Lead Adventure Forum
Miniatures Adventure => Age of the Big Battalions => Topic started by: vtsaogames on January 02, 2021, 06:49:44 PM
-
My first blog post of the new year is a rumination on George Washington's battles, how he moved to a more Fabian strategy and how to rate his troops using the Loose Files & American Scramble rules. This should be easy to apply to most AWI rules. https://corlearshookfencibles.blogspot.com/2021/01/george-washingtons-battles-and-rating.html (https://corlearshookfencibles.blogspot.com/2021/01/george-washingtons-battles-and-rating.html)
-
Very impressed by your classifications and would agree with most all of them, except to say that very few British or Continental line units saw much fighting. Most of the battles were fought (on the Crown side at least) by the elite "Reserve" usually commanded by Cornwallis, and composed of the Grenadier and Light battalions, the 33rd Foot (commonly considered the best regiment in the Army, according to Roger Lamb) and the Highland brigade of the 42nd and 1/71st & 2/71st. As such, it is difficult to assess how good most Continental - and British Regular - regiments actually were.
Another factor for the Crown was that it had to obtain replacements from 3,000 miles away.
I would dispute that Steuben did anything more than standardize the Continental army's drill, on a tactical level; to be honest, the genesis of its improved fighting ability was seen in the two Saratoga battles and at Germantown. Steuben's real contribution (IMO) was in the area that had contributed most to the early defeats - poor lower level generalship and staff work. That said, Washington still had a lot to learn; I am not surprised that US gamers still think that Monmouth was some kind of success, or at least a draw (which is somewhat more realistic - again, IMO). However, look at the tactical objectives Washington and Clinton had on the day, and see who achieved them - hint: Washington actually fails to achieve any of his! His support of Lee was woeful - he was still miles from the initial battlefield when Lee's troops began "bugging out" (largely of their own accord and/or under the orders of the two officers - Scott and Maxwell - who gave biased, and also perjured in Scott's case, testimony at Lee's Court Martial).
BvW
-
Since I'm holed up in Maine for the winter,away from most of my books and soldiers, can you suggest some reading about Steuben? I always thought his main contribution was improving the drill of the Continental line units, and teaching them bayonets had uses other than roasting food.
On another tack, I have a book back home about Hubbardton. It includes a table of the 10 Continental regiments in the northern army at the time. It lists strengths and equipment. One regiment almost had enough bayonets for the rank and file. Many had half or less. They were short some muskets too, and very short of the tools to repair muskets, standard equipment for redcoats.
-
Since I'm holed up in Maine for the winter,away from most of my books and soldiers, can you suggest some reading about Steuben? I always thought his main contribution was improving the drill of the Continental line units, and teaching them bayonets had uses other than roasting food.
I think that this is one of those AWI myths that has a vestige of truth but isn't the whole/real story. FWIW, I think the Continentals were already improving in 1777 and the campaigns of that year show that quite clearly. By the second third of the war, what you had, essentially, was two "British" armies slugging it out and it is not surprising, given that fact, that many of the later battles of the war were either bloody draws or Pyrrhic victories.
Several factors contributed to the defeat at Germantown, the most oft-quoted on being the weather, although clearer weather would have given both sides a better idea of who was where and with what. However, troops wearing enemy colours out of bravado (having been ordered not to) resulting in friendly fire, and the C-in-C being persuaded by his artillery commander (who had "read a book") to halt and reduce the Chew House rather than isolate it and keep going, strikes me as the sort of amateurish mistake that few European commanders would have made. IMO, Steuben made the Continental Army think about its generalship.
The Northern Army had enough vets in the ranks from the invasion of Canada to render them more than competent; equally, I don't think that Burgoyne's army had as much experience as it is usually credited with, and where that was greater was in the commanders. The opposing sets of rank-and-file pretty much matched each other, it was the senior officers who made most of the difference.
On another tack, I have a book back home about Hubbardton. It includes a table of the 10 Continental regiments in the northern army at the time. It lists strengths and equipment. One regiment almost had enough bayonets for the rank and file. Many had half or less. They were short some muskets too, and very short of the tools to repair muskets, standard equipment for redcoats.
Yes, I know the book and have it on my own shelves. I'm not sure where the shortage of bayonets among Rebel forces comes from, since a "stand of arms" comprised the musket, cartridge box and belt, and the bayonet and belt, so anyone supplied with a Brown Bess pre-war should have had the complete set.
Stay safe!
BvW
-
Interesting discussion.
Can you provide the name/author of the book on Hubbarton?
thanks.
-
Thread bookmarked!
I'll be following with great interest! Cheers!
-
As a sweeping generalization [easy to make since I'm in the process of writing AmRev rules] I would mostly rate American units as one grade lower as a whole than British. Being in the Army, I have a high opinion of discipline, training, and command structure, all of which was lacking in the American army. So when I create a scenario at the moment, that is a "general" scenario rather than a specific detailed historical battle, if I have 2 Elite, 2 Select, and 2 line British Units, they will fight 2 Select, 2 Line and 2 2nd Class Line units. If it is an historical battle, the Americans may be a bit worse or better.
As someone who has done drill...I don't think it is that hard. But the other 11 hours of the day are what make or break a Soldier. Is he doing his job, cleaning his weapon. making a safe and sanitary camp, etc? Or is he spending his meager pay on cheap booze and poxy gurls, showing up late for sentry duty, and stealing from other soldiers?
my 2 cents.
I make up for the qualitative difference with the victory conditions.
-
Interesting discussion.
Can you provide the name/author of the book on Hubbarton?
thanks.
https://bennington.pastperfectonline.com/library/B95648A1-4188-47FA-A9E0-425410035020 (https://bennington.pastperfectonline.com/library/B95648A1-4188-47FA-A9E0-425410035020)
-
...As someone who has done drill...I don't think it is that hard. But the other 11 hours of the day are what make or break a Soldier. Is he doing his job, cleaning his weapon. making a safe and sanitary camp, etc? Or is he spending his meager pay on cheap booze and poxy gurls, showing up late for sentry duty, and stealing from other soldiers?...
Executing drill while under fire seems to have been more difficult. Agree with your other points. Disease was a serious problem, including STDs. I read somewhere that American units marched in single file until Steuben got them to use column of fours. It got the whole unit to the destination faster.
-
vtsaogames-
Thanks. What do you think of the more recent Venter book on Hubbarton?
-
vtsaogames-
Thanks. What do you think of the more recent Venter book on Hubbarton?
Didn't know of it. I'll have to check it out.
Edit: my interest in this battle was sparked by a 2002 visit to the battlefield.
-
Can you provide the name/author of the book on Hubbarton?
A visual guide to that book (having seen vtsao's reply, it is the same one I have):-
https://www.amazon.com/Battle-Hubbardton-American-rebels-Stem/dp/B001B3TEV6
-
As a sweeping generalization [easy to make since I'm in the process of writing AmRev rules] I would mostly rate American units as one grade lower as a whole than British. Being in the Army, I have a high opinion of discipline, training, and command structure, all of which was lacking in the American army.
For the first two years of the war (1775 and 1776), I would say that that is about right, although I would not over-endow the average British line battalion with any great qualities, as they were not combat-ready at the start of the war (in fact, the average Minuteman unit probably had more combat veterans, and generally more experienced leaders up to company level). However, very few British line units saw much action after the Philadelphia battles, so what experience was gained was largely not made use of (or at least, not in N America - the units sent to the Caribbean in 1778 did very well against the French).
As someone who has done drill...I don't think it is that hard. But the other 11 hours of the day are what make or break a Soldier. Is he doing his job, cleaning his weapon. making a safe and sanitary camp, etc? Or is he spending his meager pay on cheap booze and poxy gurls, showing up late for sentry duty, and stealing from other soldiers?
This is a fair point vis-a-vis the modern soldier, but this was a different era, and levels of knowledge/understanding and sophistication of how/why men should be kept busy were nothing like what they are today. The better officers understood that the devil made work for idle hands, but the money and willpower were not always there; plus, the nature of military service meant that the Continental Army tended to attract people whom we would nowadays regard as "bolshy". Also worth bearing in mind that the Continental Army, in the initial stages at least, was often allowing men to appoint their own officers - frequently based on how lax the candidate was perceived as being towards essential chores and disciplining those who did not pull their weight. Once this pernicious practice was rooted out, things did improve; as I said earlier, if you start looking at the Continentals from the 1777 campaign onwards, their performances improve considerably over 1775/1776.
-
Very interesting. I must say the AWI is not a subject I am too well versed in. Im familiar with the received narrative but I just also read Valiant Ambition (im a big fan of Nathaniel Philibrick) and was hoping people could point me in the direction of some other thought provoking reads on the subject. Both the history of the war itself and some more detailed commentary on the battles themselves. Sorry for going off topic!
-
... I'm not sure where the shortage of bayonets among Rebel forces comes from, since a "stand of arms" comprised the musket, cartridge box and belt, and the bayonet and belt, so anyone supplied with a Brown Bess pre-war should have had the complete set.
Stay safe!
BvW
I think that supply of weapons for the Americans was like their supply of uniforms - haphazard much of the time. Philbrick's "Valiant Ambition" maintains that Washington's army had to retreat after the cloudburst that ended the brief "battle of the clouds" because hundreds of thousands of musket cartridges were ruined. So General Knox reported. The British didn't lose nearly as many because every soldier had a leather cartridge box. I assume many Americans carried cartridges in their their pockets or linen pouches that were not rain resistant. By the time of Eutaw Springs, some Continetals were reported as wearing crossbelts of braided vines. Small wonder they looted the British camp.
The British army was supported by a government that raised taxes, even if it had to ship everything 3,000 miles and deal with inefficiency and corruption. The American army was supported by a feeble government that could not levy taxes but instead pleaded with each state to contribute funds. The states got more miserly as the economy constricted and once the French entered the war, many thought it was over. Add in a good dollop of inefficiency and corruption...
You stay safe too, Baron.
-
Very interesting. I must say the AWI is not a subject I am too well versed in. Im familiar with the received narrative but I just also read Valiant Ambition (im a big fan of Nathaniel Philibrick) and was hoping people could point me in the direction of some other thought provoking reads on the subject. Both the history of the war itself and some more detailed commentary on the battles themselves. Sorry for going off topic!
Atkinson has published the first volume of his intended trilogy on the war, The British are Coming. My brief review can be found here. http://corlearshookfencibles.blogspot.com/2020/11/book-review-british-are-coming.html (http://corlearshookfencibles.blogspot.com/2020/11/book-review-british-are-coming.html)
I forget the authors' name, but for the later Southern campaign, "The Road to Guilford Courthouse". These battles cry out to the wargamer since 2-3,000 per side is often the case.
Edit: plus the Southern battles have small numbers of cavalry, rather the minute amounts further north.
Osprey has a number of titles on battles of this war, including some by Brendan Morrisey, who may be posting on this thread. ;)
He wrote Monmouth Courthouse, among others.
-
Osprey has a number of titles on battles of this war, including some by Brendan Morrissey, who may be posting on this thread. ;)
He wrote Monmouth Courthouse, among others.
Boston 1775, Quebec 1775, Saratoga 1777, and Yorktown 1781, to be precise. :D
-
Atkinson has published the first volume of his intended trilogy on the war, The British are Coming. My brief review can be found here. http://corlearshookfencibles.blogspot.com/2020/11/book-review-british-are-coming.html (http://corlearshookfencibles.blogspot.com/2020/11/book-review-british-are-coming.html)
I forget the authors' name, but for the later Southern campaign, "The Road to Guilford Courthouse". These battles cry out to the wargamer since 2-3,000 per side is often the case.
Edit: plus the Southern battles have small numbers of cavalry, rather the minute amounts further north.
Osprey has a number of titles on battles of this war, including some by Brendan Morrisey, who may be posting on this thread. ;)
He wrote Monmouth Courthouse, among others.
Ah excellent! Turns out I actually put the Atkinson book on my wishlist after reading your review originally, looks like just the sort of thing I'm looking for. I also found I have a book called 'The Long Fuse' by Don Cook on my bookshelf, which I seem to remember picking up from a charity shop.
-
What a great thread - reading and learning as I go. Thanks for starting it!
-
I forget the authors' name, but for the later Southern campaign, "The Road to Guilford Courthouse".
This one, John Buchanan. I've read it and it's quite good, although Babits' "Long, Obstinate and Bloody" has replaced it as the cutting edge in terms of research.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Road-Guilford-Courthouse-Revolution-Carolinas/dp/0471327166
"From Savannah to Yorktown" by Lumpkin is very useful as a one-volume work on the Southern campaigns, with handy orbats; although that too, has since been surpassed by O'Kelley's four-volume "Nothing but blood and slaughter" which is THE last word on all the fighting in the South, from just pre-AWI through to the end (ie post-Yorktown).
-
I would recommend Ferling's "Almost a Miracle" as a very readable one volume narrative for the AWI to start with.
Along with "Long, Obstinate and Bloody" I would also recommend Babits "A Devil of a Whipping" on the Battle of Cowpens"
I am particularly interested in the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse. BM/BvW's Osprey book is very good but as stated in the Further Reading section at the back "The confused nature of the battle is reflected in the writings of both participants and historians, and may explain why so few books have been published on the subject." I have got hold of "The Battle of Monmouth" book by W. Stryker mentioned in this section but I would welcome a Babits style more detailed and up to date account of the battle. Any chances Brendan? :)
-
Well, that's nice of you to put me forward(!), but I feel I've already done my bit - aided and abetted by a proof read by Dr Garry Stone, no less. He was also kind enough to review it as "the best account of the action yet published" when Osprey released it in 2004. However, he himself has since produced "Fatal Sunday" which, given his (former?) status as curator of the battlefield park, must be the final word on the subject, IMO, and which I would thoroughly recommend. Stryker's book is such a mucking fuddle because he died before it was completed and it was put together for publication by his editor, who obviously got lost in Stryker's extensive notes - different incidents are melded together, whilst accounts that are clearly describing the same event are misinterpreted as separate occurrences.
-
Well, that's nice of you to put me forward(!), but I feel I've already done my bit - aided and abetted by a proof read by Dr Garry Stone, no less. He was also kind enough to review it as "the best account of the action yet published" when Osprey released it in 2004. However, he himself has since produced "Fatal Sunday" which, given his (former?) status as curator of the battlefield park, must be the final word on the subject, IMO, and which I would thoroughly recommend.
Ah yes apologies, I had forgotten about "Fatal Sunday". I have it as an ebook which is maybe why.
-
My take on Babits "Devil of a Whipping" is the research he did on American pension applications was wonderful. It shows that Morgan had more troops than usually credited with and also his losses were higher than the usual number reported, although still a small fraction of Tarleton's losses. I do take issue with some of his battle reconstruction based on his own impressive prowess with black powder weapons. He claims 6 aimed shots in a minute with a smoothbore musket. While perhaps a few among the American ranks could match that, most would likely be in the 2-3 shots per minute group. And that always degrades when the target shoots back, or rushes you in a group with cold steel.
Fatal Sunday is excellent, get a copy. Dissing George Washington was a dengerous thing to do. The group of young officers associated with him were prone to challenge to duels.
George lost a number of battles against the British but in the long run, none against army rivals.
-
On one level, it speaks well of Washington that his officers were so loyal to him; on another, it's not difficult to see how that loyalty could be extremely intimidating to those who felt that GW was not always right.
It's worth noting that all the French officers in the Continental Army, bar La Fayette and his coterie (who had their own pro-GW agenda), felt that Lee had been badly mistreated by his C-in-C when he was so abruptly replaced, and let down by both him, and his subordinates in terms of the overall plan. Of course, Lee didn't help himself by his thinly-concealed pique at La Fayette being given command of the advance guard initially; or that he himself had originally suggested that the Crown forces be allowed to withdraw to NYC in peace, as it was what the Continentals wanted (he had also unwittingly taken Morgan's independent corps out of the game by not looking at his clock before writing the word "tomorrow" as the time for Morgan's attack). I also suspect that, if Lee was alive today, he would most likely be on a sex offenders' register somewhere. That said, I do think he was unfairly treated in being blamed for the debacle with the advance guard, a big part of which was Washington's fault in not supporting Lee closely enough to achieve the aims of initially pinning the Crown rear guard and then overwhelming it with the main body of the Continental Army.
-
I think Lee's problem at Monmouth was being in bad odor with most of the officers in the Continental army, starting with Washington. They were up for ditching him if he made any kind of mistake. Kind of like McClernand in Grant's army. He was just out of synch.
-
My take on Babits "Devil of a Whipping" is the research he did on American pension applications was wonderful. It shows that Morgan had more troops than usually credited with and also his losses were higher than the usual number reported, although still a small fraction of Tarleton's losses. I do take issue with some of his battle reconstruction based on his own impressive prowess with black powder weapons. He claims 6 aimed shots in a minute with a smoothbore musket. While perhaps a few among the American ranks could match that, most would likely be in the 2-3 shots per minute group. And that always degrades when the target shoots back, or rushes you in a group with cold steel.
Automatic musket fire was possible. See the attached ;);
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VUWrU8dEIaA
-
Automatic musket fire was possible. See the attached ;);
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VUWrU8dEIaA
So that’s how they won! lol
Seriously though, what I found interesting from reading “A Devil of a Whipping” is according to Babits, the Americans were able to reload while falling back to refuse their flank and so, on turning round in their new position were able to deliver a point blank range volley into the opposing highlanders who, thinking they were retreating, had gone into an uncontrolled charge. Then to be hit in the flank by Washington’s cavalry! No wonder they surrendered. Perfect timing though I am not sure how much credit for it can be given to Morgan.
Although it isn’t difficult to find fault with GW as a man, tactician and strategist, I still feel his legend status is warranted for his sheer tenacity and stamina in keeping the cause going and holding the army together for the duration of the war, particularly when it often it seemed so bleak.
-
So that’s how they won! lol
Seriously though, what I found interesting from reading “A Devil of a Whipping” is according to Babits, the Americans were able to reload while falling back to refuse their flank and so, on turning round in their new position were able to deliver a point blank range volley into the opposing highlanders who, thinking they were retreating, had gone into an uncontrolled charge. Then to be hit in the flank by Washington’s cavalry! No wonder they surrendered. Perfect timing though I am not sure how much credit for it can be given to Morgan.
Although it isn’t difficult to find fault with GW as a man, tactician and strategist, I still feel his legend status is warranted for his sheer tenacity and stamina in keeping the cause going and holding the army together for the duration of the war, particularly when it often it seemed so bleak.
Morgan was lucky, but he had taken Tarleton's measure and had the right plan. His guys were rested and ready, Tarleton's were hungry and tired. And came on right up the middle, like Morgan prepared for.
George Washington had learned from Forbes' campaign against Fort Duquesne (French & Indian War) that the force remaining in the field wins, regardless of how many whippings they took.
For me, his truly legendary status is earned by his suppressing the Newburgh Conspiracy near the end of the war, demobilizing his army after the end, turning down suggestions of a throne and standing down after two terms as president. There were a lot of opportunities for the US to start life as a banana republic.
-
For me, his truly legendary status is earned by his suppressing the Newburgh Conspiracy near the end of the war, demobilizing his army after the end, turning down suggestions of a throne and standing down after two terms as president. There were a lot of opportunities for the US to start life as a banana republic.
Completely agree, we’re here today because of Washington. Not what he did, but what he didn’t do.
-
For me, his truly legendary status is earned by his suppressing the Newburgh Conspiracy near the end of the war, demobilizing his army after the end, turning down suggestions of a throne and standing down after two terms as president. There were a lot of opportunities for the US to start life as a banana republic.
When George III heard that Washington had refused "the throne" and stood down after his time as President, he said what an admirable man GW obviously was. It's a shame in many ways that they never met, as they would have had a lot to talk about, both being keen farmers with a strong sense of duty. Actually, they both also seem to have been rather boring and laconic in private, so whilst they might have had a lot to talk about, they probably wouldn't have said very much!