Japanese in the Mad Baron's Army

[Mark Plant]

SOME REMARKS ON BARON R.F. VON UNGERN-STERNBERG

Nakami Tatsuo
Professor emeritus, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Even in Japan, after 1990s, historical researches on “Siberian Intervention of 1910s”
and “Mongolian People’s Revolution of 1921” were done by scholars investigating
primary historical sources. However, historical research on Baron R.F. von Ungern-
Sternberg was never written by any scholars. Among the troops of Baron R.F. von
Ungern-Sternberg, The Japanese person’s group were included.

They were called as “Hinomaru Dai-tai/ Rising Sun Flag Battalion” invading Ikhu
Kuree together with Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg.

For COVID-19, all our daily life in Tokyo now strongly controlled. For example I
have to stay home, and prohibited to go to my office or library and archives. I am unable
to complete my academic paper, by checking the historical sources. I wish to talk some
remarks on Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg.

1. What kinds of the Japanese were joined into called as“ Hinomaru Dai-tai ”.among
the troops of Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg,?

Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg had not recruited and organized his troops by
himself. He took over the troop of G. M. Semenov after the his downfall in the fall of l920.
At first, in the end of 1917, in Mandzuli of Northeast China. G. M. Semenov organized his
troops and invaded Trans-Baikal. G. M. Semenov was advised by Japanese army
officers, as like Captain Kuroki Chikanori. His army was supported by the Japanese
Army in Siberia and supplied weapons from Japanese Army. G. M. Semenov’s Army
were composed of the Mongolians including Buriat Mongolians, Chinese, Russian and
Japanese members. The Japanese members were uncultivated and wild peoples, including
retired soldiers and civil adventures, recruited by the Japanese officers in Northeast China
and their cultural and political standard were not high. These Japanese and Mongolian
persons had jointed into Babuujabu’s troop and aimed at anti-Yuan shihkai campaign in
1916.leading by the Japan’s civil-expansionists. However, after Babuujabu’s death, they
moved to Barga-Mongolia and occupied there and finally joined into G. M. Semenov’s
Army. And Semenov’s downfall of 1920 the Japanese advisers as like Kuroki left from
G. M. Semenov’s camp, a part of Japanese, Chinese, and Mongolian soldiers remained
under Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg’s leadership

2. Why the historical sources related to Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg was little
in Japan?

However between Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg and old Japanese advisers
under G. M. Semenov, no official relationship nor private communications were found.
Almost Japanese had no information on R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg. As a result of such
situation, concrete and detail facts related to Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg were not
described among the Japanese foreign and military documents It was difficult for us to
write anything on Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg, using historical sources preserved
in Japan. The only rare material which I had found related to Baron R.F. von Ungern-
Sternberg and his troop was list of member of “Hinomaru Dai-tai”, compiled by Captain
Kuroki Chikanori at the Kuroki’s personal papers in Miyazaki. It seems that at the time
of dissolving “Hinomaru Dai-tai”, Kuroki personally attempted to give financial aid for
their returning to Japan and made list of member of “ Hinomaru Dai-tai” However, the
list did not include all the member of “ Hinomaru Dai-tai”. Personal description or
memoirs on “Siberian Intervention of 1910s” were written by many Japanese. However,
I had not found any Japanese descriptions or memoirs related to Baron R.F. von Ungern-
Sternberg.

This is one reason in Japan historical research on Baron R.F. von Ungern-Sternberg
was never written by any scholars in Japan.

[Sakuragi Miniatures]

Thanks for sharing that, I've never heard of the Mad Baron before or read on the fighting in Mongolia.

[Mike Blake]

Thanks. Anything you can tell us is most welcome.

[Mark Plant]

I found a book containing collection of articles about the Baron on line and I am working my way through it slowly. It's mostly in Mongolian and Russian, celebrating the 100 years since the baron's arrival in Mongolia, but that article was in English. I've tidied up a couple of the worst spelling and grammar errors, but left the sentence structures as they are.

I know people in the past have asked about the nature of the Japanese men in the Baron's army, which is why I thought it might be of interest to a handful here.

[Patrice]

Interesting and surprising, thanks!

[Mark Plant]

The Role of the Mongolian Military in the Struggle for the Liberation of the Capital

Major ?. Sukhbaatar
Doctor of Historical Sciences
Head of the Military History Centre at the Military Research Institute
National Military University
Ministry of Defence of Mongolia
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia,

Abstract. In October 1920, Baron R.F. Ungern organized several attacks in order to capture the capital of Mongolia, but retreated. After the mobilisation of hundreds of Mongols and Buryats, including many young people, the capital city was captured on 2 and 3 February, 1921.
In the morning of 2 February, a detachment of 200 pre-trained Tatars and a small number of Cossack troops attacked the Chinese military garrison in Maimachen (Amgalanbaatar), and a group led by B.P. Rezukhin advanced through the southern gate of Maimachen. During that time, the Tatars, together with the Mongol troops, rapidly seized the city. On 2 February, sotnias led by Arkhipov, Khobotov and Parygin marched to the eastern outskirts of Niislel Khuree capturing the Chinese prison and the nearby consular settlement.
Mongolian military units, well versed in the situation on the ground, played a decisive role in the battle for the capital city.

In 1911, the Mongols started their National Liberation Revolution and proclaimed the state independent.
However, due to interference from foreign countries, the autonomy of the Mongolian state was abolished by the Chinese in 1919. In that year the Chinese General Xu Shuzheng and his troops entered Mongolia and destroyed the then Mongolian state. The Mongolian army was disbanded. This did not discourage the Mongols but provoked a further struggle for independence.
When Mongolia's autonomy was crushed by the Chinese military in November 1919, Bogd Khan  said: “After it [Mongolia’s autonomy] is under Chinese rule, the time to return it will be in two or three years, so do it properly.” This was a politically far-sighted and timely policy, the correctness of which was confirmed by subsequent events.
One of the most important roles in the fate of our country was played by the Tsarist General Baron von Ungern-Sternberg. His full name is written in Russian as Baron Robert Nikolai Maximilian (Roman Fedorovich) von Ungern-Shternberg, in German as Robert Nikolaus Maximilian Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg.
From 1908 Ungern served as a 2nd Lieutenant in the 1st Argun Regiment of the Transbaikal Cossack Host. He wanted to take part in the 1911 revolution in Mongolia. For that purpose, having arrived in Mongolia, he travelled to Khovd (then Kobdo). On the way from Uliastai (then Ulyasutai) to Khovd, Baron Ungern was joined by A. V. Burdukov, a Russian businessman who later became a famous Mongolist, who described the peculiarities of the Baron's character and behaviour in his book “In Old and New Mongolia”, translated into Mongolian.
Unfortunately, the Russian consul in Khovd, a diplomat named Lyuba, did not allow him in on the grounds that he could not interfere in foreign affairs. However Russian historians and researchers continue to believe that he remained in Mongolia until 1914.
With the outbreak of World War I, Ungern enlisted in the 34th Don Cossack Regiment operating on the Austrian front in Galicia. During the war he was wounded five times, but returned to the ranks with his wounds not fully healed. For his exploits, bravery and courage he was given five awards, including the Order of St George, 4th degree.
At the end of 1914, the Baron transferred to the 1st Nerchinsk Regiment, in whose service he was awarded the Order of St. Anne, 4th class with the inscription “For bravery”. In September 1915, Ungern was seconded to Ataman L. Punin’s special cavalry detachment on the Northern Front, whose task was partisan actions in the enemy rear in East Prussia. During further service in the special detachment Ungern received two more awards: the Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd degree and the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree. Baron Ungern returned to the Nerchinsk Regiment in July or August 1916. In September 1916 he was promoted from lieutenant to staff-captain, then to captain for his military distinction and was awarded the Order of St. Anne, 3rd degree. In October 1916, while in Chernivtsi (then Chernovtsy, Ukraine), he was removed from the regiment for a breach of discipline.
In 1917 he went to Vladivostok, and from there to the Caucasian front. There is an assumption that he was transferred by the commander of the 1st Nerchinsk Regiment, Colonel Baron P. N. Wrangel. There he found himself again together with his friend G. M. Semenov – the future ataman. There, in the Lake Urmia area of Persia (Iran), Ungern participated in the organisation of volunteer detachments of Assyrians fighting for Russia.
The reason for Ungern's arrival in Mongolia is an interesting and ambiguous story. My assumptions about it are as follows.
During the Civil War, Soviet Russia sought to assert its influence in Mongolia, based on the fact that the remnants of Admiral Kolchak's army had been pushed into Siberia. In order to protect the young Soviet republic from China, two buffer states (the Far Eastern Republic) and Mongolia were to be created. Initially the Bolsheviks wanted to send troops to Mongolia, but this was against China's interests. Both Tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia recognised Outer Mongolia as part of China.
So they waited for Ungern, who was under the command of Ataman Semenov, to go to Mongolia and then, from supply bases in Mongolia, attack Soviet Russia.
The Soviet Chekists had long followed the Baron's views on Greater Mongolia, carefully analysing the composition of the armed forces concentrated on Mongolia’s north-eastern border region. At a time when Soviet power was developing and strengthening in Siberia, the Baron would be able to strike at the young Far Eastern Republic through Mongolia. Among the Baron's associates was a Soviet spy who was believed to have persuaded him to send troops into Mongolia.
The Mongols were blessed by the god of good luck. In October 1920 Baron Ungern led the Asiatic Horse Division across the eastern border of Mongolia. The Baron had three cavalry squadrons of 150-200 men each, a Dauria cavalry detachment with a machine gun team and three incomplete batteries, totalling about 800 soldiers. The squadrons included Mongols, Buryats, Tatars, Bashkirs and Russians.
This incident was not aggressive. Researchers disagree as to whether the government invited Ungern to Mongolia. For example, the Russian authors S. K. Roshchin, L. A. Yuzefovich and B. D. Tsibikov believed that the Mongolian nobility had turned to Japan for support. The Mongolian historians L. Dandev, N. Magsarjav and H. Parle believe that Baron Ungern's soldiers entered Niislel Khüree  and asked Bogd Khan for permission to fight the Chinese army. In a letter Ungern wrote:
I, Baron Ungern of Russian roots, want to help Bogd Khan. I have come with an open heart. Please allow us to enter the capital of Khüree to protect Mongolia from the tyranny of the Chinese...
Bogd Khan agreed to this mission, and sent the aristocrat Luvsantseren as his leading envoy.
The Baron's goal was to increase his military power, turn Outer Mongolia into a buffer zone to protect it from Soviet Russia, and create a dream of a united Mongolia that would unite all Mongols. He intended to seek help from countries such as the United States and Japan. Baron Ungern was not interested in conquering Mongolia and proclaiming himself Khan – he believed that invading Mongolia was a matter of world importance.
After Baron Ungern arrived, Mongolians came from all sides to Terelj, where he was stationed, and expressed gratitude for his rescue and volunteered to serve him. Initially, when the Baron arrived in Mongolian territory with more than 800 soldiers, the additional Mongols meant he had about 1,000 soldiers.
The first attack on Khüree was launched on 27 October 1920. However, it failed and the troops were forced to withdraw. On 2 November, preparations for a new attack began. However, the Chinese who were in the capital offered organised resistance. On 5 November, the troops returned to their original positions at Terelj. Their losses were enormous.
The Baron began to recruit soldiers from the neighbourhood to reinforce his troops. In November, 170 soldiers arrived from Prince Naidan. In general, the Mongol warriors were entrusted with the most important tasks. Mongolian soldiers did all the work of searching for escaped soldiers, guarding the herds of horses and guarding the supplies.
He was supported by influential Mongol princes and powerful nobles such as Dugar-maren, Luvsantseren and Navanneren. They met with him, outlined measures to improve the situation and organised the recruitment of new recruits by secret order of Bogd Gegen. According to S. L. Kuzmin, the baron established a military ministry, which included Baila Zhamyan, Princes Mishigdorj and Tserendorj, Prince Dugarsuren, Prince Tserenvandui-Bavudorj, and the army lamas Rinchinsambu and Derin-Choijin. Exhausted by the Chinese harassment and oppression, Mongols flocked to him day and night, considering the Baron their only saviour. In spite of Chinese threats, the Mongols supplied the Asiatic Horse Division with food and horses, giving everything they had.
In December 1920, on the Baron's orders, a Mongol regiment and 200 Russian soldiers successfully attacked and took control of the strategically important village of Mandal on the road to Altanbulag (then Kyakhta). In addition to the Mongols, Bogd Gegen's associates Sazh-lama and the Buryat Tubanov recruited a hundred Tibetans from the Khüree area into a military unit. The Mongols were the largest part of the army during the re-attack on Niislel Khüree. The Mongols, who knew the land very well, were often sent on reconnaissance missions. They also waged constant psychological warfare against the Chinese by spreading false rumours. The Chinese gained insight into the Baron indirectly both from the intentional and unintentional rumours spreading among the Mongols.
In the two months after the previous assault, the Asiatic Division had almost doubled in size (to 1,460 men) and had been partially reorganised. It had 12 machine guns and 4 guns. The Mongolian population spread rumours that Ungern was forming a large Mongolian army of up to 5,000 men. This became known to the Chinese command, which had not carried out any fortification work during the entire occupation and could not confirm the reliability of this information due to the lack of an established intelligence service. The Mongols fulfilled all the missions under the Baron's leadership with integrity and honesty and played an important role.
On 27 January, the influential aristocrats Erdene-Shantszotba Dashzhav, Jalkhantsza-hutukhta Damdinsuren, Darhan-chin-van Puntsagtseren, Erdene Shirnendamdin, Khuvchin-chin-van Tsogbadrakh, and Suzhigt-van Dorjpalam met with Ungern to discuss the release of Bogd Gegen. Regardless of who initiated the plan to free Bogd Gegen, the plan was authorised by Baron Ungern.
Baron Ungern inspected the military preparations for the invasion of Niislel Khüree for the last time on 31 January. His army consisted of 200 Mongol groups, of 180 men each. Tubanov's special divizion also had 200 men, including a Mongol-Buryat sotnia. Thus, we can say that the Mongolian army was ready to fight.
The general composition of the Asiatic Horse Division was as follows:
- 1st Tatar Horse Regiment, 350 sabres under the command of Captain Parygin;
- the 2nd Horse Regiment, 300 sabres under command of Captain Khobotov;
- Captain Dmitriev's artillery divizion, 4 cannons and 60 artillerymen;
- Captain Evfaritsky's machine-gun team, 80 men with 12 machine guns;
- a Japanese horse company, 40 men;
- a Mongolian divizion, 180 men;
- Tubanov's independent divizion, 170 men (one Tibetan and one Mongolian-Buryat sotnia);
- Naidan's Chakhar [Mongol] divizion.
On the night of 1 February Tubanov left the U-Bulan valley just by the south-west of Bogd Uul mountain together with two hundred Tibetans, Mongols and Buryats. Sazh-lama and the Bargut Luvsan went with him. Only the Mongols knew the terrain. Naidan was left behind as a final standby assistance if the two sotnias failed in their mission.
On the morning of 2 February Rezukhin launched an attack at Modochin, while Khobotov and his Mongols crossed the Uliastai River. Ungern estimated that it was a suitable place for artillery and sent two of his four artillery pieces to open fire. While the artillery fire was being directed at the Chinese, a detachment under Sazh-lama, Tubanov and Louvsan launched the most dangerous operation to free Bogd Gegen, kidnapping him from house arrest and taking him to Manjushri Monastery via Mount Bogd Uul.
At night, large bonfires were lit on Mount Bogd and on Maihan Tolgoi, indicating the presence of Whites to the south and north of the city. Bonfires also burnt on many hills around. This had a great moral effect on the Chinese army. This method had been used by Mongolian soldiers historically, and the fires were definitely directed by the Mongols. The bonfires gave Ungern an added impetus by giving the impression of a tight siege of the city. In addition, according to D. P. Pershin, the superstitious Gamins believed that he had magical powers.
During the battle, Ungern occupied the Mongol barracks buildings near Makhur Tolga, near the present military hospital; Mongol and Chakhar soldiers forced the Chinese out at the critical moment when the Chinese began to crowd Ungern with artillery fire. By 4 February the capital was largely liberated, and the next day individual groups of Chinese soldiers were destroyed.
This battle is not considered the end of the liberation of Mongolia. The expelled and defeated Gamins were driven out of Khüree, but could gather in other areas and join forces for a new attack. Therefore, the battle to liberate the country took place in several stages. These include the battles of Ulan Khad and Choir.
It is barely mentioned that Bogd Khan's state played a significant role in the defeat and expulsion of the Chinese Gamin army – instead the sole occupier of Mongolia is given as Baron Ungern. This is a “blank spot” in the history of Mongolia and its armed forces.
Only the Chakhar Bairgun remained from the Mongolian troops under the baron’s control. He was defeated in a battle with the People's Army near Altanbulag, and the rest joined the People's Army. 
The defeat of Xu Shuzheng's 15,000-strong army, which had entered Mongolia a year and a half earlier and then collapsed, was proclaimed in Beijing as a national catastrophe. L. Bat-Ochir, a doctor of history and professor, first published an article about it entitled “Mongolian Soldiers, Not Traitors.” He wrote:
Of Ungern's 12,000 soldiers, 8,000 or two-thirds were Mongols. Since most of them were Mongols, it is clear that the Mongols were the main force in the victory of Ungern's army over the Gamins at Niislel Khüree, Ulan Khad and Choir.
Dr L. Zhamsran wrote:
Mongolian patriots recruited troops, united with the White Russians, liberated the Jebtsundamba, and proclaimed him Khan for a second time, and on 22 February restored the autonomy of Inner [sic] Mongolia. This was a great step forward for the national liberation movement.
The Provisional People's Government, the Mongolian People's Party (MNP) never considered those Mongolian troops who were under the command of Ungern's army as their enemies, and were able to attract them to the side of the national-democratic revolutionary forces.
The following conclusions can be drawn from this.
•   The use of Baron Ungern's troops in Mongolia was a tactical matter for the Mongolian government.
•   The 15,000-strong Chinese army was defeated by Ungern's Whites, with the intervention of the People's Army as well as Mongolian volunteers who joined Ungern's army and fought for freedom.
•   The Provisional People's Government and the MNP never considered the Mongolian troops under Ungern's command as enemies and managed to attract them to the side of the armed forces of the National Democratic Revolution. With the exception of Bairgun's detachment, the Mongols under Baron Ungern's command retreated without his support. This may have led scholars to conclude that the threat of civil war between the MNP and the Khüree government was averted.

[Mike Blake]

Thanks for this