The War that 'no-one' wargames..will that change?

[carlos marighela]

Little has changed. In the early 1980s, the tone and texture was all very Alan Clarkish. Along with lashings of Graves and Sassoon.

Of course the corrective texts were already out there. John Terraine's first book actually predates Alan Clark's tosh. Not that any of that penetrated the school masterly collective mindset. Maybe we have Oh What a Lovely War to blame?

I'm fond of Graves and Sassoon and read in conjunction with that rarest of things a Great War private soldier's memoir in the form of Frank Richards Old Soldiers Never Die we have a remarkable portrait of an infantry battalion on the Western Front. That said, it's a close up portrait and not a sweeping vista.

If it comes to it I'm quite fond of Oh What a Lovely War as a bit of theatre it's quite good. Alan Clark I'm a lot less fond of. His father was the only decent member of the family and Alan's moral compass can readily be discerned by his invention of the term 'Lions lead by Donkey's and his entirely fictitious attribution of the expression. The fact that he was a walking disaster as a Cabinet Minister and barely capable of telling the truth should have come as no suprise to anyone. An utter c*** but one who arguably had an outiszed influence on the popular mindset.

[monk2002uk]

I would be cautious about how cavalry is represented in '1914'. There are issues. The Mounted Cavalry Bonus is an example. 'Fresh horsemen against any unit on foot can be devastating'. This did not happen at the scale represented by '1914'. There is the broader issue of the WW1 'myths'. There is the description of French cavalry as 'renowned for their courage and also their recklessness!' Or the German cavalry having 'fought numerous mounted actions, suffering heavy losses against Belgian firepower.' These myths find their way into game mechanics, such as 'L'offensive à outrance' and 'Élan vital'. 'Old Contemptibles' is another example that could bestow undue benefit on British cavalry. Consider leaving all these out of games with '1914'.

Robert

[sundayhero]

thanks for the comment,

to be honest I'm not erudite enough to see what is wrong with 1984. For what I readed and watched it seems to be fun to play because of the "hollywood" choices if you see what I mean.

I will probably try it at some point.

[Gribb]

I would be cautious about how cavalry is represented in '1914'. There are issues. The Mounted Cavalry Bonus is an example. 'Fresh horsemen against any unit on foot can be devastating'. This did not happen at the scale represented by '1914'. There is the broader issue of the WW1 'myths'. There is the description of French cavalry as 'renowned for their courage and also their recklessness!' Or the German cavalry having 'fought numerous mounted actions, suffering heavy losses against Belgian firepower.' These myths find their way into game mechanics, such as 'L'offensive à outrance' and 'Élan vital'. 'Old Contemptibles' is another example that could bestow undue benefit on British cavalry. Consider leaving all these out of games with '1914'.

Robert

Mounted cavalry actions appear to have been very rare. Like others, French cavalry seemed reluctant to use the saber, preferring instead to dismount and fire their carbines before retiring in good order. The few exceptions that did occur have been inflated—like the white gloves of the Saint-Cyr cadets—to feed the Churchillian post-war narrative of an alleged anachronistic spectacle during the war’s opening weeks.

From what I've read so far, cavalry patrols typically tried to lure each other into ambushes, where hidden infantry could gun down any pursuers. Among cavalrymen, there seems to have been a genuine fear of exactly that scenario—far more so than any tendency toward reckless charges or disregard for modern firepower.

[monk2002uk]

From what I read and watched it seems to be fun to play because of the "hollywood" choices if you see what I mean.

Yes, I do know what you mean. This style is at the heart of Great Escape Games rulesets. There is a misprint on page 37. The highlighted text refers to German forces. Just refer to the first set of highlighted text on page 36 instead if you go with French forces. Otherwise let us know how you get on.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

For me, it's still the in-game decisions that WWI battles tend to lack (again - relatively), for fundamental reasons to do with the technology and resulting battlefield geometry. I believe the best (but perhaps not the only) way to overcome that problem is to design scenarios at the operational level rather than grand tactical.

I want to address the hypothesis that operational level WW1 scenarios can overcome the problem of relatively insufficient in-game decisions. Here is a quote from Jack Sheldon that summarises the issues:

"In any examination of the battle of Le Cateau, the question always arises as to why it was not possible for the considerable forces of First Army at von Kluck's disposal to deal the BEF a mortal blow during the retreat from Mons. The short answer and the most important reason is that the commander was let down by his intelligence organisation. There were inherent systemic deficiencies in the way information was collected, communicated, collated and processed by the German army at the time and these problems, coupled with failures on the ground, meant that for much of the campaign von Kluck was forced to take decisions based on incomplete and misleading intelligence appreciations." From: 'Le Cateau: 26 August 1914' (page 14) by Nigel Cave and Jack Sheldon (Battleground series published by Pen and Sword, 2008).

Robert

[ChrisBBB]

I want to address the hypothesis that operational level WW1 scenarios can overcome the problem of relatively insufficient in-game decisions. Here is a quote from Jack Sheldon that summarises the issues:

"In any examination of the battle of Le Cateau, the question always arises as to why it was not possible for the considerable forces of First Army at von Kluck's disposal to deal the BEF a mortal blow during the retreat from Mons. The short answer and the most important reason is that the commander was let down by his intelligence organisation. There were inherent systemic deficiencies in the way information was collected, communicated, collated and processed by the German army at the time and these problems, coupled with failures on the ground, meant that for much of the campaign von Kluck was forced to take decisions based on incomplete and misleading intelligence appreciations." From: 'Le Cateau: 26 August 1914' (page 14) by Nigel Cave and Jack Sheldon (Battleground series published by Pen and Sword, 2008).

Sorry, Robert, I'm being dense again. I'm not sure I follow how that "addresses the hypothesis". Do you mean that, because von Kluck had to take decisions with a fuzzy int picture, a game at that level should produce challenging and interesting decisions for the player?

[nicknorthstar]

Yes, in 28mm it has been a recurring problem: a manufacturer starts out boldly with new units and ambitious promises, only for the range to come to a crashing halt. The Great War Miniatures line offered through North Star is a good example of this—especially the 1914 factions. Reading older threads, there were grand plans for dismounted cavalry—even cavalry operating MGs! This was a real historical tactic and would be a huge bonus for skirmish scenarios involving French and/or British cavalry clashing with Germans.

Take this thread from when the French Cuirassiers were released back in 2013—there was a lot of enthusiasm, and the sculptor promised that dismounted figures would follow:
http://theminiaturespage.com/news/talk/msg.mv?id=1014114476
But it never happened.

The Belgians, meanwhile, have only a few basic unit packs—none of the dashing cavalry.
https://www.northstarfigures.com/list.php?man=20&cat=153&sub=202&page=1

While I'm not going to argue against the premise of your thread, I can tell you the popularity of WW1 or lack of it has nothing to do with the rate of releases from Great War Miniatures. I can't go into it on a public forum, it's personal reasons why there's been no expansion.
When GW released Warhammer Great War, it is no exaggeration that for a long period we could barely keep up with the casting to fulfil demand. That rule set really got folks building big armies.

[monk2002uk]

By way of further background, the problems faced by von Kluck were not unique to his First Army nor to just the German army. The 'inherent systemic deficiencies' that Jack refers to are seen in the BEF and French army as well during this period of mobile operations (and beyond). Using contemporaneous reports, regimental and other unit histories, anecdotal accounts by soldiers, officers and generals, and other sources, I have studied how intelligence flowed from cavalry troops/squadrons, infantry reconnaissance units, aircraft and airships, wireless intercepts, etc up through the chain of command to GHQ levels and back down again. There was no shortage of information. The huge problem was making sense of it all. This problem arose because of a concept known in German as 'Die Leere des Gefectsfeldes' - the empty battlefield. The combination of fieldcraft and firepower meant that the enemy was rarely seen but even very small units could project disproportionate firepower onto the advancing troops. Thus, if the forward elements of an advance guard or reconnaissance unit came under fire then it was impossible to understand the size of the enemy unit(s) in the contact.

I will dissect these issues further with the 'Retreat from Mons' example.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

In case the concept of the empty battlefield is unfamiliar, here is Walter Bloem's account of his battalion's attack on the BEF at Mons:

"The day, though overcast, was sweltering hot again.  The regiment was advanced guard, and after a march of some twelve miles halted in the village of Baudour.  Hussar patrols, trotting past, reported the country free of the enemy for fifty miles ahead.  The cookers were bought up and we settled down to a comfortable midday rest.  Scarcely had we finished our meal, when two Hussars, covered in blood, galloped up to us stating that the enemy was holding the line of the canal in front.  A third Hussar limped along behind them, carrying a blood-stained saddle; his horse had been shot under him: "They are in the village just ahead".

Almost at once despatch-riders, adjutants, motor-cyclists rushed past.  Somehow we felt in our bones this was going to be the real business.  In a moment we were gathered around our battalion commander.

"Maps out, gentlemen!  The village of Tetre in front of us is held by the enemy: strength not yet known.  The regiment will attack.  The Fusilier battalion, supported by two batteries in position south of Bandour, will occupy Tertre railway station.  We, the 1st Battalion, have orders to take the strip of wood west and south-west of Bandour - you will see it on the map, gentlemen - and clear the enemy out of it.  We shall be supported by Wiskott's Battery.  My orders, therefore, are as follows: The battalion will advance at once on the strip of wood, companies in the following order; B, A, C, D.  B Company will send out half a section both to its right and left as flank-guards to the battalion.  Any questions, gentlemen?  No.  Then please move off immediately."'

Bloem's company came under some long range fire but could not see where it was coming from.  So the advance continued in a series of short rushes:

'From now on the English fire gradually weakened, almost ceased. No hail of bullets greeted each rush forward, and we were able to get within 150 yards of the [Condé] canal bank [near Mons].  I said to Graeser: "Now we'll do one more 30-yard rush, all together, then fix bayonets and charge the houses and canal banks."

The enemy must have been waiting for this moment to get us all together at close range, for immediately the line rose it was as if the hounds of hell had been loosed at us, yelling, barking, hammering as a mass of lead swept in among us.

"Down!" I shouted, and on my left I heard through the din Graeser's voice repeating it.  Voluntarily, and in many cases involuntarily, we all collapsed flat on the grass as if swept by a scythe.

The firing continued, more and more of my men were being hit [by fire from a machine-gun section of the East Surrey Regiment and part of C Company in the wood].  I discovered too at this time that we had scarcely any ammunition left.  "Pohlenz, my lad, stop firing.  We must keep every round we've got in case those fellows across the canal make a counter-attack on us."'

Robert

[monk2002uk]

The example provided in the previous post is but one of many that I have collated. Other examples have been shared on this Forum before. They illustrate tactical situations which are a subset of the operational art. I will explain separately the significance of such tactics in relation to operational scenarios. In this post, there are two tactical issues to be highlighted. First, Bloem's regiment was operating as advance guard for the infantry division and when they halted in Baudour, the regiment was 1 km from BEF forward elements (cavalry) in Tetre and about 2 km from the forward defensive line on the Condé Canal at Saint Ghislain. Yet the initial reports from German cavalry 'reported the country free of the enemy for fifty miles ahead'. It was only when German hussars ran into BEF cavalry at Tetre that the advance guard became aware of the BEF. Even then, however, the strength of the BEF was 'not yet known'. And there was no awareness of the BEF at Saint Ghislain. It was the role of the foremost BEF elements, often divisional cavalry or cyclists, to screen the main line of defence which they did very successfully.

The second tactical lesson is that the German infantry were well trained in how to advance to contact. There is a scenario rule in 'The Retreat from Mons' that reads:

'German tactics evolved rapidly during the battle [that is covered by 'The Retreat from Mons' including the Battle of Le Cateau], from blundering columns to more prudent infiltration. All German units are therefore rated (T). This means each unit is Tactically Inept until it has lost its first base.'

This type of rule or characterisation of the early war German army is not supported by the historical details. It reflects a perspective that dominated the English literature for many decades - that the Germans advanced in dense Napoleonic-style columns and were shot down in huge numbers by BEF soldiers trained in the Mad Minute. The assumption was that the Germans suffered massive casualties - a myth that helped justify the BEF having to retreat. The assumption in the English literature was incorrect as was the basis for the assumption in the misunderstanding of how the German infantry performed tactically.

Robert

[monk2002uk]

For anyone who is interested, here are details of the handwritten messages that were sent by the British forces ahead of Bloem's regiment. They provide fascinating insights into what was happening 'on the other side'.

The first report from British 19th Hussars was timed at 9.15 am. It suggests a low-level encounter:

"Major Parsons 19th H.
23.8.14
Am advg to Fork Rd
North of TERTRE
12 Cavy enemy driven back. Leaving 1 man (German) wounded.
9.15 am TERTRE"

The next report was more disturbing, suggesting a much larger force was bearing down. Note, however, that it is timed at 2.40 pm:

"CG Corah Lt
5th Div Cyc Coy

To: 1/RWKent
Divn Squadron reports about four squadrons have broken through his line just North of first T in TETRE AAA Divn Squadron is withdrawing on VILLE POMMEROEUL [sic].
2.40 pm"

Note also that the message was directed to the infantry battalion immediately to the rear, the Royal West Kents. Their War Diary is quite detailed:

"7.30 am
When the mounted troops had moved out north of the canal, A Coy took up a position to cover their retirement at the road junction south of the E in TERTRE (Mons map B.T. 7a). Later the cyclists were driven in by a superior force of GERMAN infantry, A Coy coming under heavy fire (rifle and shrapnel) and being forced to retire on the line of the canal. Their casualties were killed: [1 officer] and 6 other ranks; wounded: [1 officer] and 29 other ranks; missing: [1 officer] (known to be wounded) and 58 [62 scored out in the original] other ranks.

12.0 NOON to 8.0 p.m.
The buildings along the line of the canal in which "C", "B", which had been brought up in support of the remainder of "A" were now located in the trenches in front of the LOCK, occupied by "D" were subjected to a continuous shell fire which did much damage to the buildings but comparatively little to men and horses. [1 officer] was wounded."

The British infantry battalion was already in the thick of things well before the message finally arrived.

The communication of recon information was even more complex, as the following quote from Colonel Gibbs, OC 2nd Battalion Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment. This battalion was initially in reserve just behind the Royal West Kents (RWK).

"I visited Martyn [OC 1/RWK] who told me he would be glad to have Tulloch's Company reinforced near the railway bridge, he also told me that with exception of an odd cyclist or two who had come back with reports and who gave somewhat different stories, he did not yet know what was in front."

This confirms the fact that the RWK Battalion Commander had little idea what was happening, partly because the cyclists were feeding back different information. The commander was concerned enough to ask for extra help, so his overall impression suggests that although the verbal feedback from the cyclists was muddled, it all added up to the presence of something potentially significant.

Robert

[HerbertTarkel]

Yeah. By the time of the Retreat, the massive influence of modern German tactics over archaic British field presence was … no less than devastating.

I wonder how much the value of inter-cooperation between British and “allied” forces would have perhaps slowed, stalled or even stopped the German juggernaut that bore down in those first weeks and months of the war.

[monk2002uk]

Yeah. By the time of the Retreat, the massive influence of modern German tactics over archaic British field presence was … no less than devastating.

I wonder how much the value of inter-cooperation between British and “allied” forces would have perhaps slowed, stalled or even stopped the German juggernaut that bore down in those first weeks and months of the war.

Thanks, HerbertTarkel.

Your comment about 'archaic British field presence...' sounds like Zuber's conclusion in his book 'The Mons Myth'?

With regards to your point about 'inter-cooperation', much is made of the failure in relationship between Generals French and Lanrezac. The much bigger issue, however, was the cooperation with the Belgian army. Belgium wanted to preserve complete neutrality. The Belgian official history records that Belgium was just as worried about the French crossing the border in the same way that the Germans did when war broke out. Belgium was also worried that the British would conduct a landing on the Belgian coast. Rather than concentrating their army to stop German forces, the army was spread out across the country to counter all three 'threats'. When Germany invaded Belgium, it was not possible to consolidate all of these forces again. Had Belgium concentrated everything towards Liège, Namur, etc then the BEF and French forces would have had a protected left flank.

Robert

[ChrisBBB]

All very erudite, but I still don't see how any of it "addresses the hypothesis". What's your point exactly, Robert?

Re the 'rapidly evolving tactics' scenario rule in my Le Cateau scenario:

This type of rule or characterisation of the early war German army is not supported by the historical details.

Happy to accept that whatever source I relied on may have been debunked since. A minor point of troop rating, though, rather than anything fundamental to do with my suggestion that the operational level is the interesting one.