteries. Hence when the Germans broke through at Nonne Bosschen then the 60 pounders previously in defilade were brought into action in direct fire mode.
Robert
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I think Stephen has been reading too may accounts of the quality of the Australians written by Australians!
The old regular army of 1914, who learned to shoot to get their beer money, was nothing like any other army or the post- 1914 British Army: the long and slowly gained skills disappeared in the opening battles. I find WW1 gaming, certainly for the Western Front, pretty well impossible except at skirmish level - trench raiding and such like - and nothing captured the feel of what was needed by individual men. I can only regret that I did not talk more to the elderly gentlemen I knew as a boy - not, I suspect that they would have talked to me or anyone else about what they had seen and experienced. My wife's grandfather was an Old Contemptible, Grenadier Guards, tall and very upright and able to sink a pint with the best till he died.
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Here is a battle map showing the advance of the German infantry divisions on Nimy and Obourg. It is taken from the German official history of the Battle of Mons. This is the relevant text from the official history, which Holger and I translated then published as 'The Battle of Mons: The Official German Account'. I have highlighted the key sentence for this post:
"Shortly after 0900 hours IX Corps approached the Canal du Centre northeast of Mons in four parallel march columns. The right column of 18th Division, which comprised the reinforced 35th Brigade, had reached the Champ des Manoeuvres southwest of Casteau at that time. The reinforced 36th Brigade formed the left column, which had reached St. Denis. The 17th Division’s reinforced 33th Brigade marched to Ville sur Haine and the reinforced 34th Brigade headed towards Thieu.
Dragoon Regiment 16, which was 17th Division’s cavalry, reconnoitred ahead and found the canal crossings defended by weak enemy forces. The information was sent back to the division. The artillery was immediately given preference over the infantry march columns and was brought forward into position. The enemy forces, British cavalry, withdrew from the area after a few shots. The dragoons advanced aggressively, easily capturing the intact bridges.
Around 1000 hours, General von Quast (commanding IX Corps) ordered both divisions to advance to the canal crossings. 18th Division’s objectives were the bridges between the Obourg-Mons road. 17th Division was directed to the crossings from La Bruyere up to Bracqeugnies. The divisions were instructed not to go beyond the line Nimy - southwest corner of the woods west of the Obourg-Mons road - the southern edge of the Bois d'Havre - Bois du Rapois in the first instance.
The brigades from 17th Division completed the crossing without incident and reached the objective line under the protection of batteries deployed in an overwatch position. 18th Division, however, struck fierce enemy resistance.
Generalleutnant von Kluge directed the right column towards the crossings northwest and northeast of Nimy, while the left column was ordered towards the bridges south of Obourg. All of the artillery was available to support the infantry advance. It was positioned along the high ground around Maisieres and southwest of St. Denis.
Opposite 36th Brigade it was discovered that the British were defending the Obourg railway building located south of the canal and had occupied the edge of the forest running west from there. Further west again, the enemy had expertly entrenched themselves in a position that was difficult to spot. Located about 500 meters northwest of St. Denis, two batteries of II Abteilung Field Artillery Regiment 45 opened fire on the bridge area and on the defenses that had been detected. Under this covering fire, infantry from Infantry Regiment 85 approached Obourg. Third Battalion came under heavy rifle fire from the occupied railway buildings opposite, which prevented any further advance towards the bridge. The batteries were too far back to destroy the obstacles blocking the infantry’s advance. The divisional commander ordered an artillery section forward. Despite the intense enemy fire, Leutnant Petersen and two men succeeded in bringing a field gun into position. Unfortunately a house still blocked the field of fire to the British outpost. With a few shots this obstacle was cleared. Several shells were then fired at the other railway building, which soon collapsed in on itself like a house of cards."
Robert
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I would love to use Paul Hicks' Mutton Chop 28mm figures to fight 1914, but the game seems almost unplayable. Huge ranges. Straight-on tactics. And a slow long-range contest for fire superiority. This has neither the appeal of Napoleonic / ACW close-range mass maneuver, nor WW2 / Modern close range small unit high firepower.
Can anyone suggest how to make 1914 interesting to game?
As it is, it seems I need a table 40' long and 2' wide and 100 turns of just pushing the offensive side forward against a static, entrenched defence and hoping that off table artillery rolls will kill enough defenders to allow the attackers to close and charge.
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huevans, I can tell you, from my perspective, that Great War Spearhead gives a great game. It is both playable and enjoyable, but it is designed around Division/Corps level. It is not beer and pretzels gaming, you need to take a few moments to figure out what you are trying to do and how you are going to do it. (I am the author by the way and Robert and I have also produced 4 scenario books to support the period). Most of our tables are 4 x 6, but that is using 6 to 20mm figures. I would suggest that at 28mm you would want to increase the distance by a third for all measurement so you would likely want an 6 x 8 table. You can play a divisional sized game in 2 to 3 hours once you are read up on the rules.
The game works very well in both open warfare and trench warfare. There are a lot of added rules specifically for trench warfare but again I will say up front that they give a superb feel of the period and reflect well on the historical use of tactics. In other words if you plan well, and then execute the plan you have a good chance of victory on the table - just like in real life.
From where I sit I feel that most skirmish rules, miss completely the nuance that WWI has, and through my own tooling about, reading, discussing and playing, I find that the scale of GWSHII lends itself perfectly to the period - not that the rules are perfect, everyone has their own slant, but if you play them as written, I believe you will get a great feel of the period.
But I can only speak of my own perspective, I am sure others would gain say me on some points above, but I will again say it is my perspective/opinion not right or wrong, just mine.
Shawn
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I would love to use Paul Hicks' Mutton Chop 28mm figures to fight 1914, but the game seems almost unplayable.
heuvans, you have provided a very accurate summary of WW1 small unit actions. Most rules that are available for skirmish style actions get around this in various ways. You can tell, however, that the mechanics are not quite right when two equal size forces can go head-to-head on table and the attacker can win. It makes for fun games, which is absolutely fine.
When you examine the Battle of Mons, for example, then it is possible to zoom in on some of the small unit firefights. Nimy is a classic for wargaming. The canal is represented on table, with the Germans attacking frontally towards the railway and the road bridge (if the latter is included). In reality, the Nimy defensive position was unlocked by a combination of frontal pinning and an outflanking manoeuvre. German units quickly realised that the BEF position would require a difficult, costly, and lengthy frontal assault. A German pioneer found an alternative route across the canal between Nimy and Obourg. German infantry began filtering across unopposed. Facing the threat of being outflanked, the Nimy defenders fell back.
The canal crossing succeeded, in part, because the Middlesex Regiment was defending around Obourg. They couldn't react because their positions were under heavy threat, including another outflanking manoeuvre further east again. These two examples illustrate how the ultimate success of the German attack was dictated by the higher level tactical advantages. This is characteristic of many WW1 battles in 1914, with success being achieved by outmanoeuvring rather than outshooting the enemy. This is why I like the higher level of Great War Spearhead. You will see the prolonged firefights breaking out in some areas of the battlefield. It is easy to get drawn into these engagements, reinforcing 'failure'. The challenge is to identify and then exploit where the terrain and enemy dispositions give you the best advantage. Get this right and you will more quickly whittle away and then overwhelm an exposed flank or equivalent. Only to find that your reserves won't get moving to exploit the opportunity... lol
Robert
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Thanks, gents! Looks like Great War Spearhead is the game of choice. But those pretty MC 28's are probably going to have to be supplanted by a scale that looks better for a division level game!
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Thanks, gents! Looks like Great War Spearhead is the game of choice. But those pretty MC 28's are probably going to have to be supplanted by a scale that looks better for a division level game!
I reckon it is do-able using 28s. Just scale it down a bit to say 12 - 16 figures to represent a battalion. I was thinking of using Black Powder with a few minor adaptations. Inspired by this:-
http://talesfromghq.blogspot.co.uk/2016/12/it-will-be-over-by-christmas.html
http://talesfromghq.blogspot.co.uk/2016/11/oh-oh-oh-what-lovely-war.html
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You don't need that many, my GWSH battalions only have eight figures (four stands of two each), which looks fine.
There isn't much point having huge battalions as the stands come flying off the table once the shooting starts...
I would humbly submit that 1914 is best gamed at Corps level as you've actually got a chance for some manouvre. Works for me anyway.
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I reckon it is do-able using 28s. Just scale it down a bit to say 12 - 16 figures to represent a battalion. I was thinking of using Black Powder with a few minor adaptations. Inspired by this:-
Yes, I've gone down this route, but my battalions are 19 figures strong (4 stands of 4 figures and a command stand of 3 figures). The sources do naturally draw one to company level actions, but you do need to play at formation level to get the feel of 1914 manoeuvre, I think.
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I think Stephen has been reading too many accounts of the quality of the Australians written by Australians!
It should be remembered that over 50% of the "Diggers" who signed up at the start of WW1 were British and Irish ex-pats who had emigrated in the previous decade, and that many of these (and many "genuine" Aussies) undoubtedly had prior military experience as volunteers in the Boer War.
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Be prepared - if you continue down this line of enquiry (which I would encourage) then you will never look on 28mm games in the same way again ;-). Based on Blöem's account for example, combined with a study of a contemporary map and the British records, neither the BEF infantry nor the East Surrey MG section would have appeared on table up to and including the point at which Blöem's unit was brought to a halt. Only the British officer patrol would have featured on table. I am not arguing against the scale, far from it. Games at this scale can be great fun but lines of men advancing across the open and evicting the enemy from cover...
Robert
I still have some of the lovely Footsore British 1914 figures sitting unpainted on a shelf. Lately I have been toying with the idea of finding / writing a set of rules about "officer's patrols" and other small unit recce or rear guard type skirmishes.
Would these be accurate and authentic for infantry in this period? Would there be much scope for this sort of thing in the training manuals of the time?
How would one find out actual historical details?
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It should be remembered that over 50% of the "Diggers" who signed up at the start of WW1 were British and Irish ex-pats who had emigrated in the previous decade, and that many of these (and many "genuine" Aussies) undoubtedly had prior military experience as volunteers in the Boer War.
IIRC, most of the early Canadian volunteers were accepted because they had previous British Army experience. So be default, they would be British immigrants to Canada.
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monk2002uk,
Thanks, I really appreciate the first hand accounts and your perspective on this.
LB
Eejduduc euhehe sururyehe 🎧
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Eejduduc euhehe sururyehe 🎧
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Grant.
Please use a language we all can understand. Thank you.
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Just to throw in my two penneth worth here, have a look at Spencer Jones' work on the British Army from the Boer War to the first years of the First World War, I'm sure there is plenty in there that cover tactics used.
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I still have some of the lovely Footsore British 1914 figures sitting unpainted on a shelf. Lately I have been toying with the idea of finding / writing a set of rules about "officer's patrols" and other small unit recce or rear guard type skirmishes.
Would these be accurate and authentic for infantry in this period? Would there be much scope for this sort of thing in the training manuals of the time?
How would one find out actual historical details?
When you say 'accurate and authentic', are you referring to the Footsore figures or to the idea of writing a set of rules about officer patrols? I presume the latter.
There is information in some training manuals, yes. Any historical details will have to come from the myriad of anecdotal reports written by officers. From what I have read, I doubt such patrols would make for interesting games. Rommel's book has an example of a patrol that he went on with cyclists if I recall (he definitely went on the patrol, just can't recall the other detail exactly).
Robert
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" The main essential to success in battle is to close with the enemy, cost what it may. A determined and steady advance lowers the fighting spirit of the enemy and lessens the accuracy of his fire. Hesitation and delay in the attack have the opposite effect. The object of the infantry in attack is therefore to get to close quarters as quickly as possibe, and the leading lines must not delay the advance by halting to fire until compelled by the enemy to do so.
The object of fire in the attack, whether of artillery, machine guns, or infantry, is to bring such a superiority of fire to bear on the enemy as to make the advance to close quarters possible.
The action of infantry in attack must therefore be considered as a constant pressing forward to close with the enemy. Owing to the effect of the enemy's fire, however, this onward movement can rarely be continuous, and when effective ranges are reached there must usually be a fire-fight, more or less prolonged according to cirumstances, in order to beat down the fire of the defenders.
During this fire-fight the leading lines will be reinforced; and as the enemy's fire is gradually subdued, further progress will be made by bounds from place to place, the movement gathering renewed force at each pause until the enemy can be assaulted with the bayonet.
The length of rushes must depend upon the ground, the enemy's fire, and the physical condition of the troops. The paramound duty of all leaders in the firing line is to get their troops foward, and if every leader is imbued with a determination to close with the enemy he will be unconsciously assisting his neighbor also, for as a rule the best method of supporting a neighbouring unit is to advance.
If the assault is succesful, and the enemy is driven from his position, immediate steps must be taken to get the attacking infantry in hand for the futher work that lies before them. The victory is yet but half won, decisive success will be achieved only by the annihilation of the enemy. A portion of the troops must at once be pushed forward to harry the retreating forces while the remainder are being re-formed, under their own officers if possible, in preperation of a relentless pursuit.
As soon as re-formed, units must be ready to carry on the pursuit by day and night without regard to their exhaustion. To sustain a relentless pursuit the outmost energies of every commander must be exerted; only indomitable will can overcome fatigue and carry the men forward. A commander must demand the impossible and not think of sparing his men. Those who fall out must be left behind and must no more stop the pursuit than casualties stopped the assault.
Infantry in pursuit should act with the greatest boldness and be prepared to accept risks. Delay for the purpose of detailed reconnaissance or for turning movement is not warranted, and the enemy must be attacked directly as he is seen."
Source: An Officer's Manual of the Western Front 1914-1918
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from youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y5esAR2o-oY
Please explain the relevance of this? This topic is about the mobile warfare tactics that took place for the brief period before both sides dug in for the slog of trench warfare. I fail to see the relevance of a film set in 1916 about trench warfare?
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And here is a German cavalry regiment's account of a French infantry attack early in the war (1914):
"Once in its new position, 4th Squadron received orders to link up with a company of Bavarian Reserve Jaeger Battalion 1 on its right and Schwere Reiter Regiment 2 on its left and to hold the new position at all costs. The enemy, however, did not allow us sufficient time to provide cover from fire for the troopers. The move was directed at about 10 am and, only a short time after we reached the new position, enemy infantry detachments began bearing down on us from the direction of Merville, moving in tactical bounds and brilliantly supported by their field artillery. Shortly afterwards, rifle and machine gun fire was opened from the northwest. This had a very damaging enfilade effect on our troopers deployed to counter the threat from Merville. Despite everything, the courageous troopers of 4th Squadron exercised excellent fire discipline and made sure that every round found a worthwhile target."
Robert
Would You mind sharing which book this account was taken from, Please?
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Would You mind sharing which book this account was taken from, Please?
I translating the content from a German cavalry regiment history. Can't remember which one - I have several upstairs.
Robert
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The Bavarian Schwere Reiter Regiment 1 (1st Heavy Cavalry Regiment).
Robert
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The Bavarian Schwere Reiter Regiment 1 (1st Heavy Cavalry Regiment).
Robert
Thank You.
"Die Bayerischen- Sachsischen- und Wurttembergischen Kavallerie-Regimenter 1913/14" by Hugo Schulz is all I could find. I have already several books with French accounts, but besides Walter Bloem and Ernst Junger it's a bit scarce.
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"Die Bayerischen- Sachsischen- und Wurttembergischen Kavallerie-Regimenter 1913/14" by Hugo Schulz is all I could find. I have already several books with French accounts, but besides Walter Bloem and Ernst Junger it's a bit scarce.
Gribb, are you referring to accounts that describe small unit tactics? In English or also in German?
Robert
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Gribb, are you referring to accounts that describe small unit tactics? In English or also in German?
Robert
Yes, that's correct. Both English and German is fine.
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French cavalry vs German infantry October 1914:
"The Captain got us together and warned us we were being sent to the front. The enemy's march had to be delayed at all costs. We then received orders to prepare for dismounted action. Leaving Our horses in a street we set off across the ploughed fields laden with ammunition. Some round clouds, of snowy whiteness, which made them stand out against the crude and washy blue of the background. The fresh, strong wind was intoxicating.
Towards four o' clock the enemy showed himself in sections and in companies, well aligned on the plain beneath us. There was no attempt at concealment. Under cover of some thin brushwood we opened fire on these regular formations. We must have got their range, for we noted through field-glasses a slight confusion in the enemy's ranks, and, instantaneously, the advancing infantry disappeared. They were still there, however, for their bullets, slipping over the ridge where we offered a good target, pitted the turf all around us without wounding anyone. The Germans have a remarkable faculty of making themselves scarce in the twinkling of an eye as soon as they have been seen by an enemy.
Our naval guns ranged by the side of the road fired over the plain. We saw the shell burst in beautiful plumes of dark or light smoke. The enemy's fusillade ceased, much to Our satisfaction. But the German artillery began to reply, and we were soon subjected to such a fire we had to retreat towards the village. Going along the main street we kept close to the walls to avoid shell splinters. Shells of all calibers fell without ceasing. It was just like an earthquake, the whole street was shaken by it. Without losing a second we distributed extra cartridges and returned to Our place between the farms in the grass fields shut in by hedges and barriers. We protected Ourselves with sand-bags, agricultural implements, etc.
Night had hardly come when an infernal fusillade broke out. Thousands of projectiles struck Our fragile barricade or passed whistling over Our heads. We fired straight in front of us into the dark night. We had only perhaps two hundred troopers to check the onslaught of a formidable mass of infantry. Unless the infantry came to Our aid we would be cut up to a man. A part of the village was on fire, a horde of Germans dashed into it yelling 'Hourraa!'. Yells and cries of bestial joy mounted with the thick smoke of the fires. Captain de Tarragon signaled to us that we should retire. We reached a farm on the crest of the ridge. 400 meters of a German company was advancing.
The captain seized a carbine and turned round to fire. I aimed as best as I could but my greatcoat interfered. At last with cartridges being exhausted he decided to retire. Instead of taking the ditch which ran roadside he crossed the field of fire. A moment afterwards Our number was increased by the arrival of an officer of the Hussars. He was young, elegant and good looking. He opened his mouth as if to speak, but before having emitted a sound he fell dead. The Captain who was by my side, stepped forward to put himself, at last, under shelter. Hardly had he taken a step before a bullet hit him, and I uttered a cry of rage seeing him fall in a heap. I also fell, and both of us rolled into a ditch. A hail of bullets passed like a squall above Our heads."
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Here is the German description from the 88th Infantry Regiment's history:
"The attack by 5th and 8th Companies developed as if on the parade ground. Their advance was then partially held up by wire fences around the paddocks. The obstacles were overcome with a variety of implements, including wire cutters, spades, bayonets, and pickaxes. The leading riflemen could hear the incessant soft chirping sound of enemy bullets but they couldn't see their opponents. Captain Zickendraht, the commander of 8th Company / 88th IR, was seriously wounded by small arms fire. His company pushed ahead undeterred, with the 5th Company / 88th IR continuing to be further forward. Suddenly the air was filled with a shrill then eerily hollow whistling noise followed by a loud, metallic cracking sound. The battalion was under hostile artillery fire but this only accelerated the attack. When Major Schmidt detected an enemy position south of Longlier, he pushed the 6th Company to the left of the 8th.
Near the entrance to Longlier, a German cavalry patrol consisting of Jager zu Pferde and hussars was rescued. They had been bravely defending a farmstead against an enemy cyclist detachment after their horses had been shot down. German artillery had set Longlier on fire. The right flank platoon of 5th Company / 88th IR pushed forward as ordered to a wood that was lying half-right on a hill. There it made contact with the (left flank) Company von Hirschfeld (6th Company) from the Brigade Regiment (87th IR, the other regiment in the 41st Brigade of 21st Infantry Division). This meant that 5th Company was able to move left again, taking the two men wounded by artillery fire, and head towards Longlier to join in the battle. The enemy appeared to have machine guns because the automatic rapid rate of fire, which the German machine guns could not achieve, was clearly heard from certain directions above the din of the battle.
Having deployed, the companies now commenced the firefight. The air was rent with the loud German musketry. As the enemy's fire diminished, Oberleutnant Eger strained to get his 6th Company's skirmish line forward. The men at the front refused to get up. The "Fix bayonets!" signal rang out. Then the village was stormed! The leutnants rushed ahead of their platoons with swords drawn. The assault parties cheered as they entered the village. Savage house-to-house fighting broke out wherever the enemy resisted stubbornly. Individual fanatical civilians joined in, to whom no quarter was given. The cyclist battalion, which had defended Longlier, fell back. They pressed between the burning buildings in Longlier, rushing through our men. Enfilade fire then struck our left flank."
Robert
This account is also really interesting. Could You also Please share which book You read this or where to get a book copy containing information about the 88th regiments history? Thank You.
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The account is from:
Walter Rogge: Das Königl. Preuß. 2. Nassauische Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 88. Deutsche Tat im Weltkrieg, Band 7, Verlag Bernard & Graefe, Berlin 1936.
Robert
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The TooFatLardies rules ‘Through the Mud and the Blood’ are very good on WW1 small unit tactics, and there is also a scenario pack which were used to train officers. One thing the rules capture well are the changes in tactics as the was went on