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Author Topic: Threadsplit: WWI leadership - analysis and Tactics vs Strategy discussion.  (Read 5784 times)

Offline FramFramson

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This is true. And it is also clear that some veterans wrote passionately about the seeming futility and waste. There were some veterans who loved being involved, who wanted to continue, who missed being in action. We see this today, for example, with some veterans taking up arms against ISIS. It seems to be a very small minority but there are WW1 memoirs that are full of these sentiments. The Master of Belhaven is one such book, about a British artillery officer who didn't survive the war but whose diaries were published.

Peter Jackson's film is full of comments from veterans that echo what my Grandfather spoke about when he was alive. He never glorified war, quite the opposite. In his view, however, the war was a terrible necessity. In the 1970s, he had no truck for the idea that the generals had little or no idea how to fight a modern war. My Grandfather was very clear that the Germans were an extremely formidable and determined enemy. We can see this echoed in the fact that Germany continued fighting for more than 4 years. There was no simple or 'easy' way to overcome such a determined enemy. Like the American Civil War, the Great War was a massive struggle between two enemies that would not give way or give in.

World War 2 was the same. Indeed, the only reason that we lament the casualties in WW1 is that we did not have to do what the USSR did in the Great Patriotic War. Had the Soviets not borne the brunt of the Germans in WW2 then we would be praising the ability of the WW1 generals to sustain so few casualties by comparison.

War is a terrible thing. It exacts a terrible toll when determined foes remained locked in battles for years. We miss the point, however, if we think that generals were to 'blame' for what happened in WW1. This approach leads to a desire to praise and admire generals who seem flamboyant and daring. Remember the gasps of admiration as 'smart' bombs struck buildings so precisely in the First Iraq War? And the 'daring' left hook through the desert? But the 'war' was not won. The enemy learned and adapted, just as the Germans (and British and French) did in WW1.

We need to stop wars happening the first place...

Robert

Well, I'd certainly agree that the best measure would be to stop wars happening in the first place.

I do disagree about the responsibility of command. While "Led by donkeys" is a common trope which is probably overstated, it is true that much of the senior allied leadership were older men, used to colonial wars or who leaned on the memories of the highly misleading Franco-Prussian war.

Obviously it's clearer in hindsight, but any war on even footing from the American Civil War to the Edwardian era showed the the dominance of defensive technology vs offensive technology at the time. Funny enough, three years was also roughly the amount of time it took the Union forces to elevate effective leadership to senior positions as well. The only times this paradigm broke apart in the Victorian era were between grossly overmatched participants (colonial wars again, or the various Balkan Wars directly preceding WWI), or when some serious failure of organization took place (I would classify the FPW under the latter).

So I do place blame on senior Allied commanders during WWI. As someone in such a position, higher standards ought to be expected than those of a middle manager of an everyday plodding business. The post-Crimean reforms DID do away with the outright purchase of offices, but the British army still grappled with the effects of class bias on their officer corps (as did many European armies of the age, to be fair). I also feel that the German army on the other hand was less likely to suffer the effects of non-military class distinctions and tended to allow more autonomy to junior officers, which generally led to more effective command at lower levels (a doctrine which they took much further in WWII of course).

Even without the shackles of past experience, the war went on long enough that unworkable tactics were pursued long after it became clear that pre-battle projections were consistently, repeatedly over-optimistic. There's certainly hay to be made arguing about how quickly a person in that position might be expected to learn, or about how much the allied leadership were let down by unknowable factors outside their control (such as the disastrous quality of British shells early in the war, the horrible French attempts at an early light machine gun, or the understandably protracted development period of mobile offensive weapons such as tanks), but it's also clear that there were many younger officers champing at the bit with new ideas who could have been given opportunities one or even two years sooner. Hell, the Americans demonstrated far too late it would have been possible to greatly increase the effectiveness of trench assaults with a mundane existing weapon - the shotgun - whose absence from earlier assaults was almost shocking in retrospect. Certainly it was clear after the first year that this was warfare on a completely unprecedented scale, requiring different thinking, but the response to this was muddled.

It's worth noting that the Central Powers, (well, mainly Germany in this case) managed to hold out with what was essentially half the military forces. As as percentage of mobilized men, of course the Central Powers were hit harder, being the losers, but in overall terms of casualties, the German figures are significantly lower year-over-year. There's an argument to be made that there was certainly room for improvement among the Allies even by contemporary standards, as the Central Powers clearly held their own with far fewer men. On the other hand, picking apart casualty figures can open a rather dangerous can of worms with many many caveats, so I wouldn't push that claim too hard.

It's also worth noting that, we're used to British sources which may have been negative, or which may have simply seen the effort involved as necessary, but French sources tend to be far more negative of their early leadership, given their losses drove them to the point of outright refusal en masse during the 1917 Mutiny. This is a personal bias, of course, but the French accounts I've seen are deeply bitter and cynical to a degree not typically seen even in English anti-war sources.

As for the very correct observation that it was largely Russia who bled Germany dry in WWII, I must point out that Russian casualties as a ratio to German ones were so high due to severe depletion of the officer corps, technology and tactics which fell far behind German operational technologies and tactics during the initial invasion (or poor implementation of good existing Russian technology and tactics - many early Russian tactical improvements were implemented by officers who outright disobeyed standing orders), and the simple circumstances of Eastern Front warfare taking place mostly on Russian territory. Had Tukachevsky and most of the officer corps not been purged and had the Russian 'Deep Battle' doctrine (far superior to German tactics, IMO) been allowed to fully develop PRIOR to the war, it's clear the Russians would have had significantly lower casualty figures. How much lower, well, that's another can of worms.

I'll happily concede though that - like the war itself - the whole thing is a massive, sprawling quagmire with room to stake out all manner of positions. 
« Last Edit: December 27, 2018, 09:55:04 AM by FramFramson »


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Offline Metternich

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My kids just bought it for me on DVD (delivery second week in January).

Offline monk2002uk

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While "Led by donkeys" is a common trope which is probably overstated, it is true that much of the senior allied leadership were older men, used to colonial wars or who leaned on the memories of the highly misleading Franco-Prussian war.

Obviously it's clearer in hindsight, but any war on even footing from the American Civil War to the Edwardian era showed the the dominance of defensive technology vs offensive technology at the time. Funny enough, three years was also roughly the amount of time it took the Union forces to elevate effective leadership to senior positions as well.
Thank you for your reply. I will discuss the various points in different posts.

All of the 'senior allied leadership' were familiar with the lessons of the Sino-Russian, Balkan, and South African wars. Observers from all of the major Western powers were present if their forces were not actively engaged. For example, lessons from aerial reconnaissance in the Italian invasion of Libya were applied during the British military manoeuvres before WW1. All of the major powers emphasised fire and manouevre, even down to the section/squad level prior to the Great War. This reflected a clear and oft-repeated analysis of the superiority of defence over attack, which could only be overcome by fire superiority and movement.

The American Civil War was studied extensively in the British, French and German military colleges or equivalent. A key lesson from all of these studies (and from Kitchener's personal involvement in the Franco-Prussian War) was that the Great War was likely to be protracted. This view was reinforced in the Great German General Staff by the Volkskrieg [People's War] of the Franco-Prussian War - the long period of guerrilla warfare that took place after the 'highly misleading', seemingly dramatic collapse of France in the first weeks of the war. The German Army strove hard to avoid a protracted war in 1914 but General von Moltke the Younger knew full well what the failure on the Marne meant.

It did take the Union several years to settle on General Grant as the most effective leader. His approach was to push and keep pushing, no matter what the cost. Grant's battles of attrition mirror what had to happen in the First World War too. The South was no more likely to collapse than the Germans - both were utterly determined adversaries.

Robert

Offline FramFramson

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Thank you for your reply. I will discuss the various points in different posts.

All of the 'senior allied leadership' were familiar with the lessons of the Sino-Russian, Balkan, and South African wars. Observers from all of the major Western powers were present if their forces were not actively engaged. For example, lessons from aerial reconnaissance in the Italian invasion of Libya were applied during the British military manoeuvres before WW1. All of the major powers emphasised fire and manouevre, even down to the section/squad level prior to the Great War. This reflected a clear and oft-repeated analysis of the superiority of defence over attack, which could only be overcome by fire superiority and movement.

The American Civil War was studied extensively in the British, French and German military colleges or equivalent. A key lesson from all of these studies (and from Kitchener's personal involvement in the Franco-Prussian War) was that the Great War was likely to be protracted. This view was reinforced in the Great German General Staff by the Volkskrieg [People's War] of the Franco-Prussian War - the long period of guerrilla warfare that took place after the 'highly misleading', seemingly dramatic collapse of France in the first weeks of the war. The German Army strove hard to avoid a protracted war in 1914 but General von Moltke the Younger knew full well what the failure on the Marne meant.

It did take the Union several years to settle on General Grant as the most effective leader. His approach was to push and keep pushing, no matter what the cost. Grant's battles of attrition mirror what had to happen in the First World War too. The South was no more likely to collapse than the Germans - both were utterly determined adversaries.

Robert
In reverse order...

The Union did have the benefit of the blockade, as well as a massive advantage in manpower and materiel - basic math always had the Union winning unless foreign intervention tipped the scales and both sides realized that "sheer determination" alone would not be enough. Many, like Gen. Sherman, did recognize this quite clearly "Not a bolt of cloth or pair of shoes can you make", and the ACW essentially followed the Anaconda Plan laid down by Winfield Scott at the beginning of the war - another who all-but-predicted the exact course of the war. 

At the same time, inexperience and a reluctance to accept casualties by inexperienced Union generals led to several famous misses where attacks were called off or not pressed, which could have shortened the war by one or two more years. So leadership was certainly an issue there as well, even if we accept stubborn resistance. As Lincoln said of Grant "He fights!", as a way of explaining that Grant clearly understood, as he did, that undue avoidance of casualties would only make the war more protracted and lethal in the long run anyway.

Now, looking at WWI, we see the reverse. Of course when you delve into the details of individual campaigns, we can acknowledge that the choices made were not blind, that legitimate efforts were made to secure meaningful advantage, but I think the generals were too eager to overcome resistance with stubborn Grant-like attrition strategies, when the same strategy did NOT apply in the Western Front where the sides were far more equal (especially as trench warfare mitigated numeric differences to a degree). The two sides were far more balanced in technological and industrial capacity, and both sides had various advantages and disadvantages throughout the war (the traded periods of air supremacy, for example). Too much hope was placed too frequently on minor, incremental advantage, and too often battle plans were laid down which were only a minor change from those of the weeks and months prior, when it was very clear by 1915 (1916, if you're feeling generous) that only an overwhelming difference in force would have any real chance to break the western stalemate in the end. Both sides did eventually have their shot at such a campaign.

Strategic considerations which would produce a far bigger imbalance were required. The Germans did manage this in some ways - the Fleet In Being concept, Unrestricted Submarine warfare, the undermining of Russia as the political level, the East African shoestring campaign draining massive numbers of troops which might have gone to the Western Front and so on, and these did give them a significant advantage in holding their own against a larger foe. The Zimmerman telegram also represents an attempt, albeit a desperate one, which backfired spectacularly.

The Entente on the other hand mostly failed to follow similar high-level strategic plans which would have made a significant difference in manpower, and by continually engaging in battle, they simply depleted reserves which (in theory) they could have built up to a breaking point sooner (though to be fair, I recall the French WERE actually trying to formulate such a buildup, but were interrupted by the German strategic failure of the Verdun offensive). There were a few exceptions, such as Lawrence's infamous guerrilla wars which met a double goal of securing middle-eastern territory, while also tying down large amounts of Turkish troops with only a handful of British ones. For the most part however, the Entente could have explored many other options or bungled the ones they did pursue: Bulgaria was a complete disaster as the Entente did not do their research and completely failed to follow through with their promises; Greece was courted but at the same time her neutrality was repeatedly violated, leaving a divided and ultimately damaged Greece; Western help for the failing Russians came too little, too late (though to be fair, attempts WERE made and the logistics were terrible); attempts to destabilize a very vulnerable Austro-Hungary or support the Italians in their Austrian campaigns were essentially non-existent; the RN failed to lure the German fleet out more or to risk a direct attack on German naval bases, and the SIS (MI6) completely failed to develop a network of ANY sort whatsoever in Germany, when better information was so crucial. Ultimately the one major success of Entente strategic diplomacy - the entry of America into the war - would have been enough to make the difference on its own (given a few more months). Yet even there, this was not so much an Entente success as it was a German failure.

Meanwhile command on the front lines was lacking - I still find the repetition of failures due to campaigns repeatedly made with only minor tweaks or comparatively small increases in manpower to be nearly criminal in their negligence. The Allies, especially the British continually underestimated the depth of German defences and reserves (a famous case was that Haig was noteworthy for only accepting intel reports from Charteris, who tended to tell Haig what he liked to hear), and while the Germans did the same on occasion, they did so far less often and were usually not as far off as the Entente were in their estimations - Verdun came fairly close to succeeding, for example and might very well have come off (or been avoided) had the French buildup been known to them.

While we could go back and forth all day about mid-level Entente leadership and western combat operations, there's certainly enough material out there centring on the excessive, even obsessive political activities of the senior Entente military leadership, the exact sort of leaders for whom larger strategic concerns should have been paramount. Yet instead of cooperating, the British and French often clashed harshly (at minimum through to mid-late 1917), failed to share information and resources, tried to stick each other with poor sections of the front, and in Haig's case specifically, literally spent more time engaged in domestic political manoeuvring against real and imagined enemies within the military and political leadership, than in actually formulating military operations.

Ah Haig. Even if you think Haig was a skilled leader (and I obviously don't, ha), or accept that some amount of politics is unavoidable at the highest levels of military leadership (debatable), this was grossly irresponsible. The war and millions of men's lives were far less important than butting heads with the CIGS of the moment, intriguing against Lloyd George, playing revolving door with his subordinates, or grousing about Wilson, the French, or whoever else had irritated him or made him fear he was about to be sacked that week (I seem to recall that Napoleon supposedly had a witticism about second-rate men hiring third-rate men...). One is struck by how profound Haig's insecurity was, hell, he almost gave up and wanted to retreat to the channel during Blucher! And wanted the French to sacrifice themselves to cover a British retreat! Even his great "success" of the Hundred Days is cannot be clearly attributed to him. First off, he was locked into the cavalryman's mindset, so I feel that this is at least partially the result of the stopped clock being right twice a day, and in any case this was right after the Germans had conveniently exhausted themselves on their "Gambler's throw". Plus it's very arguable how much direct operational command he had at that time, as subordinates like Plumer, Byng, Currie, Monash, etc. and allies like Foch were arguably were more important in actual combat operations (certainly the French credited Foch and not Haig... though of course this would be natural in any case).
« Last Edit: December 27, 2018, 04:40:06 AM by FramFramson »

Offline monk2002uk

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The post-Crimean reforms DID do away with the outright purchase of offices, but the British army still grappled with the effects of class bias on their officer corps (as did many European armies of the age, to be fair). I also feel that the German army on the other hand was less likely to suffer the effects of non-military class distinctions and tended to allow more autonomy to junior officers, which generally led to more effective command at lower levels (a doctrine which they took much further in WWII of course).
Class bias was an issue in the British and German armies alike; much less so with the Republican French army. Within the German army, there were the biases at the equivalent of the state level. Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers, etc often wrote about being treated as inferior by Prussians. The biggest problem within the German army, however, was the relationship between the General Staff and the other senior commanders. Writers like Jack Sheldon have clearly shown how the role of the General Staff created significant friction within the German army. The concept also saw men like von Loßberg and Bruchmüller elevated to positions of great influence, without having climbed the normal chain of command. The latter officer planned the artillery barrages for Operation Michael. One German army chose to follow his 'advice'; the other did not. The latter did not succeed anywhere near as well on the first day, despite however well the junior officers were trained and exercised command at the tactical level.

Robert

Offline monk2002uk

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Even without the shackles of past experience, the war went on long enough that unworkable tactics were pursued long after it became clear that pre-battle projections were consistently, repeatedly over-optimistic. There's certainly hay to be made arguing about how quickly a person in that position might be expected to learn, or about how much the allied leadership were let down by unknowable factors outside their control (such as the disastrous quality of British shells early in the war, the horrible French attempts at an early light machine gun, or the understandably protracted development period of mobile offensive weapons such as tanks), but it's also clear that there were many younger officers champing at the bit with new ideas who could have been given opportunities one or even two years sooner.
The issue of the 'learning curve' lies at the crux of this debate. The notion is predicated on the idea that there was a way to overcome the Germans but no-one was smart enough to figure it out or flexible enough to lay aside outdated views until several years had gone by. The latter concept conjures up a view of 'stuck-in-the-mud' generals who refused to 'see' what was actually happening.

In reality, there was a complex set of processes that mitigated against a 'quick win'. Most significantly, at no point in the war was there a 'simple fix' that, once applied, could overcome the enemy. The reason being that all sides were constantly adapting to each other within weeks, eventually almost in real-time. Take the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for example. This was launched by the British in early 1915 after the introduction of static warfare. A hurricane bombardment, supported by artillery in the front line firing over open sights, opened up the German trenches and enabled a rapid penetration of the British attacking force, except on the British left flank. Despite having been requested by Haig to plan for quick exploitation of such success, Rawlinson refused to let the advance continue immediately. He preferred to consolidate the situation rather than push on, which enabled the German reinforcements to come forward and negate any further advance. The initial assault was so successful that details were published throughout the French army as an example of best practice.

The Germans quickly examined the 'lessons learned' by way of their After Action Reports. Immediately, they set about putting counter-measures in place. The depth of trench lines was increased. MG nests were positioned at ground level within the parapets, protected by metal rails. Barbed wire defences were upgraded, with wire being placed below ground level in many cases. This made the wire obstacles invisible to advancing troops. These changes meant that the next time the British attacked, it was not possible to create or maintain a deep lodgement as happened in Neuve Chapelle.

The process of development and counter-development went on throughout the war. By way of another example, as the Germans mastered the techniques of immediate counter-attacks with Stoßtruppen in 1916 and 1917 so the British developed new tactics to counter the counter-attacks. In the Third Battle of Ypres, British intelligence officers followed immediately behind the advancing British and Dominion attacking forces in each of the major advances. They quickly interrogated captured German prisoners and read any captured documents. This enabled them to understand, in near real-time, how and where the German counter-attacks would be launched. British artillery were then tasked with interdiction missions, based on the new intelligence. Ludendorff and his architect of the counter-attack, von Loßberg, became desperate to figure out how to negate the advantage that now lay with the British. The new tactics exacted a heavy toll of German forces, causing one German writer to note how drained and worn out von Loßberg had become as he tried to figure the next move. As it happened, Ludendorff decided to go back to packing the German front line with defenders, just like Neuve Chapelle. The consequences were disastrous for the German defenders. Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote of the huge relief that the rains brought late in the extended battle. Otherwise, the Germans would have had to execute their plan for abandoning the Ypres area.

Robert

Offline FramFramson

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Class bias was an issue in the British and German armies alike; much less so with the Republican French army. Within the German army, there were the biases at the equivalent of the state level. Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers, etc often wrote about being treated as inferior by Prussians. The biggest problem within the German army, however, was the relationship between the General Staff and the other senior commanders. Writers like Jack Sheldon have clearly shown how the role of the General Staff created significant friction within the German army. The concept also saw men like von Loßberg and Bruchmüller elevated to positions of great influence, without having climbed the normal chain of command. The latter officer planned the artillery barrages for Operation Michael. One German army chose to follow his 'advice'; the other did not. The latter did not succeed anywhere near as well on the first day, despite however well the junior officers were trained and exercised command at the tactical level.

Robert

No question the Germans faced the same Victorian/Edwardian class issues in WWI (the air service being the most famous example) and the pro-Prussian bias is well-known and then there's the whole issue of Ludendorff - worth many books all on it's own. I would only argue that they suffered somewhat less than the British, who were particularly egregious in this regard. Even today, Britain remains one of the most highly stratified nations in Europe, though the link between the British upper class and the leadership of the BA or RN has mercifully been greatly diminished.

I've probably pushed a bit far in comparing the British and German command style, when the original point was that the war was exceptionally grossly wasteful and futile (if not outright devastating) from the point of view of many of the participants.

The issue of the 'learning curve' lies at the crux of this debate. The notion is predicated on the idea that there was a way to overcome the Germans but no-one was smart enough to figure it out or flexible enough to lay aside outdated views until several years had gone by. The latter concept conjures up a view of 'stuck-in-the-mud' generals who refused to 'see' what was actually happening.

In reality, there was a complex set of processes that mitigated against a 'quick win'. Most significantly, at no point in the war was there a 'simple fix' that, once applied, could overcome the enemy. The reason being that all sides were constantly adapting to each other within weeks, eventually almost in real-time. Take the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for example. This was launched by the British in early 1915 after the introduction of static warfare. A hurricane bombardment, supported by artillery in the front line firing over open sights, opened up the German trenches and enabled a rapid penetration of the British attacking force, except on the British left flank. Despite having been requested by Haig to plan for quick exploitation of such success, Rawlinson refused to let the advance continue immediately. He preferred to consolidate the situation rather than push on, which enabled the German reinforcements to come forward and negate any further advance. The initial assault was so successful that details were published throughout the French army as an example of best practice.

The Germans quickly examined the 'lessons learned' by way of their After Action Reports. Immediately, they set about putting counter-measures in place. The depth of trench lines was increased. MG nests were positioned at ground level within the parapets, protected by metal rails. Barbed wire defences were upgraded, with wire being placed below ground level in many cases. This made the wire obstacles invisible to advancing troops. These changes meant that the next time the British attacked, it was not possible to create or maintain a deep lodgement as happened in Neuve Chapelle.

The process of development and counter-development went on throughout the war. By way of another example, as the Germans mastered the techniques of immediate counter-attacks with Stoßtruppen in 1916 and 1917 so the British developed new tactics to counter the counter-attacks. In the Third Battle of Ypres, British intelligence officers followed immediately behind the advancing British and Dominion attacking forces in each of the major advances. They quickly interrogated captured German prisoners and read any captured documents. This enabled them to understand, in near real-time, how and where the German counter-attacks would be launched. British artillery were then tasked with interdiction missions, based on the new intelligence. Ludendorff and his architect of the counter-attack, von Loßberg, became desperate to figure out how to negate the advantage that now lay with the British. The new tactics exacted a heavy toll of German forces, causing one German writer to note how drained and worn out von Loßberg had become as he tried to figure the next move. As it happened, Ludendorff decided to go back to packing the German front line with defenders, just like Neuve Chapelle. The consequences were disastrous for the German defenders. Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote of the huge relief that the rains brought late in the extended battle. Otherwise, the Germans would have had to execute their plan for abandoning the Ypres area.

Robert

This is fair.

However, it's not so much the individual tactical changes that I'm focusing on, but the failure to rise above that pattern of extremely rapid adaptation. I've read my share of what-ifs in the wake of bunglings, but even if Rawlinson had committed the reserves, it's unlikely this would have crucially changed the outcome of the war, along with a hundred other what-ifs. 

It's the conflicts between staffs and allied nations (the internal German divisions had nothing on the British-French mistrust, well that's my opinion anyway), and the horrible failure to think in larger scales which bother me more. It's a very military habit to focus on those brief incremental tactical advantages, but an excessive focus on them to me indicates a leader promoted well beyond his ability; a case of target fixation no army side could afford.

Military buffs do this too! The what-if of battles past are fun to think about, and as wargamers how often do we see historical battles refought on a 4x6 table? But just as the better leaders in Union in the ACW realized that it was about the larger strategic numbers. Even Grant didn't just want to run a meat grinder, and he took many steps to avoid straight one-for-one attrition as much as possible. What was key was that Winfield Scott, Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman all understood very well that losing a single battle was not as important as overall strategic considerations. Grant knew they had to USE the manpower and materiel advantages of the Union in full, especially for major strategic operations which would result in meaningful changes in the war's situation - Vicksburg, being a prime example; casualties were atrocious, but splitting the Confederacy in twain constituted a massive strategic blow. Sherman, in his turn, moved to destroy the tottering economy of the Confederacy. These were grand plans appropriate to their position as high-ranking senior generals, and they worked together harmoniously not only to sketch their operations but to execute them - famously so in Grant and Sherman's case.

By contrast, you never see anything half so clear out of the office of the CIGS, GOCinC, etc. instead it was the politicking, personal acrimony, and shocking insecurity that seems to characterize most of the higher-level interactions (French weren't so bad about this, but the English could be atrocious about it when dealing with the French). Who would outrank who, who was responsible for what, etc. Coherent strategic plans, when they did come up, were tainted by association by their creator and often shelved. Even tanks ended up being developed by the damn admiralty at first due to such ridiculous politics and Kitchener's intransigence, and only because Churchill exceeded his authority on his own initiative (I have found that many of my favourite military leaders are those who have first learned the rules and then learned to break them, I will admit to a happy bias here).

The Germans were always looking for those angles: ways to tie down or force the commitment of vast numbers of enemy troops, or gain efficiencies on a great strategic scale. Now, it's perfectly possible that the Germans were not particularly talented in this regard and only pursued such things more vigorously out of necessity, given their weaker allies and having a lesser force overall. But they did so with more vigour, more focus, and with many remarkable successes, most crucially, in Russia.

But British efforts in this regard weren't just bad... sometimes they were plain disgraceful. The British attempt to involve Romania - who could have been a major threat to the Alliance, had matters been better planned - was such a complete cock up, that the British essentially destroyed what was left of the country just to deny it to the Germans. The major agreement in the mideast, Sykes-Pecot, was far more about two sides overconfident in eventual victory carving up the spoils in a holdover of colonial-style wrangling than it was about coordinating war plans. And the suspension of the Third Home Rule act was just utterly disastrous. The politicians were so frequently at odds, while the military leadership failed to press for those crucial political solutions.
« Last Edit: December 27, 2018, 10:13:21 AM by FramFramson »

Offline FramFramson

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Thanks for the threadsplit Driscoles. This had gotten rather off track from the film.

Offline Driscoles

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Offline monk2002uk

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...the Americans demonstrated far too late it would have been possible to greatly increase the effectiveness of trench assaults with a mundane existing weapon - the shotgun - whose absence from earlier assaults was almost shocking in retrospect.
As it happens, I am translating a copy of a German account of one of the first major battles featuring the American 2nd Division. This is the series of battles that took place in June 1918, in and around Belleau Wood. The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments featured in these battles. The book is entitled 'Sternenbanner gegen Schwarz-weiß-rot', which translates as 'Star-spangled Banner versus Black-White-Red'. The latter refers to the colours of the Reich war flag:



General Pershing had come to the conclusion that the British and French armies were using outmoded tactics. He was keen that the American forces should demonstrate a better way to conduct infantry assaults. The Big Red One had enjoyed a minor success in capturing Cantigny earlier, with the aid of French tanks and flamethrower units. Belleau Wood brought home how difficult the problem of assaulting German forces could be. For ten days, the Marines attempted to take Belleau Wood and surrounds. The Germans described their attempts as brave but naive essentially. The initial assaults were cut to ribbons with enfilade machine gun fire. Eventually, in a battle of attrition in which numbers won out, the Marines took and then finally held the wood. The Germans had huge respect for what the Marines achieved in the end but not so for the means.

It wasn't possible to get close enough to use shotguns until Day 11 (not that there is any evidence that shotguns were actually used in this battle).

Worse was to come in the Meuse-Argonne offensive...

The point is not that the American forces were useless, far from it! But there was a massive lesson that had to be learned the hard way - there was no 'simple' bloodless way to beat the Germans in the field of battle.

Robert

Offline monk2002uk

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But British efforts in this regard weren't just bad... sometimes they were plain disgraceful. The British attempt to involve Romania - who could have been a major threat to the Alliance, had matters been better planned - was such a complete cock up, that the British essentially destroyed what was left of the country just to deny it to the Germans.
I respectfully disagree. The Romanians were completely responsible for their decision to join the war. They illustrated what could happen when a military force attempted to engage with the Entente after the latter had two years of experience in the war. The Romanian example is one of the best at illustrating how the war had evolved. The major powers had kept up with each other, constantly innovating and nullifying the enemy's progress, who in turn nullified the new innovations. Bring in a new player after two years... the Romanians were no match until the front finally stabilised after the fall of Bucharest. The Romanians were then refitted and retrained, subsequently performing well in the Battle of Mărășești for example.

Robert

Offline FramFramson

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I respectfully disagree. The Romanians were completely responsible for their decision to join the war. They illustrated what could happen when a military force attempted to engage with the Entente after the latter had two years of experience in the war. The Romanian example is one of the best at illustrating how the war had evolved. The major powers had kept up with each other, constantly innovating and nullifying the enemy's progress, who in turn nullified the new innovations. Bring in a new player after two years... the Romanians were no match until the front finally stabilised after the fall of Bucharest. The Romanians were then refitted and retrained, subsequently performing well in the Battle of Mărășești for example.

Robert

The Romanians were responsible for their own decision, but it was made under false pretenses by the Allied powers, especially the British, who cajoled them into the declaration with big promises (land guarantees, supplies, armaments, as well as crucial coordinated offensives against Bulgaria and the Ottomans to ensure Romania would not face them all alone), only to hang Romania out to dry.

The British KNEW early on in the war that Romania was not prepared in any way and would end up more a liability than an asset in the state she was in in 1916. Christopher Thomson (the eventual commander of the British troops in Romania) fully and clearly warned the British government, but they ignored his assessment, even though he'd been sent there in 1915 for the express purpose of doing just that. Worse, the agreement signed between the Allied powers and the Romanians - upon which the Romanians depended and planned for - was not fulfilled in any meaningful way by the allies and the few Allied (British) troops who did go to Romania and who clearly knew the parlous state of the Romanian military, failed to seriously prepare the Romanians in any way (though this was not their fault as they had no time or resources to work with).

Romania's comparatively large army for its size, was completely wasted, when they might have otherwise had a serious influence on the course of the war, given Romania's geographic position. It was disgraceful on the part of the Allied powers, and even apart from moral considerations, or the propaganda effect of serving an ally so badly on other wavering neutrals, it was horrible strategic math. An incredible waste.

The Germans on the other hand were continually pressing the Austro-Hungarians to make concessions in order to buy Romanian (and Italian) neutrality, correctly assuming that Romania would join the allies as they had (on paper) far more to offer. It was pure good fortune on their part that the Entente failed Romania so badly.
« Last Edit: December 28, 2018, 01:27:33 AM by FramFramson »

Offline FramFramson

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As it happens, I am translating a copy of a German account of one of the first major battles featuring the American 2nd Division. This is the series of battles that took place in June 1918, in and around Belleau Wood. The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments featured in these battles. The book is entitled 'Sternenbanner gegen Schwarz-weiß-rot', which translates as 'Star-spangled Banner versus Black-White-Red'. The latter refers to the colours of the Reich war flag:



General Pershing had come to the conclusion that the British and French armies were using outmoded tactics. He was keen that the American forces should demonstrate a better way to conduct infantry assaults. The Big Red One had enjoyed a minor success in capturing Cantigny earlier, with the aid of French tanks and flamethrower units. Belleau Wood brought home how difficult the problem of assaulting German forces could be. For ten days, the Marines attempted to take Belleau Wood and surrounds. The Germans described their attempts as brave but naive essentially. The initial assaults were cut to ribbons with enfilade machine gun fire. Eventually, in a battle of attrition in which numbers won out, the Marines took and then finally held the wood. The Germans had huge respect for what the Marines achieved in the end but not so for the means.

It wasn't possible to get close enough to use shotguns until Day 11 (not that there is any evidence that shotguns were actually used in this battle).

Worse was to come in the Meuse-Argonne offensive...

The point is not that the American forces were useless, far from it! But there was a massive lesson that had to be learned the hard way - there was no 'simple' bloodless way to beat the Germans in the field of battle.

Robert

Heh. Pershing. Another fellow I happen to have a rather low opinion of, the great gormless goof...

I don't mean that shotguns would have been a magic answer, but the Germans ARE on record as remarking on their efficacy, irrespective of the naivete of American soldiery (to the point of even engaging in a bit of political theatre in September 1918, threatening to execute any American POWs who had been found armed with shotguns). Effective pump action shotguns were available before 1900 (with the model the Americans carried dating back to 1912), and though they were not originally envisioned as weapons for trench warfare, the Americans quickly seized the possibilities they offered.

This isn't about the Meuse-Argonne specifically or about inexperienced American troops (they certainly were), but about the failure to use such a weapon earlier on by the Allied Powers (or, to be fair, the Central ones too), when they might have served earlier in the war in the same manner as the MP18 later did for the Germans, allowing both sides to attempt stormtrooper-type tactics earlier on, which might have made breakthroughs more definitive or meaningful (though I don't want to get too far into theorycrafting).

Forget about shotguns in the hands of raw Americans in 1918, and instead imagine them in the hands of experienced British troops in 1916 or 1917. This wasn't some crazy new innovation in warfare, it was rather a curious blind spot, where a well-established and proven effective weapon failed to be used - by both sides!

Offline monk2002uk

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However, it's not so much the individual tactical changes that I'm focusing on, but the failure to rise above that pattern of extremely rapid adaptation. I've read my share of what-ifs in the wake of bunglings, but even if Rawlinson had committed the reserves, it's unlikely this would have crucially changed the outcome of the war, along with a hundred other what-ifs.

If Rawlinson had committed his reserves then the outcome of the war would not have been changed. Many commentators hold up Rawlinson's early view of 'bite and hold' as the major lesson that should have been learned. Even Rawlinson, however, recognised that this tactic was not war-winning in general either. As long as the major combatants were prepared to keep going then the war was going to exact a high price on manpower. Although a temporary minor advance in tactics might reduce manpower losses for a brief period, the long-term price was going to be the same no matter what.

There were plenty of attempts at rising about the 'pattern of extremely rapid adaptation'. General Nivelle's ill-fated Chemin des Dames offensive in 1917 was just such an example. Gallipoli was another.

Quote
It's the conflicts between staffs and allied nations (the internal German divisions had nothing on the British-French mistrust, well that's my opinion anyway), and the horrible failure to think in larger scales which bother me more. It's a very military habit to focus on those brief incremental tactical advantages, but an excessive focus on them to me indicates a leader promoted well beyond his ability; a case of target fixation no army side could afford.
Each incremental tactic change may have been 'brief' but they were constant and multiple. There was no respite, as all sides constantly sought to gain a lasting advantage. Ultimately, manpower reserves, manufacturing capacity, and access to resources won out but none of these strategic elements were 'brief' in execution or time to conclusion.

Respectfully, you over-estimate the mistrust between the British and French. I have read many accounts from various British and French politicians, generals, liaison officers on both sides (not just Spears), senior staff officers (for example, Pierrefeu's accounts of French GQG) and others. There were diverse opinions, disagreements, but rarely severe dysfunctional failures. The oft-reported incidents between Generals French and Lanrezac in August 1914 were not representative of the working relationships across the spectrum of political and military liaisons. Indeed, there was a tremendous sharing of information and lessons-learned, along with detailed strategic debates and planning sessions, such as General Joffre led in late 1915/early 1916. The French-Russian-British plans were undone by the German Verdun offensive, reminding us that the enemy never stood still.

Robert

Offline monk2002uk

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Military buffs do this too! The what-if of battles past are fun to think about, and as wargamers how often do we see historical battles refought on a 4x6 table? But just as the better leaders in Union in the ACW realized that it was about the larger strategic numbers. Even Grant didn't just want to run a meat grinder, and he took many steps to avoid straight one-for-one attrition as much as possible. What was key was that Winfield Scott, Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman all understood very well that losing a single battle was not as important as overall strategic considerations. Grant knew they had to USE the manpower and materiel advantages of the Union in full, especially for major strategic operations which would result in meaningful changes in the war's situation - Vicksburg, being a prime example; casualties were atrocious, but splitting the Confederacy in twain constituted a massive strategic blow. Sherman, in his turn, moved to destroy the tottering economy of the Confederacy. These were grand plans appropriate to their position as high-ranking senior generals, and they worked together harmoniously not only to sketch their operations but to execute them - famously so in Grant and Sherman's case.
With respect to wargaming, I have focused on reproducing the huge scale of WW1 battles. The most interesting was the First Battle of the Marne, where we set out 50' of tables, with 10,000 figures, and reproduced the battles involving the German First and Second Armies versus the French Vth and VIth Armies as well as the BEF.

I can't comment on whether Grant wanted to run a meat grinder but the reality is that, even with the various additional efforts of Sherman and Sheridan, the war continued to exact a heavy toll on casualties until the end. So it was with WW1 as well. There was extensive cooperation between the British and French forces on the Western Front for example; the more so after Foch was appointed Generalissimo. He worked closely with Haig and Pershing, as well as Pétain, to ensure that the Germans were hit with multiple rolling offensives across the whole line. This high-level strategy finally broke the German resistance but the casualty rate during the last 100 Days was amongst the highest in the war on the British side.

Robert