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Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.

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monk2002uk:

--- Quote from: FramFramson on December 25, 2018, 08:11:48 PM ---Even without the shackles of past experience, the war went on long enough that unworkable tactics were pursued long after it became clear that pre-battle projections were consistently, repeatedly over-optimistic. There's certainly hay to be made arguing about how quickly a person in that position might be expected to learn, or about how much the allied leadership were let down by unknowable factors outside their control (such as the disastrous quality of British shells early in the war, the horrible French attempts at an early light machine gun, or the understandably protracted development period of mobile offensive weapons such as tanks), but it's also clear that there were many younger officers champing at the bit with new ideas who could have been given opportunities one or even two years sooner.
--- End quote ---
The issue of the 'learning curve' lies at the crux of this debate. The notion is predicated on the idea that there was a way to overcome the Germans but no-one was smart enough to figure it out or flexible enough to lay aside outdated views until several years had gone by. The latter concept conjures up a view of 'stuck-in-the-mud' generals who refused to 'see' what was actually happening.

In reality, there was a complex set of processes that mitigated against a 'quick win'. Most significantly, at no point in the war was there a 'simple fix' that, once applied, could overcome the enemy. The reason being that all sides were constantly adapting to each other within weeks, eventually almost in real-time. Take the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for example. This was launched by the British in early 1915 after the introduction of static warfare. A hurricane bombardment, supported by artillery in the front line firing over open sights, opened up the German trenches and enabled a rapid penetration of the British attacking force, except on the British left flank. Despite having been requested by Haig to plan for quick exploitation of such success, Rawlinson refused to let the advance continue immediately. He preferred to consolidate the situation rather than push on, which enabled the German reinforcements to come forward and negate any further advance. The initial assault was so successful that details were published throughout the French army as an example of best practice.

The Germans quickly examined the 'lessons learned' by way of their After Action Reports. Immediately, they set about putting counter-measures in place. The depth of trench lines was increased. MG nests were positioned at ground level within the parapets, protected by metal rails. Barbed wire defences were upgraded, with wire being placed below ground level in many cases. This made the wire obstacles invisible to advancing troops. These changes meant that the next time the British attacked, it was not possible to create or maintain a deep lodgement as happened in Neuve Chapelle.

The process of development and counter-development went on throughout the war. By way of another example, as the Germans mastered the techniques of immediate counter-attacks with Stoßtruppen in 1916 and 1917 so the British developed new tactics to counter the counter-attacks. In the Third Battle of Ypres, British intelligence officers followed immediately behind the advancing British and Dominion attacking forces in each of the major advances. They quickly interrogated captured German prisoners and read any captured documents. This enabled them to understand, in near real-time, how and where the German counter-attacks would be launched. British artillery were then tasked with interdiction missions, based on the new intelligence. Ludendorff and his architect of the counter-attack, von Loßberg, became desperate to figure out how to negate the advantage that now lay with the British. The new tactics exacted a heavy toll of German forces, causing one German writer to note how drained and worn out von Loßberg had become as he tried to figure the next move. As it happened, Ludendorff decided to go back to packing the German front line with defenders, just like Neuve Chapelle. The consequences were disastrous for the German defenders. Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote of the huge relief that the rains brought late in the extended battle. Otherwise, the Germans would have had to execute their plan for abandoning the Ypres area.

Robert

FramFramson:

--- Quote from: monk2002uk on December 27, 2018, 07:18:26 AM ---Class bias was an issue in the British and German armies alike; much less so with the Republican French army. Within the German army, there were the biases at the equivalent of the state level. Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers, etc often wrote about being treated as inferior by Prussians. The biggest problem within the German army, however, was the relationship between the General Staff and the other senior commanders. Writers like Jack Sheldon have clearly shown how the role of the General Staff created significant friction within the German army. The concept also saw men like von Loßberg and Bruchmüller elevated to positions of great influence, without having climbed the normal chain of command. The latter officer planned the artillery barrages for Operation Michael. One German army chose to follow his 'advice'; the other did not. The latter did not succeed anywhere near as well on the first day, despite however well the junior officers were trained and exercised command at the tactical level.

Robert

--- End quote ---

No question the Germans faced the same Victorian/Edwardian class issues in WWI (the air service being the most famous example) and the pro-Prussian bias is well-known and then there's the whole issue of Ludendorff - worth many books all on it's own. I would only argue that they suffered somewhat less than the British, who were particularly egregious in this regard. Even today, Britain remains one of the most highly stratified nations in Europe, though the link between the British upper class and the leadership of the BA or RN has mercifully been greatly diminished.

I've probably pushed a bit far in comparing the British and German command style, when the original point was that the war was exceptionally grossly wasteful and futile (if not outright devastating) from the point of view of many of the participants.


--- Quote from: monk2002uk on December 27, 2018, 07:44:52 AM ---The issue of the 'learning curve' lies at the crux of this debate. The notion is predicated on the idea that there was a way to overcome the Germans but no-one was smart enough to figure it out or flexible enough to lay aside outdated views until several years had gone by. The latter concept conjures up a view of 'stuck-in-the-mud' generals who refused to 'see' what was actually happening.

In reality, there was a complex set of processes that mitigated against a 'quick win'. Most significantly, at no point in the war was there a 'simple fix' that, once applied, could overcome the enemy. The reason being that all sides were constantly adapting to each other within weeks, eventually almost in real-time. Take the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for example. This was launched by the British in early 1915 after the introduction of static warfare. A hurricane bombardment, supported by artillery in the front line firing over open sights, opened up the German trenches and enabled a rapid penetration of the British attacking force, except on the British left flank. Despite having been requested by Haig to plan for quick exploitation of such success, Rawlinson refused to let the advance continue immediately. He preferred to consolidate the situation rather than push on, which enabled the German reinforcements to come forward and negate any further advance. The initial assault was so successful that details were published throughout the French army as an example of best practice.

The Germans quickly examined the 'lessons learned' by way of their After Action Reports. Immediately, they set about putting counter-measures in place. The depth of trench lines was increased. MG nests were positioned at ground level within the parapets, protected by metal rails. Barbed wire defences were upgraded, with wire being placed below ground level in many cases. This made the wire obstacles invisible to advancing troops. These changes meant that the next time the British attacked, it was not possible to create or maintain a deep lodgement as happened in Neuve Chapelle.

The process of development and counter-development went on throughout the war. By way of another example, as the Germans mastered the techniques of immediate counter-attacks with Stoßtruppen in 1916 and 1917 so the British developed new tactics to counter the counter-attacks. In the Third Battle of Ypres, British intelligence officers followed immediately behind the advancing British and Dominion attacking forces in each of the major advances. They quickly interrogated captured German prisoners and read any captured documents. This enabled them to understand, in near real-time, how and where the German counter-attacks would be launched. British artillery were then tasked with interdiction missions, based on the new intelligence. Ludendorff and his architect of the counter-attack, von Loßberg, became desperate to figure out how to negate the advantage that now lay with the British. The new tactics exacted a heavy toll of German forces, causing one German writer to note how drained and worn out von Loßberg had become as he tried to figure the next move. As it happened, Ludendorff decided to go back to packing the German front line with defenders, just like Neuve Chapelle. The consequences were disastrous for the German defenders. Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote of the huge relief that the rains brought late in the extended battle. Otherwise, the Germans would have had to execute their plan for abandoning the Ypres area.

Robert

--- End quote ---

This is fair.

However, it's not so much the individual tactical changes that I'm focusing on, but the failure to rise above that pattern of extremely rapid adaptation. I've read my share of what-ifs in the wake of bunglings, but even if Rawlinson had committed the reserves, it's unlikely this would have crucially changed the outcome of the war, along with a hundred other what-ifs. 

It's the conflicts between staffs and allied nations (the internal German divisions had nothing on the British-French mistrust, well that's my opinion anyway), and the horrible failure to think in larger scales which bother me more. It's a very military habit to focus on those brief incremental tactical advantages, but an excessive focus on them to me indicates a leader promoted well beyond his ability; a case of target fixation no army side could afford.

Military buffs do this too! The what-if of battles past are fun to think about, and as wargamers how often do we see historical battles refought on a 4x6 table? But just as the better leaders in Union in the ACW realized that it was about the larger strategic numbers. Even Grant didn't just want to run a meat grinder, and he took many steps to avoid straight one-for-one attrition as much as possible. What was key was that Winfield Scott, Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman all understood very well that losing a single battle was not as important as overall strategic considerations. Grant knew they had to USE the manpower and materiel advantages of the Union in full, especially for major strategic operations which would result in meaningful changes in the war's situation - Vicksburg, being a prime example; casualties were atrocious, but splitting the Confederacy in twain constituted a massive strategic blow. Sherman, in his turn, moved to destroy the tottering economy of the Confederacy. These were grand plans appropriate to their position as high-ranking senior generals, and they worked together harmoniously not only to sketch their operations but to execute them - famously so in Grant and Sherman's case.

By contrast, you never see anything half so clear out of the office of the CIGS, GOCinC, etc. instead it was the politicking, personal acrimony, and shocking insecurity that seems to characterize most of the higher-level interactions (French weren't so bad about this, but the English could be atrocious about it when dealing with the French). Who would outrank who, who was responsible for what, etc. Coherent strategic plans, when they did come up, were tainted by association by their creator and often shelved. Even tanks ended up being developed by the damn admiralty at first due to such ridiculous politics and Kitchener's intransigence, and only because Churchill exceeded his authority on his own initiative (I have found that many of my favourite military leaders are those who have first learned the rules and then learned to break them, I will admit to a happy bias here).

The Germans were always looking for those angles: ways to tie down or force the commitment of vast numbers of enemy troops, or gain efficiencies on a great strategic scale. Now, it's perfectly possible that the Germans were not particularly talented in this regard and only pursued such things more vigorously out of necessity, given their weaker allies and having a lesser force overall. But they did so with more vigour, more focus, and with many remarkable successes, most crucially, in Russia.

But British efforts in this regard weren't just bad... sometimes they were plain disgraceful. The British attempt to involve Romania - who could have been a major threat to the Alliance, had matters been better planned - was such a complete cock up, that the British essentially destroyed what was left of the country just to deny it to the Germans. The major agreement in the mideast, Sykes-Pecot, was far more about two sides overconfident in eventual victory carving up the spoils in a holdover of colonial-style wrangling than it was about coordinating war plans. And the suspension of the Third Home Rule act was just utterly disastrous. The politicians were so frequently at odds, while the military leadership failed to press for those crucial political solutions.

FramFramson:
Thanks for the threadsplit Driscoles. This had gotten rather off track from the film.

Driscoles:
youre welcome !

monk2002uk:

--- Quote from: FramFramson on December 25, 2018, 08:11:48 PM ---...the Americans demonstrated far too late it would have been possible to greatly increase the effectiveness of trench assaults with a mundane existing weapon - the shotgun - whose absence from earlier assaults was almost shocking in retrospect.
--- End quote ---
As it happens, I am translating a copy of a German account of one of the first major battles featuring the American 2nd Division. This is the series of battles that took place in June 1918, in and around Belleau Wood. The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments featured in these battles. The book is entitled 'Sternenbanner gegen Schwarz-weiß-rot', which translates as 'Star-spangled Banner versus Black-White-Red'. The latter refers to the colours of the Reich war flag:



General Pershing had come to the conclusion that the British and French armies were using outmoded tactics. He was keen that the American forces should demonstrate a better way to conduct infantry assaults. The Big Red One had enjoyed a minor success in capturing Cantigny earlier, with the aid of French tanks and flamethrower units. Belleau Wood brought home how difficult the problem of assaulting German forces could be. For ten days, the Marines attempted to take Belleau Wood and surrounds. The Germans described their attempts as brave but naive essentially. The initial assaults were cut to ribbons with enfilade machine gun fire. Eventually, in a battle of attrition in which numbers won out, the Marines took and then finally held the wood. The Germans had huge respect for what the Marines achieved in the end but not so for the means.

It wasn't possible to get close enough to use shotguns until Day 11 (not that there is any evidence that shotguns were actually used in this battle).

Worse was to come in the Meuse-Argonne offensive...

The point is not that the American forces were useless, far from it! But there was a massive lesson that had to be learned the hard way - there was no 'simple' bloodless way to beat the Germans in the field of battle.

Robert

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