WW1 Western Front Tactics Prior to Commencement of Trench Warfare

[carlos marighela]

You need to make sure that these rules do not use a WW2 ground scale. Otherwise you run into the opposite problem from the FPW. By WW2, an infantry platoon covered the same frontage as a WW1 infantry company. This is an order of magnitude difference.

Robert

Well yes and no. In the first place the platoon stand or figure is a nominal marker that isn't deployed in any particular fashion, attack/ defend, open order/ closed,  worms etc. It's effectively a datum point.

In the second, the game is aimed at battalion through to Brigade + actions. The smalkest command element is at Coy level. How you space the companies and battalion is more important in that regard.

[monk2002uk]

I totally understand the point about a stand or figure being a nominal marker. It can't be the case though that such nominal markers are then spaced at 5x the interval or more on the table compared to what would have happened historically. At one level it doesn't matter. If the game is fun then what the heck anyway... My point relates to the historical consistency though and there was a world of difference between the two wars (pardon any sense of pun). There are comments that late WW1 was like WW2 but this can't be taken too literally.

Robert

[madman]

My point relates to the historical consistency though and there was a world of difference between the two wars (pardon any sense of pun). There are comments that late WW1 was like WW2 but this can't be taken too literally.

Robert

My point (if it was my comment eliciting the above statement) is that the difference I see is in dispersement of forces. Leaving out support weapons (mgs) the primary infantry weapon's basic design (bolt action rifle) is same for WWI and WWII. As for all the above posts (for my application) WWII infantry fire rules would hold and the difference would be the dispersement of the troops. Between, say, the Franco Prussian war and WWI I don't know enough about the weapons to say if there is a significant (in game terms) difference there but it seems troop dispersement is greater in WWI then the F-P war. Would the training of troops (the extensive British rifle practice) be enough to change the attack factors? By the end (or middle) of the war would troop training have gone down to enough to remove this benefit? Or would the situation on the ground (in the trenches) have made such extreme training mute?

Not trying to beat a dead horse, just becoming interested in a new era (WWI, RCW, Soviet-Polish war) and thinking, mechanically at least, my favorite WWII system should hold given variations in tactics, etc.. Thank you.

Stephen

[Leman]

Prior to the end of October 1914, and certainly in August and September, the continental powers were using the same, or very similar tactics to the early part of the Franco-Prussian War. Many German troops on the Western Front at this time were untried, enthusiastic volunteers and the tactic appears to have been the company column with fixed bayonets. Similarly the overriding French tactic at this point was the charge with élan. Both tactics resulted in horrific casualties: 3000 enthusiastic German students at Langemarck in Belgium, 250,000 French casualties within the first month of the war. As often happens in  warfare, the initial tactics were dictated by the lessons of the previous war, in this case the Franco-Prussian War, where the French in particular had taken a defensive stand initially and lost every battle in the Imperial phase. The tactics were initially unsuited to the advances in weaponry. The British, however, had entered the war having learnt valuable lessons about dispersal and marksmanship in their previous war, the Boer War. Unfortunately they were still using a professional, small, colonial style army unsuitable for tackling the massive German army of 1914.

As to using WWII tactics, these would be much more suitable to the warfare of 1918, when the Germans had devised the successful use of small squad stormtrooper tactics, later copied by the Allies, who supported their troops with early tanks.

[monk2002uk]

Stephen, no it wasn't your comment that elicited my statement. I was referring to general comments about the similarities, which often appear in secondary sources. Rifle fire was very significantly different from mid-19th Century wars. The training in musketry was not unique to the BEF - all sides were trained to coordinate rifle fire against targets at multiple distances. Unlike marksmanship training, which used traditional targets, musketry involved groups of figures that were mechanically made to appear and disappear. The 'figures' were cutout shapes mounted on sleds and / or mechanical means of making the figures 'stand up'. They were placed at different ranges in order to simulate battlefield conditions where the enemy was manoeuvring with small unit bounds.

Later in the war, the focus on rifle fire was actually restored. This followed a relative lull during the static trench warfare period of 1915 through mid-1916. The introduction of automatic rifles and light machine guns made a big difference too, enabling smaller 'fire' units to put out equivalent levels of small arms fire to a standard section. The reason for the increased training was that almost all major attacks were associated with significant advances deeper into the enemy trench systems distributed in depth.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

Many German troops on the Western Front at this time were untried, enthusiastic volunteers and the tactic appears to have been the company column with fixed bayonets.

Leman, did you read the quotes from German attacks earlier in this thread? It was not the case that German infantry attacked in company column with fixed bayonets.

I have also quoted posts about how French soldiers were trained before the war and will dig out quotes that show how they fought once the war started. The notion of just charging with élan is not correct but it took hold in the literature soon after the earliest debacles in the Battle of the Frontiers. The notion has been perpetuated ever since, coupled with a misrepresentation of the concept of 'offensive à outrance'.

Robert

[vtsaogames]

In the Franco-Prussian War, German company columns were used to move troops into the combat zone quickly. They then tended to shake out into skirmish lines or more likely reinforce existing skirmish lines in an ongoing firefight. Some old-school colonels might lead their units into action like it was the Seven Years War but this was the exception. The heavy losses of the company columns early in the Great War were caused by the quick-fire French 75's shooting them up before they got into rifle range and deployed. Also, just attacking was sanguinary business, as all sides discovered.

By the end of the FPW Germans were using fire and movement tactics which then were rediscovered 40 odd years later through painful experience.

The company column was never intended to be a battering ram of bayonets. It was much more supple than a battalion column. It also forced tactical choices down the chain of command to the company level.

Further: the French Chassepot rifle was approaching being a modern rifle. The Needlegun was a very poor relation. The Germans were aided by their superior artillery - still a way from that available in 1914 - and the abysmal French staff work of 1870. This last was corrected by 1914.

[monk2002uk]

This quote is from the book 'In the Fire of the Furnace', which was authored by 'A Sergeant in the French Army'. Here the author is describing the first attack by his unit, as part of the Battle of the Frontiers. The unit fought near the Mangiennes, not far from Longwy, in August 1914. In preparation for the attack:

"...the captain said only a few words. He was nothing of an orator. I was afraid for a moment that his speech might end in gibbering. He recovered himself and concluded. And the men seemed moved by it.

The company formed up again, by platoons, in columns of four. I considered my companions, one by one, with passionate curiosity.

Once having left the wood, we reached the little hill-top...

In spite of having been told that the modern battlefield is empty, I had never imagined anything so desert-like as this. Not a man to be seen in these fields which sloped gently downwards: it was abandoned territory.

Down below us, yonder, there rose a puff of smoke, then another nearer; a third; all in a line. They might have been bonfires lit by an invisible hand.

The noise of the sharp reports reached us.

We had stopped, silent and non-plussed. The captain galloped along the line.

'To fifty paces - Extend!'

We had taken up an extended order and went on marching, but with rather broken ranks.

Our 'connecting file' [sic. - I think this is a mistranslation of serre-file - an officer who followed behind an advance] rushed up.

'Blob formation!'

[The unit then came under artillery fire and went to ground. When the fire subsided...] we raised ourselves up on our knees. Some aeroplanes were circling over us. Taubes, of course!

'Up you get!'

The neighbouring section had started off again. We advanced rapidly. Our serre-file came towards us at the double.

'By sections!'

Henriot repeated:

'Dreher, Guillaumin, by sections!'

We looked at each other, then I exclaimed:

'Come along, the 2nd [Section] with me!'

We covered a good bit of ground, two or three broad undulations. The bursts of firing grew less frequent. We advanced in rushes, for longer distances but not so fast. We felt comparatively safe."

Robert

[monk2002uk]

And here is a German cavalry regiment's account of a French infantry attack early in the war (1914):

"Once in its new position, 4th Squadron received orders to link up with a company of Bavarian Reserve Jaeger Battalion 1 on its right and Schwere Reiter Regiment 2 on its left and to hold the new position at all costs. The enemy, however, did not allow us sufficient time to provide cover from fire for the troopers. The move was directed at about 10 am and, only a short time after we reached the new position, enemy infantry detachments began bearing down on us from the direction of Merville, moving in tactical bounds and brilliantly supported by their field artillery. Shortly afterwards, rifle and machine gun fire was opened from the northwest. This had a very damaging enfilade effect on our troopers deployed to counter the threat from Merville. Despite everything, the courageous troopers of 4th Squadron exercised excellent fire discipline and made sure that every round found a worthwhile target."

Robert

[vtsaogames]

Robert, you are the man for Great War tactical info. Thank you. I have a book to read about the Eastern Front in 1916-1917 (after my current one). I shall undoubtedly have questions for you afterwards.

[monk2002uk]

No problem. Happy to help on the Eastern Front questions if I can, should any arise.

Robert

[Wirelizard]

Missed this thread up until now. Fascinating excerpts and some good sources to follow up on for the period.

I really should get back into my Russian Civil War 28mm project... or give in to the temptation to re-visit the RCW in 6mm or 10mm for the grand tactical scale...

[monk2002uk]

Here is an example of an infantry attack that was not handled well. It involved a French infantry company that attempted to outflank a German force that was occupying the town of Longlier.

"The men readied themselves on the commander’s signal; they rushed forward, singing. A small ridge lay ahead and our commander indicated that a German detachment was spread out 1400 meters behind it. Bounding forward, we reached the top of the hill that separated us from the enemy and finally came face-to-face with them.

We reached the edge of a potato field that provided the only cover and threw ourselves down. Immediately we came under murderous fire. Our men pressed themselves more deeply into the furrows; an officer gave the order to fire at a certain range, without estimating the distance and without ever seeing a target. Our shooting was pathetic! But the German bullets went over our heads! The enemy had the more advantageous position. They were able to take us under effective fire from well protected rifle pits. We did not, however, suffer any casualties at that time.

Risking death at any moment, the Major wandered very calmly back and forth to study the terrain. His face displayed a feisty disdain. 'We will wait until they have used up their ammunition,' he said; 'If we notice that their fire is subsiding then we can push forward.'

Soon afterwards the firing stopped completely. The moment seemed right. 'We have to advance,' the Major told us. We rushed forward, without the defilade cover of the furrow being available. As soon as we were on our feet, the enemy fire crackled into life again. We couldn’t reciprocate because our whole line was involved in the assault. Men went down straightaway, the wounded were groaning and the dead lay prostrate. Cohesion began to break down, then panic set in."

This is similar to the problem that afflicted Walter Blöem's company at Mons. A wrong interpretation was placed on the enemy fire dying away. Note, however, that the attack was not carried out as a blind rush on the enemy. The Major failed to appreciate that the Germans were positioned in strength because he couldn't see them. More seriously, he misinterpreted fire control by the enemy for loss of ammunition. This is why he pushed the whole infantry line forward, rather than use fire and manoeuvre.

Robert

[JArgo]

What an absolute joy of a thread to read.  Many thanks.

If I may, once the move to contact was established was there much evidence of urban fighting?

Or did units retreat?

[fred]

Great stuff Robert.

One thing that strikes me is the importance of suppressing fire. When the troops are advancing in bounds they are able to put fire down on the enemy, reducing the volume and effectiveness of fire coming back at them.

Troops in cover are well protected from enemy fire. But can loose sight of the enemy, especially if they are using improvised cover.

In the last example when the charge is attempted, the enemy are able to be very effective in their shooting as they are shooting at targets in the clear, and are not under suppressing fire.

I'm not sure I've really seen a rule set factor in fire and movement that well (perhaps Chain of Command, but it tends to become a fire fight, rather than a suppress and manoeuvre)