OTO Melara Argentine mountain howitzer for the Falklands War

[italwars]

Hello
as title said and taking into account my rising interest for that very conflict i would like to just point out that, at least, there is on the market also a model repesenting  that essential Italian made gun ..i've no connections with the Polish producer but i find a 3D model (in 1/72 but i suppose it could be printed, if asked, in 28mm ecc..) offered at a good price on ETSY..i think i'll buy it and let you know ..i suppose it could even be placed phisically on a wargame table cause, contrary to classical field  artillery (including the British one), is range , size ecc were small and they were actually used quite near the front line during the battle of Goose Green ..from what i  read on a very  detailed Argentine book about Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso,  the day before the battle, one piece was temporary  towed trough a requisitioned land rover even behond the front defensive line....the absurdity, from the Argentine HQ, to rely as their main or only defensive  artillery piece on such a small, easily outgunable,  moutain gun is another question.

https://www.etsy.com/it/listing/1143082571/oto-melara-mod-56?click_key=72d7cba2aaf450126a8545b166ad876c28b8045a%3A1143082571&click_sum=30c6058d&ref=user_profile&sts=1

[Jemima Fawr]

Nice model and very useful, as it was used by most NATO nations (including the UK until the mid-70s, as the L5).  Yes, as you say, they could easily be actually on-table during a Goose Green refight.  The chief reason they were the majority type on the Falklands was one of organisation and mobility; they were simply what the Marine and Airborne Artillery Battalions were equipped with (much the same as most NATO Marine/Airborne artillery of the period).

However, I think it's stretching it somewhat to suggest that they were 'outgunned'.  The invaders had nine M56 105mm batteries and one CITER 155mm battery on the Falklands versus five L118 105mm batteries, so in terms of raw numbers they had a 2:1 artillery advantage.  Yes, the L118 did have almost double the range of the M56, but the liberating forces had to come well within the artillery envelope of the M56 wherever they attacked enemy positions.  The CITER also outranged the L118 by around 20%, though thankfully there were only four of those.

However, the Argentine artillery advantage of numbers was mitigated by their appalling training and maintenance regimes, which meant that only two guns out of a full battery were operational at Goose Green. Nevertheless, M56 fire did account for a large proportion of land casualties through the war.

[italwars]

Jemina you provide us, as usual, with very useful infos..maybe you're the author of a very good miniature scenario on that very battle which i downloaded from the web years ago and that ll be the basis for a future game..sorry just allow me to add that i would  disagree with your use of the therms "invaders" and "liberators" which i would use with exactly the opposite meaning  ..but i know that's my unique thought and i really do not want to argue cause it's a game and i totally respect your tought which is in absolute good faith..
said that i 've just read for the second time a pair of very good books from Argentina on that very battle..they are very accurate as concerning also maps and Toes..on the same level of "Goose Green a battle is thought to be won" by M. Adkin that you certainly know...according to those sources and also to other it seem that the lack of real field artillery on the whole theater of war was due, in addition to what you truly said, also to a great problem of guilty disorganisation ..the very Argentine Brigade that defended Goose Green was sent at the last minute only after an impromptu inspection on the islands by Gen. Galtieri himself who stunned when he realised that no sufficient troops and material had been envisaged for the defence of the islands..the commanders on site had hidden the true situation..and even so the brigade hastly sent to Goose Green/Darwin, the so called "Fuerza de Tarea Mercedes" lacked heavy weapons, basic equipment, even shovels and field kitchens..not to say it had been positioned, despite their numbers, with units having to face ennemies with sectorial an inferiority of 1 to 5..their CO Italo Piaggi was totally inept....about the guns you mentioned even the big 155mm Citer which were a pride of the Argentine armaments industry were sent as if with an  eydropper..sent too late in Puerto Argentino and only one of the two used effectivly...while plenty of them, brand new, where stocked in Argentina mainland.
I think that, even with that example, those Argentine generals where inefficient and probably traitors of their own Nation..someting similar to Italian generals in East Africa or in 1940-41 Western Desert during WW2..maybe i have to admit that is  sad characteritic of Latin commanders and supposed to be élites.
my last question ..that you could probably reply is about the numer of OTO  Melara guns employed at Goose Green..some British sources (including the above mentioned scenario) said just one because the other  did'nt work..while my Argentine sources are contradictory...so i'm in doubt to buy one or two models as, this battle, could easily be gamed at 1to 1 scale..or maybe 1/2?
Sorry when i wrote "outgunned" i was thinking about the ranges not the numbers..so probably the right therm, if it exist in English, should be"outranged"
Last if you need any particular info from Argentine sources, ( land battles), i'll be happy to help you

[carlos marighela]

The CITER's only arrived in the last week of the war IIRC.

I don't think it is accurate to suggest the Argentines were outgunned either. They certainly were not at Goose Green where for the most part the tiny RA support for the most part played a fairly small role in the victory.

Leaving aside the nominal range advantage of the British Light gun, you have to weigh up the advantages the Argentines had of having sizeable ammunition holdings in place and the ability, whether they chose to or not to accurately survey and plot their DF missions. They had weeks to do this. There is quite a bit of evidence that Argentine artillery fire was their most effective asset in the final battles for the mountains.

The Argentine land forces were outfought from go to woah (or in their case 'woe')In part due to rather optimistic strategic notion that the forces sent would act as garrison and deterrent and wouldn't have to fight, it all being settled diplomatically . They were somewhat handicapped by their strategic position, having created sufficient tension with Chile, to require them to hold back, the best theatre trained and equipped troops in case the Chilenos were tempted to intervene but the fundamental thinking was that Britain would not respond.

Of course the Argentine Army was both morally and intellectually bankrupt to its core. It's method of conscription and 'training' laughable, mixed but on the whole negative relationships between officers, NCOs and OR's prevailing and its only recent 'combat' service involved shooting the occasional Montonero. Too often the commentary revolves around professional vs conscript armies. It's a false dichotomy. A capable, well trained and logistically supported conscript army can perform wonders. History is littered with examples. The Argentine Army was none of these things.

The 105mm Pack howitzer was a pretty good gun for what it was, an air portable mountain gun. When Australia took them to Vietnam the Yanks were green with envy as Australia had the only guns that could be lifted by a Huey. They could even be trundled into the rear of an M113, which was used at times as a deception technique when moving fire support assets. Their principal weakness was part of their strength. They were light, so they suffered when required to perform sustained fire. That said, they functioned well enough at Long Tan.

Useful as a gaming piece too and not just for Goose Green. They were extensively used in both the Radfan campaigns and against the Indonesians in Borneo, where they deployed in one or two gun detachments. Empress have hinted that one is in the pipeline in 28mm and I'm looking forward to picking up one or two.

[italwars]

excellent and sharable infos Carlos
i only disagree on two points .. from what i read on Argentine sources (and i ve collecting quite a few books by paying them an arm and a leg    from USA or from Buenos Aires) about the role of Argentine Artillery ..contrary to what was succesfully achieved by 20mm and 35mm  GADA 601 A/A pieces used in ground role, the mountain/para artillerymen had'nt sufficient ammo and were totally outgunned also by British MGs, Milan teams,  2" and bigger mortar fire...not to say a tactical disadvanatge of around 5 to 1 wheighting  over each defensive line reached by British paras..all .essential assets totally lacking in Fuerza de Tarea Mercedes  ..maybe , but i'm not sure about that, also the supressive effect  from a limited naval bombardment (according to British sources it stopped due to a malfunction of the frigate's fire control unit just after few rounds, while the argentines sources said the opposite) ..argentine former artillery crewmen and their support infantry related  that they were obliged to change continually position and back toward the airport... that let me think that a mountain piece, not even provided with a decent vehicle to tow it (they were helped by retreating infantrymen) , without any decently equipped and purposly trained FOO (the 25 IR fallen hero Lt Estevez acting as first line forlorn hope  had to call the Piaggi  HQ to have passed the coordinates of the targets to the artilley battery and then even to send a runner),  in a flat landscape and with defensive orders was  not the best tactical situation for a crew.
 My other doubt is about the theorical possibility that the Argentine, as you stated, were concerned by the risk to  have to face a war at their eastern  border with Chile..i've read hundred of times that theory but i cannot believe at it...Chile ad Argentina had and probably will  continue to narrate something similar to a "drole de guerre" that they perfectly knew will never happen..(i've seen the nice moovie about the experience of some conscripts during the Chile/Argentina crisis that you suggested us to see years ago)
Some reasons of the débacle could have been, probably, the disgraceful behaviour of high ranking military commanders (Piaggi, Menendez, the totality of the Navy ones) added to  a high degree of inexperience in foreign  policy  and, as you said,  the foolish idea that some troops placed as  a deterrent, would have been sufficient after the fait accompli of the recuperation of Puerto Argentino.
anyway i'm totally aware that you do know Latin America history and politics far better than me and in any case, i'll carry on with my late night  readings in order to solve my Hamletic doubt if picking one or two models of this little toy :-)

[carlos marighela]

The junta did keep back a significant reserve against the possible intervention of Chile. Remember, Argentina had come within literally hours of launching a full scale, three prong invasion of Chile just before Christmas in 1978. There was little love lost between Pinochet and the junta, despite being birds of a feather. The troops included their mountain brigades and they also brought the retired F-84 Sabres back into commission. Add to that there was at least a battalion's worth of marines around the southern airbases where the Super Etendards were based. Chile knew that if the junta prevailed in the Falklands then the Beagle Channel dispute would be back on with a vengeance, Papal intervention or no.

It shouldn't be too surprising. In 1978, Argentina earmarked a whole corps (under Galtieri) against a possible intervention by Brazil. Brazil of course responded with a call up in its southern provinces. As a curious aside, the commander chosen to lead the main push across the Andean passes to take Santiago and Valparaiso was none other than General Menendez, who commanded the Argentine forces in the Falklands.

For the almost war between Chile and Argentina, search up Operación Soberanía. Somewhere in my bookmarks there's a good website, in Spanish, giving the OBs and the hardware in use at the time. Possibly one of the most interesting what-ifs around. War would likely have drawn in Peru against Chile and quite possibly Ecuador against Peru both as score settling exercises. Chile has always kept its main armoured forces in the north as a potential response to this. Despite being fellow fascists, the ditadura in Brazil wasn't too keen on seeing a militarily dominant Argentina (hence the 1970s nuke program) so quite possible that they might have intervened.

I don't think it's fair to label the Argentine officer corps as disloyal or traitorous, at least in terms of their management of the Falklands War. In the first instance, they weren't that imaginative as commanders and their experience, such as it was, wasn't geared to fighting a conventional war at the end of a long logistic train. More importantly they were hamstrung by intervention from Galtieri and the Junta. In many ways its surprising that Argentine troops fought as well as they did. They had lived in a country where the economy was trashed and a horrific war was still being prosecuted against the civil population. The Argentine military was at least the most efficient in terms of murdering its own citizenry amongst the various dictatorships in the region. That many Argentine soldiers fought bravely and quite doggedly is quite amazing under the circumstances.

Which brings me to a greater point. The irony is that in supporting an utterly bankrupt regime, they had already acted in a treasonous manner. Sure the die was cast with Isabelita and her proceso but these fuckers supported a truly dire, anti-democratic regime quite happy to murder or disappear tens of thousands of their compatriots.

Should you ever get to Buenos Aires (well worth a visit in and of itself and with a superb military museum) a quick trip to the former Naval Mechanics School will demonstrate what an awful regime these people fought in the name of.  A trip to Villa Grimaldi in Santiago or to the Memorial da Resistência in São Paulo will give similar insights into their neighbours approach to governance.

[carlos marighela]

Found the site. There's amore out there if you look.

https://aquellasarmasdeguerra.wordpress.com/2013/01/23/algunas-armas-utilizadas-durante-el-conflicto-del-beagle-la-guerra-que-no-fue-1978/operacion-soberania/

[italwars]

I know what you mean with the “Escuela Mecanica de la Armada”… on the other hand I’ll certainly read your link about “what if between those two countries” but I would have been really amazed about the disclosure of a scenario ending with a real war between two of the major counties of Latin America ..we are not talking about limited jungle fights at Ecuador  border or a foolish small war after a football match like the one of 1969 …Chile (that’s to say Pinochet )was above all interested in defending his image and future as he actually succeeded by betraying his  South American brothers by collaborating with the British ..I also remember that the Chile-Argentine issue was solved in just a few days thanks to the visit of the Pope John Paul II.
I think you re stressing  too much , as many historians did, the connection between the Falklands conflict and an Argentine internal situation …even at  that time I was really amazed (and I must confess also pleased) to find support to the Argentine cause by supposed to be “democratic” leaders/countries or tolerated ones such as Ortega, Fidel, Ghedaffi, Israel and ,maybe I’m wrong, but I suppose also  by Brasil and, of course, Peru ..in practice by everybody except western allies of UK..how can you explain that if the Junta was evil also  as concerning her continental Foreign Policy ?..Still today the corrupted left wing Peronista Cristina Kirchner ,  the incredibly still politically alive Ortega , Mr Maduro, his former boss Chavez and many similar democrats do not hide their simpathies… are they all nostalgic,
of the Junta? I think that an analysis of the Malvinas gamble should not be linked closely with the awful Argentine  internal situation of 1982. Finally, are you aware that, in 1982, the Monteneros  offered to help the military junta trough their friendship and contacts with IRA terrorists for a possible anti British covert operation  ? ..and do you know that  the abortive Argentine operation against British ships in Gibraltar was led by an Italo-Argentine Montenero (son of a WW2 Flottiglia Mas operator) who had offered his services to the Junta? Not the best way to counter a regime committed  to a war.

[italwars]

Very ingesting link above all for the comparison between the two armies

[carlos marighela]

I recently purchased an OTO Melara as a 3D print from PlayMoreIT3D (via Etsy). It's a very nicely executed resin print although weirdly it came with a quite fictional muzzle brake ( not the avctual one shown on their site). I ordered it in 1/56 but the model I received loos more like 1/72. Admittedly it's a small gun but it looks rather tiny against 28mm figures. I suppose I should have ordered the 1/48 version.

They produce it  in a range of scales so might be useful for someone.