Infantry antitank capability 1939-1940

[Arlequín]

I don't know. I do not even know whether it was just a matter of fact claim in a report, or Rommel going for bragging rights, which he was apparently prone to do.

I suppose when looking at it at a different way, he may very well have been the first to use the weapon in this role in WWII, so some credit should accrue for that, despite the weapon being designed to do so and that the British attack had actually penetrated to the rear areas where the 88 and artillery units were. Certainly it was probably the first time the AP shell was used, as that appears not to have been used in Spain.

From what I can gather 'fear of the 88' developed initially in the Western Desert & Tunisia and was subsequently magnified. So like the 'Tiger', every AT Gun shooting at you was an '88'.

The apparent success of the AK was credited to a combination of many things that could be used as excuses, 'Unbeatable Rommel' being the most obvious. Oddly the Italians who formed the bulk of troops under his command and half his armour, are rarely credited with anything, despite having to attempt to supply his charges into the vastness of the desert. The Ariete Division was sacrificed to protect the German retreat after El Alamein, which is one of the few occasions that Rommel mentions them in a positive light.

But anyway, we are digressing from Infantry AT and into 'Jim bashes Rommel' territory.  

[Arrigo]

and what is wrong with "Jim bashes Rommel"? Ehi he needs to be bashed... he and his hagiographers... 

[FramFramson]

In general, I have found that in the early war the Germans had superior training and tactical organization, the difference was not as enormous as reputation makes it out to be. I think one allied commander once gave an off-the-cuff calculation of German troops each being worth 1.2 allied troops. Haha. A big part of that was the fact that the Germans allowed their platoon commanders great freedom of action, which, combined with even a moderate advantage in training and experience, magnified the differences between the German infantry and others. The other factor was the Germans' excellent discipline, for which credit is due. It has been commented that the test of an army's discipline is not in victories, but losses, and the Germans after 1942 fought the longest, most disciplined retreat and defence of any large military in modern history.

What really strikes one most is that the Germans were not so much superior as they were prepared to be the aggressor. In the long term, Germany was at a gross disadvantage unless it could consolidate and develop early war gains (which took far more time than any war would have probably allowed) and a lot of people knew that well before the war. They needed to win and win fast, and after the twin failures of Sea Lion and Barbarossa, it was more or less a foregone conclusion. Even the differences between training did wear down as the war went on, as the quality of British and Russian platoon command improved, though I would say the Americans never really caught up.

Some of you might recognize that in many games, there is often an army or side or deck or faction that relies on a "fast" strategy, one that burns all its resources early in exchange for speed and offensive power which is strong by early-game standards. If you win, you almost always win early, but if you falter, just about anyone who can weather the initial attack will eventually beat you back into submission with strong mid-game units which are better than your early game stuff, or bury you with a long-game resource advantage. In Magic, with which I'm most familiar, this would be a "Burn" or "Suicide" strategy. I always like to say that Germany wasn't superior, they were just "playing burn".

Incidentally, none of our Russians have mentioned the Soviet Deep Battle doctrine, which I think was actually the most impressive and advanced tactical and strategic doctrine of WWII, by a significant margin. It was developed pre-war, but could not be implemented for many years due to the damage to the Red Army's officer corps and the fact that it was conceived by Tukhachevsky and other purged generals, but once the the Red Army was capable of executing the complex and extremely large-scale operations, Deep Battle became devastating and made most German strategic planning look like schoolyard stuff (though in terms of local tactics, the Germans still remains fairly strong until the end of the war).

[mysteriousbill]

Though not involved in the war that early, the U.S. had very handy anti-tank weapon in the .50 Browning. Almost as good penetration (within a mm or 2 according to various sources) of a Boys with the added advantage of being able to fire enough rounds quickly enough that it was bound to hit something important. 

[cuprum]

Really. But then the we must remember Russian DSHK sample 1938.

[Arlequín]

Both weapons were designed and intended to be 'anti-materiel weapons' before anyone ever thought of calling them that. Up until tank designs got serious in the Late-'30s they were also ideal tank-busters too.

[MartinR]

Some light tanks were armed with .50cal or 15mm MGs as their primary weapon - a dual purpose AT/anti -infantry MG.

[MartinR]

I think one allied commander once gave an off-the-cuff calculation of German troops each being worth 1.2 allied troops. Haha.

That was Dupuy in 'Numbers, Predications and War'. the 1.2 combat effectiveness multiplier was an average of  different divisional CEVs for the units he analysed. Within the overall list, some divisions were much better than others (on both sides), but 1.2 was the average for Germans vs Western Allies. Against the Russians it was much higher (varying by period of course) but exceeded 2 for the early/mid war period.

The IDF also scored 2.1 vs the 1967 Egyptians, somewhat less in 1973.

Exactly what contributed to the differences in projected combat effectiveness has been hotly debated over the years (the raw data had been normalised for differences in terrain, posture, weapons, weather, fortification levels, air support etc and was analysed in terms of advance rates and casualty ratios). Cohesion, doctrine, differing tooth:tail ratios, mission directed vs orders, amount of ammo carried, warrior cultures, the psychology of combat participation rates, magic superman soldiers....

with no clear answer.

Armies are of course interested in this stuff, but tend to magically find the solutions proposed by particular pressure groups and arms manufacturers. The best anti-tank weapon is a tank! (say the tank generals), the best way to defeat the Taliban is to blow them apart with smart missiles! (say the missile manufacturers), the best way to increase participation rates is to have lots of officers! (say the officers). The Tornado is clearly a better plane than the Harrier! (say the fast jet clique at the MOD), and besides we don't want those smelly sailors to have any jets of their own...

Cheers
Martin

[Etranger]

Some light tanks were armed with .50cal or 15mm MGs as their primary weapon - a dual purpose AT/anti -infantry MG.

As were the British Guy and Humber ACs (Mk I,II,III). The Guy's alternative name, the Guy Wheeled Tank , gives the game away a bit.

[cuprum]

That was Dupuy in 'Numbers, Predications and War'. the 1.2 combat effectiveness multiplier was an average of  different divisional CEVs for the units he analysed. Within the overall list, some divisions were much better than others (on both sides), but 1.2 was the average for Germans vs Western Allies. Against the Russians it was much higher (varying by period of course) but exceeded 2 for the early/mid war period.

Strange, that Russian is considered so inferior to the Germans. Eventually it is Russian in 1941, having suffered in the "border battle" monstrous defeat, lost the most of the military equipment and equipment, managed to disrupt the German plans of attack (a month or half months to defeat the Russian army), delay the advance of the German army before the winter, and then inflict the Germans defeat 50 kilometers from the Moscow.
European armies were defeated much faster.

[MartinR]

It isn't an assessment of the strategic situation, just the relative combat effectiveness of divisional sized formations. Loss ratios, advance rates.

You can have the best army in the world and still lose the war (or the worst and still win).

The Soviet Army in WW2 was neither of those, but did operate under some handicaps, particularly in the early part of the war.

Cheers
Martin

[cuprum]

I agree...