The Brusilov Offensive and the development of storm trooper tactics

[Ignatieff]

Have just reading Timothy C. Dowling's excellent 'Brusilov Offensive'.  It is a great intro the war on the eastern front as it covers the run up to the offensive from the start of the war, so highly recommended.  The quote at the start, from Winston Churchill, says it all: "In the west, the armies were too big for the land; in the east the land was too big for the armies".

Anyway, I am now clear as to the 'greatness' of Brusilov:  he appears to have been the first WWI general to get combined arms (infantry, cavalry, artillery and air power) to work in an effecive co-ordinated way.  Undoubtedly he was helped by a poor enemy (mostly disintegrating Austro-Hungarian armies), and more open terrain that was available to armies on the western front armies.

However nowhere does the book expound on the oft-talked about use of proto-stormtrooper tactics by the Russians, it was rather the combination of arms that produced the breakthroughs.

So, two questions: did his efforts influence the Germans?  And secondly, what was the roles of 'shock' units in the Russian armies, if not in something like this?

At the moment, my beleive is that this co-incided with equivalent German thinking, and that the British were well on their own way to understanding better combined arms approaches (as explained in Paddy Griffiths excellent book on British tactics), but I would welcome other views and perspectives.

Thanks

[Helen]

Hi I,

If you do a search on Brusilov you will find other members who have expressed their opinions on the book.

I've used the name to find a number of posts:

http://leadadventureforum.com/index.php?action=search2

Helen

[Ignatieff]

Thanks Helen.  Some good stuff in there.  Keen to hear from others on the tactical development as well.

[Poliorketes]

I think it's a big problem of historians (especially when writing for a broader audience) to simplify things. It seems there always has to be a clearly defined 'first' of everything. but real life rarely goes this way, it's mostly a evolving process.

When talking about stormtrooper tactics for years it was a common belief that the germans invented them for the spring offensives 1918. Some of the better books or articles mentioned the experiences of Riga, and only in recent years Brusilovs merits seems to get acknowledgement. But even Brusilov wasn't a first, I can't imagine that he wasn't influenced by the events of Gorlice-Tarnow 1915, the first large scale breakthrough of the german army (even if there have been no stormtroopers) or Bruchmüllers new artillery tactics, which have been essential to the successes of early '18.

And you shouldn't forget that Brusilov reverted to the more conventional tactics after the first successes.

[Ignatieff]

I'm completely with you Poliorketes.  The idea that combined arms was a new doctrine in 1916/17/18 is ludicrous.  Brusilov had the space to practice it, while in the west they didnt.  The British and German armies were refining infiltration tactics all through the war, and it reached its peak in the late years.

On the point of Russian shock infantry, any thoughts?  Was it 'all fur coat and no knickers' as we say in Glasgow (i.e. all fancy uniforms and no real new tactical doctrine) , or was there something more to it?

[huevans]

IIRC, the book mentioned a lot about modernized artillery tactics, including the use of air observers and pauses in the bombardment to monitor progress. This was in contrast to the prevailing use of "blanket" artillery bombardments in the Russian army. Also the surreptitious movement of troops close to enemy lines for a sudden rush when the barrage lifted. And the use of broad front assaults to avoid enfilade and choking off of narrow front penetrations.

I can't remember much about squad and platoon level stormtrooper tactics.

I think it pays to remember how early in the War Brusilov was. In mid 16, the armies were only beginning to come to grips with the revolutionary changes in warfare and Brusilov developed a winning formula for the specific time period in ?. It may not have been as slick and polished as ops in 17-18, but that is understandable.

As far as the A-H army being low grade opposition, I guess it likely was. OTOH, the German units sent in to bolster the unhappy Hapsburgs were gobbled up pretty quickly too, by pretty standard use of Brusilov's formula.

IIRC, the Great Retreat of 1915 was a product of shell shortage, the over concentration of resources and optimism in the big fortresses and general disorganization on the part of the Russians. I don't think the Germans were trying anything very new in infantry tactics at that point int he War.

[Poliorketes]

The Shell shortage is today seen as much overrated.

[johnl5555]

Hi. The very early war shell shortage for the Russians was not a fallacy. They simply did not have the production or logistical means to make and get the shells to the front. Later on the shell shortage WAS used by timid Generals as an excuse to do as they preferred.

Thanks,

John