The War that 'no-one' wargames..will that change?

[monk2002uk]

The challenge of the empty battlefield propagates from the tactical to the operational level in WW1. Generals could not see the enemy dispositions. Aerial reconnaissance should have made a difference but the information from that source(s) was never definitive. Returning to 'The Retreat from Mons', here is how the scenario map would look based on what the operational command levels understood:



Maubeuge was a huge fortified position covering 250+ acres on the ground so I have modelled this in the same colour as the 'Garrison' marker. German High Command had no clue where the BEF divisions were. On 25th August, they thought the BEF was falling back on Maubeuge. I have used a marker to indicate this.

Robert

[ChrisBBB]

Yes, there's fog of war. (BBB incorporates this through movement rolls - an imperfect tool, but a unit's failure to do what we want it to at least recognises the fact that our 6mm generals don't have our godlike overview.)

Yes, there's fog of war at all levels from Private Tommy Atkins to Whitehall.

You have yet to explain what any of this has to do with the question of which level generates more interesting decisions for players.

[monk2002uk]

The only meaningful grand tactical engagement was at Le Cateau. The only time the scenario map would feature significant BEF forces is when the German advance ran into II Corps:



At an operational level, the whole German pursuit 'down' the table would not feature any significant engagements at all until Le Cateau. Each German infantry corps and the cavalry HKK followed their lines of march all the way down. There were multiple low-level tactical engagements between German point guards and BEF rear guards but these had minimal impact on the German operational awareness.

Robert

[armchairgeneral]

Played a lot of 28mm WW1 Western Front at platoon level using Bolt Action. Worked well at 1:1 as each section has a specialist role. Now CoC2 is out, looking forward to the WW1 supplement which I understand is in the works.

[ChrisBBB]

Hi Robert, I've sent you a PM.

[monk2002uk]

Thanks, Chris.

Here is the map with the movements of the German forces from First Army:



Robert

[monk2002uk]

For anyone who is interested, the map of the German First Army advance on 25 August 1914 is shown below reoriented North-South:



Legend: HKK 2 is akin to a cavalry corps; R = Reserve; and ID = Infantry Division

It shows that the advance was oriented to trap and eliminate the BEF, which was thought to be in the area of Maubeuge. IX Army Corps was told off to screen Maubeuge on its western side. III and IV Army Corps swept around to reach the Sambre River, where they made contact with German Second Army. HKK 2 was trying to get below where the BEF was thought to be when they ran into BEF II Corps unexpectedly next day. Having discovered the mistake about the BEF on the evening before the Battle of Le Cateau, IV Army Corps proceeded south next day and made contact with BEF II Corps. III Army Corps was following on behind.

All the while that III and IV Army Corps were heading towards the Sambre, they were clashing with rearguard elements of BEF II Corps. The two German corps passed across the back of BEF II Corps retreat but never realised the significance of the clashes. This highlights how hard it was to know that a major force was relatively close by. Certainly the BEF forces would have been visible to a wargamer commanding the German forces but not to his/her real life counterpart on the ground.

This brings me to the influence of the Great German General Staff (GGGS) on operational planning and execution. Army corps and infantry division HQs all had generals in nominal command. The planning and execution was performed by the attached officers of lower rank but higher command status from GGGS. Usually there was agreement between the generals and GGGS staff. If disagreements arose (such as von Kluck's insistence on trying to continue attacking the French on his exposed right flank near Paris) then GGGS had the ultimate authority.

A goal of GGGS (and its equivalent in the French and British armies) was to ensure that the million man armies operated as a synchronised whole. They coordinated the routes of march, for example, to ensure that divisions remained in their allotted sectors and maintained the timetables.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

I was reminded of the following quote from Brigadier Peter Jones (Commandos) from the 1960/70s:

‘The worst feature of all amateur wargames that I have seen - this does not apply to wargames conducted in the Army for experimental or instructional purposes - is the chopping and changing, the butterfly-mindedness of the commanders. Every threat seems to call forth an immediate reaction, often in the very move! This could not happen in war. This is partly because in a wargame army there is seldom any CHAIN OF COMMAND. One player often acts as all the Generals, Colonels and Captains in the one army. There is, of course, a reconnaissance of the terrain before the battle, but one seldom sees written plans or orders even in note form. The player dreams up a few rather short-term objectives in the first place and thereafter, keeping a weather eye open plays it ‘off the cuff’.’

Robert