A question about the use of a Tank Platoon in battle.

[ErikB]

This is a great thread!

Now, per the Frunze question.  Just the way it is stated (here), I get the idea of reinforcing success, but wouldn't it be wiser to take more variables into account, such as METT-T?

One group is succeeding, one is stalled and would be successful with help, one is failing.  Which to reinforce?

What's the goal?  If the group that is succeeding has the capability to exploit that breakthrough and turn about and start hitting the enemy from behind, then yes, reinforce.

If we cannot afford to loose the men and material of the failing group (for future use), then changing their orders to dig in, hold the line and bleed the enemy dry, instead of attack, then some kind of reinforcement may make sense, especially if the succeeding group doesn't need reinforcing at this time.

And what will this whole attack accomplish?  How far do we expect it to go?  If we loose that failing unit and the resources there then will the enemy be able to counter-attack and just plough right through an unsupported position? 

Do we have anything behind that failing group that the enemy could reach and destroy before the succeeding group controls the area behind the enemy line and forces them to focus there, thereby preventing the enemy from exploiting their success against our failing group?

Then we have our succeeding and their succeeding groups spinning like a yin-yang.

Just wondering... it's been a long, long time since ROTC, and all my fighting strategy is now based on Brazilian Jiu Jitsu, which is hardly the same thing....

[MartinR]

'Monty's Highlanders: 51st Highland Division in the Second World War' by Patrick Delaforce. It's expensive mind, 49p on Kindle.

Ah, that one. I have the paperback. I do recall one interesting snippet about their approach to minefields, essentially Zhukovs approach of simply marching through as they lost fewer men that way. They were told to stop doing it in 1943.

Cheers
Martin

[MartinR]

This is a great thread!

Now, per the Frunze question.  Just the way it is stated (here), I get the idea of reinforcing success, but wouldn't it be wiser to take more variables into account, such as METT-T?

Just wondering... it's been a long, long time since ROTC, and all my fighting strategy is now based on Brazilian Jiu Jitsu, which is hardly the same thing....

Well, given that it is a Frunze question and with a fully engaged Motor Rifle Division I think we can safely assume it is GSFG with an entire Tank Army behind it waiting to pour through the breach and aiming to reach Paris in five days

Cheers
Martin

[Arrigo]

Erik,

the question is a very generic one used more to drill an idea rather than debate a solution. But if you take a look you also understand that it has an underlying hidden element, namely initiative. You are almost completely committed. You are down to your last uncommitted regiment, once this one is committed you as commander are out of options to immediately influence the battle (you need to pull back, reform, and re-plan). IF we commit the tanks to battle three we will probably only increase our casualties for little gain. Battle two is a better option, but because we a have a clean break why losing troops and the initiative? Also, if you still have the initiative (you are attacking) you can cut your losses and stop.

How many time in a game we just continue to bang our head on a good defensive position throwing good money after bad? I have seen it in several plays, especially when you have a big reserve to use. The player simply threw it at the dike. Ok sometime scenarios are designed this way, sometime we lack real table space to do any other thing, sometime the game is just a shoving match. But it is happening right now on my table. I am doing a Watch Am Rhein scenario with Beyond the Rhine (for those curious: http://www.multimanpublishing.com/Products/tabid/58/ProductID/278/Default.aspx and for those wondering I got it with a big pre-order discount  ). At the end of turn two the offensive is unravelling (I had bad wearther on turn 2 and the panzers did not push too much), but in the northern area there are some progress... not a lot mind you... of course history tell me that the norther shoulders was a bad place and the 5th Panzer Army has more chances... but is not working this way... thus I am planning to use a smattering of reserves to keep the 6th Panzer moving an using my operational reserves to extend the offensive northward if the Allies threw stuff in the bulge...

Arrigo

[FramFramson]

That is what the divisional tank regiment is for, deep operations to disrupt the integrity of the defence.

Ah, I can't say I knew enough about the tactics on their own merits, but since I'm familiar with Deep Battle doctrine that should have given me at least a clue. Or the fact of a motor rifle division wanting to stay mobile.

"Today I learned..."

[ErikB]

This is very cool.

My training/education never really got above battalion level and was mostly really focused on squad and platoon, sometimes company.  I'm not used to thinking larger... yet.

[MartinR]

Well, there are plenty of decent books to read about operations. One of my favourites is 'Spearhead of the Offensive - The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Manouvre' by David Glantz. Mainly covers the evolution of the use of Forward Detachments, but has some very handy 'how to do it' chapters on things like opposed river crossings, taking a defile etc as well as Army level breakthrough operations.

Cheers
Martin

[MartinR]

Sorry, I meant to add, we often play operational WW2 games using higher level sets of rules (1 base = 1 company or battalion type stuff). An interesting experience and very different to tactical skirmishes.

Here is part 1 of an 8 part game report on something vaguely resembling 1st Kharkov. A big game with 20 odd players, if you track through the series of blog reports you can see the whole thing.

http://megablitzandmore.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/krisis-at-kharkov-part-1-overview.html

Cheers
Martin

[SBMiniaturesGuy]

On a tactical gamer level, the NUTS! Hell Hath No Fury tank combat supplement is designed with this kind of situation in mind, in which the player is a tank platoon commander:



http://www.twohourwargames.com/hehanofutaon.html

[cuprum]

Using only a single tank to promote the the infantry in the field - not rational. For the defense is much more logical to provide for the support of infantry field artillery.
Tank is it in the first place, the weapons for the attack.
However, in the Soviet army for fight in the city, were created battle groups consisting of a group of infantry, sappers and one tank or self-propelled guns. And the tanks were to have enough a large caliber weapon to suppress the enemy's firing points in buildings.

The situation, is similar to the movie, could be in reality (in war everything is possible), but, in my opinion, US tank would be very quickly destroyed by german infantry.

About how Zhukov told Eisenhower, about attack of minefields I read. But never seen evidence that such attacks were in reality ... It seems Zhukov just joking over the Eisenhower.

[FramFramson]

(in war everything is possible)

Truest statement in this thread!

[ErikB]

About how Zhukov told Eisenhower, about attack of minefields I read. But never seen evidence that such attacks were in reality ... It seems Zhukov just joking over the Eisenhower.

One little joke becomes legend 70 years later... go figure.

[FramFramson]

There might be a few religions that got started that way

[cuprum]

One little joke becomes legend 70 years later... go figure.

I think every legend is based on a real fact - perhaps subsequently distorted in the retelling ...
This is genuine quote from the memoirs Eisenhower:

"Highly illuminating to me was his description of the Russian method of attacking through mine fields. The German mine fields, covered by defensive fire, were tactical obstacles that caused us many casualties and delays. It was always a laborious business to break through them, even though our technicians invented every conceivable kind of mechanical appliance to destroy mines safely. Marshal Zhukov gave me a matter-of-fact statement of his practice, which was, roughly, «There are two kinds of mines; one is the personnel mine and the other is the vehicular mine. When we come to a mine field our infantry attacks exactly as if it were not there. The losses we get from personnel mines we consider only equal to those we would have gotten from machine guns and artillery if the Germans had chosen to defend that particular area with strong bodies of troops instead of with mine fields. The attacking infantry does not set off the vehicular mines, so after they have penetrated to the far side of the field they form a bridgehead, after which the engineers come up and dig out channels through which our vehicles can go"

Incidentally, in the Soviet army instruction says that passages in the anti infantry minefields is doing by massive artillery and mortar shelling narrow band in a minefield and infantry quick movement from the craters to the craters. Losses from mines thus minimal, much less than would have had to to conduct mine clearance under enemy fire long period of time, losing the pace attack.

I think every army sometimes come across into a similar situation.

"The entire plan, as laid out above, broke apart completely. The 9th Battalion had been scattered on the drop. Lt-Colonel Otway waited at the Rendezvous Point, but by 02:50 he had only one hundred and fifty of his six hundred and fifty men, and nothing else besides. None of the Jeeps, anti-tank guns, mortars, mine-detectors, medical personnel, sappers or the naval liaison party had arrived.
...
When the 9th Battalion arrived at the Battery they found that their reconnaissance party had gone about their business excellently, having made a thorough study of German positions as well as clearing four paths through the minefield, though they had no tape with which to mark them and so could only indicate the paths by pushing the heels of their boots into the earth.
...
In the darkness, the marked paths were not so clearly visible and so it was inevitable that some men strayed from the path and onto mines".

http://www.pegasusarchive.org/normandy/depth_merville.htm


Sorry for the rough translation - I have only Russian translation of a few pages of this book:

"In each task group had one tank minelayer. Having overcome the crest of the hill, they went out straight into a minefield. Even though they had to to struggle not only to mines, but also with a dense mud, first they have shown themselves in business well. Under the blows chains several mines exploded, adding on the couple of extra craters. But in the end both of tank-minelayers are stuck, since sodden ground lacked the of engine power in order to rotate at the same time reel and caterpillars. Motionless, they represented excellent target, and soon found themselves knocked out.
Next tanks from both columns there was nothing alternative but to to go round minelayers and move the forward. The upshot was a nightmare domino - the first from the tanks skirted minelayer and drove a few yards before hit a mine. Next skirted them both, and moved a little further when and he is stumbled on a landmine and was destroyed...
... In the first attack was attended sixty-four "Sherman". Over the first twenty-six minutes of battle, we lost forty-eight tanks. Losses among the crews were appropriate".

In this situation, Russian method would result in to smaller losses.

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/675308.Death_Traps

[Truscott Trotter]

Even in Berlin there is no indication Soviet tanks were penny packeted in US fashion
In Soviet Tanks in City Fighting Special Assault Units Used in Battle for Berlin extracted from Writing in "Red Star," an official Red Army publication, a Major N. Novskov

For the battle of Berlin, the Russians organized combined assault detachments, consisting of one tank battalion, a rifle battalion, a company or platoon of engineers, a battalion of artillery (not less than 122-millimeter), and a platoon of flame throwers.


Even with worn down brigades I do not think the tanks would be in less than company sized groups