First foray into the Western Front in 28mm (updated 27 08 23)

[Baron von Wreckedoften]

Thanks for that extra info Metternich.  I think what I shall do is give any "line" zug operating solo, as it were, two, and any operating in conjunction with other forces (eg Stoddtruppen) just one, to keep the carnage down a wee bit.

[Metternich]

Herr Baron,
              That certainly would work.  Not that there weren't Zuge (platoons) with two LMGs in 1917, but it was more uncommon in the first half of that year than it probably would become in 1918.  In early 1917, some Companies would have only 1 or 2 LMGs (which remained true of units on the Eastern Front - don't know when/whether those redeployed to the West after the Russian collapse would have received more), and these were probably held by the Company hqs (as would the Grenade Launcher team) rather than be integral within a  platoon. 
              There was a lot of interesting experimentation by German small unit commanders in the latter half of the war.  Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson (a professor at West Point), in his seminal work Stormtroop Tactics, compared  two different companies within the Bavarian Life Guard Regiment in 1918, each of which had totally different TO&Es (also note this was an elite unit with a good combat reputation, and probably would have some priority in getting equipment).  Quoting Dr. Gudmundsson in the two paras below [bracketed text is mine]:

 One  Company is divided into five platoons - three identical "battle platoons" (Kampfzuge) , an  "expansion platoon" (Erganzungszug), and a reserve.  The "battle platoons" are composed of two "unit squads" (Einheitsgruppen) [Dr. Gudmundsson earlier describes these as hybrid squad consisting of a LMG team plus a four-to-eight man rifleman/grenadier team] and an assault squad (Stossgruppe).  The company reserve contains two specialist squads:  a small reconnaissance squad and a grenade launcher squad.  The "expansion platoon" contained four spare NCOs and 16 spare men, as well as the company armorer.  [I assume that a "small squad" would be 4 to 6 men, rather than 8.  The men and NCOs in the expansion platoon probably were used to either beef up a platoon for a special situation or task, or as replacements for casualties; they probably also could be used by the company CO as a counter-attack force to regain a lost position] [I note that this company seems to have six LMGs in total, issued two per battle platoon.  The company seems to have one grenade launcher, which is at the disposal of the company CO]

The other company has only four platoons.  The three "line" platoons are similar to each other - each has two rifle squads and two LMG squads.  The first of these three platoons, however, also has a grenade launcher squad while the third has an assault squad.  The company Hqs platoon has another, albeit smaller (four men instead of eight) assault squad and a small reconnaissance squad.   [This company likewise appears to have 6 LMGs, two per "line platoon," but differs from the first company in that its line platoons also each have two "pure" rifle squads.  Also, rather than retaining control of the grenade launcher squad, the company CO has attached it to the first platoon.] 
   

[Metternich]

Herr Baron,
  I saw that early on in your thread you made reference to the Through the Mud and Blood rules.  The set is one of my favorites for simulating small unit tactics in WW1, as you can properly reflect the different roles of: Bombers/Grenadiers; Riflemen; Assault troops (by which I would include the pistol/rifle-and-bayonet armed man preceding a trench bombing party; as well as the Stosstruppen both within the German rifle company or in separate designated Stosstrupp units), Rifle Grenadiers; LMGs; and Granatenwerfer (grenade launcher).  I think the rules also convey well the importance of small unit leaders (including the influence of NCOs).

[Baron von Wreckedoften]

Thanks very much for those two posts - extremely useful.  I am something of a "Bavarian nut" when it comes to wargaming, and almost all my WW1 German units are Bavarian in nature, so I shall be incorporating your notes into my own!!!

[monk2002uk]

In terms of field gun support, I went with a pair of Russian guns from the Tsuba Russo-Japanese War range sold by Empress.  These guns were captured in droves from the Russians in 1914-15 and were parcelled out to assault units on the Western Front because the nature of the weapon (originally designed as a fortress gun with the specific role of sweeping the ditches in front of the main walls) meant that the barrel had a far superior angle of depression to most of its contemporaries, and it also had an excellent canister round.  There were weak points - the strength of the wheels being one of them - but otherwise it was highly thought of by its new owners!

As you say, large numbers of the 7.62 cm field guns were captured on the Eastern Front. Your choice of the Empress range is a good one.

Most Russian Putilov guns were organised into new field gun regiments to support the infantry in the East. By 1916, these new regiments were absorbed into the German TO&Es but the guns themselves were replaced due to the inferior steel causing rapid wear on the gun barrels.

Some Russian guns found their way to the Western Front. Due to the demands of the Verdun battle, the German defenders of Montauban and Mametz in the southern sector of the British attack on the Somme had captured Russian (and Belgian) guns. This freed up German guns to be transferred to Verdun but compromised the defence of this sector.

Sturmabteilung Rohr started experimenting with what would be become known as Infanteriegeschützen (infantry guns - IGs). Prior to this, the German field gunners would manhandle the Krupp field guns in direct support of the infantry. There were many examples of this in the early weeks of the war. When Russian guns were modified for this direct fire support role as IGs then the barrels were shortened and the guns were mounted on smaller carriages. The barrel wear was a major problem, which meant that German IG designs followed, supplemented by large numbers of Austrian-supplied Skoda mountain guns. The IG guns were designed to be as light as possible and used a combination of field guns with cut-down barrel lengths mounted on mountain gun carriages.

IGs were not specific to specialist Sturm units. Every infantry regiment was meant to have a complement of these guns to support infantry assaults and to help with anti-tank duties.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

Incidentally, a slightly pedantic point perhaps, but given that field guns were usually man-handled by Stosstruppen, I would suspect that any extraneous weight (such as the "riding seats" in front of the gun shield) would have been removed.

The infantry guns (IGs) were definitely custom- or purpose-made, depending on the year, to be as light as possible. As mentioned above, the gun carriages were typically based on mountain gun carriages. These replaced the field gun carriages and were not equipped with the 'riding seats'.

Bearing in mind that there were various grades of Stosstruppen, the super-specialist units such as Sturmbataillon Rohr had their own dedicated IGs. These are often referred to as Sturmkanonen - assault guns. Stosstruppen in standard infantry regiments were trained by the specialists but they usually lacked the dedicated support weapons that provided the Stoss- - shock - element of the term. They would be supported by the standard IG guns within the regiment, where IG gun support was deemed appropriate and possible.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

I had formed the impression that British Empire troops did not use field guns in close support, until I read about an Australian gun team that advanced to the edge of Pozieres and started firing at point-blank range up the main road into the village!

Yes, there are numerous examples of field and mountain guns used in close support of British and Dominion troops. The latter were particularly well suited for this role. They feature in battles like Neuve Chapelle, Anzac Cove landings, Sari Bair, and the Somme to name but a few.

Ultimately the tank became the weapon system for delivering direct 'artillery' fire support to infantry in the British and French armies.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

I would be interested in Robert's take on something that has always confused me: I started off thinking that the role of Stosstruppen was to by-pass strongpoints and leave them to the more heavily-armed "line infantry" following them up.  Then I started reading about how they were, in fact, specifically trained to crack the particularly "tough nuts" that the ordinary infantry weren't trained/equippec to deal with.  These two concepts seem to be mutually exclusive, so is this the post-war "re-writing" of the role of Stosstruppen that Robert refers to?  Or is it a different approach adopted by two different types of units, perhaps according to the unit commander's own views on trench warfare or those of the OC of the division to which it was attached?  Or does it represent a shift in philosophy within the German army generally?

The highly specialised Sturmtruppen relied on heavy direct and indirect fire support to achieve specific objectives. Their assaults were well-planned and practised. Any perceived loss of fire support would lead to cancellation. Within the specialist Flammenwerfer units, for example, even a low-ranking NCO had to the authority to call off an action in support of conventional infantry forces if the latter were not paying enough attention to fire support.

The further down the scale of Stosstruppen that you go, the more likely it was that the fire support element would be diluted. This reflected variations in the amount of training as well as variations in the attitudes of infantry commanders, within whose units these small collections of more highly trained men were located. As the adjective Stoss- suggests, 'shock' was the key to success. This points to their role in tackling the hard tasks, opening up the way for (less heavily armed) infantry colleagues to exploit. It might be argued that Stosstruppen infiltrating their way through defences, bypassing strongpoints and popping up in rear areas would be a 'shock' but this is not the meaning of the term 

Two streams of writing seems to have fostered the impression of the 'infiltration' tactics. Post-war, the Nazi regime definitely played up the stormtrooper concept. The goal seems to have been to create a stereotype that would inspire young men to join the army and to instil an offensive spirit.

The second set of sources related to the explanations for the failure of Fifth Army to defend adequately against Operation Michael. 'Infiltration' worked in this context, not through the use of specialist stormtroopers but as a result of the British line being so thinly defended in a hastily upgraded front, which had been quiet under the French previously.

Robert

[Baron von Wreckedoften]

As you say, large numbers of the 7.62 cm field guns were captured on the Eastern Front. Your choice of the Empress range is a good one.

Most Russian Putilov guns were organised into new field gun regiments to support the infantry in the East. By 1916, these new regiments were absorbed into the German TO&Es but the guns themselves were replaced due to the inferior steel causing rapid wear on the gun barrels.

Some Russian guns found their way to the Western Front. Due to the demands of the Verdun battle, the German defenders of Montauban and Mametz in the southern sector of the British attack on the Somme had captured Russian (and Belgian) guns. This freed up German guns to be transferred to Verdun but compromised the defence of this sector.

So would I be right in thinking that by, say, the end of 1916, the Putilov guns had "worn themselves out" and been replaced by Krupp versions (at least on the Western Front), or would the odd example still be in service into 1918, for example?

Robert - many thanks for this and the other answers.  I hope it wasn't too time-consuming for you, but I suspect that I am not the only reader to find your comments invaluable!

[TacticalPainter]

Robert - many thanks for this and the other answers.  I hope it wasn't too time-consuming for you, but I suspect that I am not the only reader to find your comments invaluable!

Indeed you are not, a very welcome contribution to the thread.

[Metternich]

I would certainly second that.  Robert's knowledge of German WW1 units is encyclopedic.

[monk2002uk]

Thank you, All.

Your contributions, not limited only to questions, inspire further research. I am only too happy to be part of this. It is great to see so many sources, particularly primary sources, becoming available. Plus I have the privilege of being in contact with many other experts in various aspects of the war.

Robert

[TacticalPainter]

While it's all well and good painting the figures my main issue is terrain. I game the Second World War in 20mm so most of the buildings I have that are suitable for the First World War are too small. I can fudge things like trees but not buildings. So I've used the Warlord Games Ruined Hamlet set to put together three pieces for a forthcoming game. It's a fairly versatile set and I've put together a longer, tutorial blog post on how I made these which you can find here http://thetacticalpainter.blogspot.com/2023/08/terrain-making-using-warlord-games.html

[TacticalPainter]

I also made my first attempt at a stretch of trench. My preference is not to do above ground trenches but I need to work out how best to do these on some form of terrain board and then how to store them. That may be a challenge. Meanwhile, other than being 'above ground' I'm pleased with the way this has turned out. I'm going to be using it in a forthcoming game as a piece of trench joining two of the ruined buildings from the earlier post. While I was at it I've also made up sections of barbed wire.

[Baron von Wreckedoften]

Splendid work, Mark!!!