More Mud and Blood with Chain of Command

[H.M.Stanley]

I bow to your greater knowledge gentlemen ...

[Atheling]

I bow to your greater knowledge gentlemen ...

I do that quite a lot when it comes down to it 

Darrell.

[monk2002uk]

Any semblance of 'greater knowledge' can be attributed to my Grandfather. He served in the NZ Machine Gun Corps during WW1. Unlike many veterans, he was prepared to talk about his experiences and I learned a lot from him. To his memory... and to the memory of all those who served in the Great War, including the 'Suicide Club' as the MGC was often referred to (a description shared with the trench mortar batteries FWIIW).

Robert

[Atheling]

Any semblance of 'greater knowledge' can be attributed to my Grandfather. He served in the NZ Machine Gun Corps during WW1. Unlike many veterans, he was prepared to talk about his experiences and I learned a lot from him. To his memory... and to the memory of all those who served in the Great War, including the 'Suicide Club' as the MGC was often referred to (a description shared with the trench mortar batteries FWIIW).

Robert

My Great Grandfather, who I'm just beginning to find out about served with the Ulster lot. I'm starting to research his war record. Problem is his name was William McGraph..... looking through the records thus far there were quite a lot of them with the same name..... 

Darrell.

[scrivs]

Thanks, great information.

The off-table machine-gun represents a weapon deployed just outside the gaming area to give fire support rather than a weapons firing in indirect fire.

It has the benefit of not being able to be pinned or knocked out, but it has a fixed target point that you can engage enemy troops within 6" of (great for targeting start points) and you have to expend a Chain of Command dice to select a new target point.

[Metternich]

Monk, I would disgree that the Chauchat belongs in the same category as the MG08/15, and instead would posit that "automatic rifle" is indeed a better categorization for it (both as to performance and how it was often employed).  The Chauchat's half-moon magazine contained only 20 rounds (and troops often loaded only 18 or 19, to prevent jamming) and the weapon fired at the comparatively slow rate of 250 rounds per minute. By contrast, the MG08/15 (which was a water-cooled weapon utilizing the same action as the original sled-mounted MGO8) fired 400 - 500 rounds per minute (about twice the rate of the Chau-Chau), and had a box container for a 100 round belt (alternatively a 200 round belt box could also be used - in contrast to the MG08's 250 round belt).  Although the MG08/15 could accompany advancing infantry, it would be employed from the prone or supported position while the Chauchat was light enough to employ in "walking fire" up on the line with assaulting troops (much like the BAR  - See Ian Hogg's Military Small Arms of the 20th Century).  The MG08/15 is a "light machine gun," and the Chauchat an "automatic rifle."   

[monk2002uk]

I would disgree that the Chauchat belongs in the same category as the MG08/15, and instead would posit that "automatic rifle" is indeed a better categorization for it (both as to performance and how it was often employed).

Thank you for you comments, Metternich. In one sense, this is a matter of definition. If an automatic rifle is defined as being capable of firing less than x rounds per minute maximum versus a light machine gun being capable of x times y rounds per minute then I agree. The definition I used, based on the British MG Corps usage of the term 'automatic rifle', implies firstly that the Chauchat and MG08/15 are not the equivalent of their respective medium machine gun counterparts. This is a different but equally valid definition, which offers up a different perspective.

There is a more significant issue though. You touched on this in your comment that there was a difference between the Chauchat and the MG08/15 'both as to performance and how it was often employed'. It was the issue of difference in 'performance' that caused me to review Paul's comments on his Scrivsland blog about problems with the French 'performance'. With respect to the Chauchat and the MG08/15, one measure of performance is the comparison between the respective maximum rates of fire. I have no quibble with the figures you have quoted. There are slight variations on these figures, depending on the source, but any which way the MG08/15 had a significantly higher rate of fire. In many rules systems, the comparison would stop there. MG08/15s would end up having a much greater effect than the Chauchat on the game by virtue of higher maximum rate of fire.

If we translate up the assumption that the MG08/15 performed, say, twice as well as the Chauchat then we are saying, in effect, that the Germans had a very significant tactical advantage over the French. Translate this up still further then every encounter should be won by the Germans and the outcome of the war would be... which is when we run into a problem. I have over-simplified of course but another way of looking at this issue is to recognise that neither side would tolerate a significant imbalance in any major weapons system for any length of time. The whole character of WW1 is about each side trying to either regain parity or leap-frog the other in respect of weapons systems and other aspects of the tactical encounter. So, with respect, the real question is whether there was a quantifiable difference in the Chauchat versus the MG08/15 in the impact they had on the battlefield, irrespective of the maximum rates of fire.

This comes back to your point about 'performance'. I have been accumulating information about how Chauchats and MG08/15s performed from the perspective of their tactical impacts. I would be very grateful for any evidence that you can provide on this aspect of performance. In general terms, however, it should be noted that the firepower capabilities of all sides increased massively across the board as the war progressed. These weapons were one example but their MMG cousins, artillery, trench mortars, etc brought about quantum differences in the amount of firepower that could be brought to bear on the WW1 battlefield. Yet the rate of casualties did not increase. Why? Because infantry became more dispersed and their use of 'fire and movement' continued to improve. Take an MG08/15 gunner who is defending against an attack. Compared to his French Chauchat counterpart, he has a much higher rate of fire. The MG08/15 gunner is laying down with a limited view to the front. Movement off to the left... A quick traverse and 5-10 rounds are fired at 2 or 3 men who quickly bound from one shell hole to the next (yes, you could fire more but the men have disappeared and you know that others will attempt to bound forward elsewhere if you are not paying attention). Movement to the front... A few more rounds fired off before the few attackers disappear from view after another quick bound. And so it goes on, all the while taking cover from incoming Lebel, Chauchat, infantry gun, and/or VB fire.

Now reverse the situation. The Germans used the same infantry tactics during an attack. The Chauchat gunner was faced with the same situation - small numbers of men bounding forward in multiple locations and at different times, exposing themselves to no more than short bursts from the Chauchat. Viewed in this light, the smaller magazine capacity of the Chauchat has much less relevance. Tactically, both weapons are capable of achieving the same effect.

Robert

[James Morris]

Thanks for the detailed notes!  I hadn't thought about it in quite that much detail before.  The Chauchat suffered from frequent jams, I believe, so I'm happy that the lower rate of fire reflects some of those jams under the rules.  There is also an option to increase the Chauchat's rate of fire by +2 dice if the NCO commanding uses both his Command Initiatives to direct fire. 

[monk2002uk]

James, do you mean the NCO commanding the Chauchat team itself or an NCO commanding a larger unit that includes the Chauchat team?

Robert

[Metternich]

Monk, I quite take your point about the limits of merely comparing respective rates of fire (and no automatic weapon, except perhaps a medium machine gun mounted on a tripod for the sustained fire mode, actually will maintain its maximum rate of fire for very long).  However, the two weapons were employed very differently.  The Chau-Chau could be used right up with the assaulting troops, firing from the hip ("walking fire"); that was the doctrine.  However, due to the need for frequent magazine changes (only 20 rounds per magazine), it was incapable of anything like a sustained fire (even leaving aside its distressing tendency to jam).  The MG08/15 was too heavy for walking fire so, while it could accompany assaulting troops crossing No Man's Land, the gunner provided fire support to the assault (from somewhat behind and to a flank) from a prone position - however, the larger "magazine" (actually a belt inside the container) allowed for more sustained bursts (see Bruce Gudmundsson's seminal work, Stormtroop Tactics, Chapter 6, for a discussion of the MG08/15:  "... a weapon that maintained many of the virtues of the heavy Maxim.  (t)he 08/15 was capable of firing a series of long bursts in a short period of time with little danger of the mechanism jamming and no danger of the barrel overheating.")  In modern parlance, the MG08/15 gunner "shot them onto the objective;"  in contrast, the Chau-Chau gunner was actually part of the assault itself.  When Browning developed his automatic rifle, it was basically an improvement on the Chauchat (more reliable - US troops frequently tossed their Chauchats away) but the mode of use was the same.  As for your point that the French wouldn't have let the Germans acquire such a tactical advantage, there are often varying factors that can lead to that - taking a munitions factory off-line to re-tool it can mean you don't have even a mediocre weapon in sufficient quantities while you await the "perfect weapon" (and note that the French had one of the worst medium machine guns of the war, the Hotchkiss, whose strip magazine feed meant it couldn't perform one of the most important functions of a medium machine gun - sustained fire, which is critical for maintaining final protective fires in the defense, or for barrage fire in offense)>

In 1934, the German army adopted the MG34, partially replacing it in 1942 with the MG42 (the MG1 in the post-WWII Bundesheer) - both weapons capable of functioning as either light machine guns (fed from a belt or drum) or (on a tripod) as sustained fire medium machine guns.  Because they were air-cooled (vice water-cooled, like the MG08 and 08/15), they were light enough to use in the assault itself (just barely).  The US Army adopted the M60 (similar to the MG1) and it performed much the same (as a young infantry lieutenant in the 1970's, I can testify that it certainly could - barely - be fired from the shoulder or hip in assault).           

[monk2002uk]

Metternich, thank you very much for the further comments. I will pick up on your points about how the MG08/15 and Chauchat were used tactically during assaults. My main concern in this discussion has been about the significant difference that has been modelled between the tactical impact of the Chauchat versus the MG08/15.

One issue that has been raised in this regard on several occasions in this related set of threads is the issue of stoppages/ mechanism jamming. I am very familiar with Bruce's work, which was a major contribution to the understanding of German assault troop tactics. With respect to his comment about 'little danger of mechanism jamming' then it is worth checking out this video clip . Start 18 minute 14 seconds into the video at the live firing example. There are other MG08/15 live firing clips on YouTube that do show long bursts of firing without examples in the videos of stoppages. One of the most significant films, however, is 'Der Infanterie-Nahkampf', which was made in 1918. It shows examples of various German infantry weapons systems, including the MG08 and the MG08/15, being used in demonstrations. During the short segments for both machine guns, the former suffered three stoppages and the latter four stoppages during filming under ideal battlefield conditions.

With respect to stoppages with the Chauchat, General Pétain ordered a detailed review of all weapons systems used by the French infantry after the dreadful Nivelle offensive. During the course of that review, infantry units were asked for feedback on the Fusil-mitrailleur. There were comments made about the stoppages relating to the magazine rims. This led to a revision of the magazine quality.

In battlefield conditions, particularly those pertaining to the Chemin des Dames offensive, the tendency of the Chauchat to jam was no more frequent than it was for the Hotchkiss medium machine guns, as evidenced in Pétain's report. All automatic rifles and light machine guns were prone to fouling and stoppages. I have never seen any evidence that the Chauchat was more likely to be affected in this regard than the Lewis gun or the MG08/15.

Here is a sample of comments from the survey:

"16th Infantry Regiment:
…The CSRGs have been used to defend conquered trenches and have made a major contribution in breaking counter-attacks; walking fire was not used.
Several guns functioned normally and gave excellent service; a few had stoppages what were nearly all caused by deformations of the magazines at the lips.

19th Infantry Regiment:
…The CSRG has been used in the offensive, where its handling is difficult, and in the defensive where it very effectively played the role of machine guns.
…Obtained results were very satisfactory, particularly in the defensive. Observed problems: when it is raining and the terrain is muddy, the CSRG becomes dirty and fouled and a certain number of these guns are put out of action.

34th and 49th Regiments:
…After having given excellent results during the actions of May 4 and 5, by intense flanking fire, these weapons were less effective because of stoppages, in spite of all the precautions. It is necessary that this weapon should be cleaned and oiled during combat…
Also, since the Assistant Gunners are overloaded, one of the riflemen should help transport the ammunition.

137th Infantry Regiment:
The CSRGs expand the action of the machinegun sections; they must be pushed forward as much as possible. Their deployment in combination with groups of V-B rifle and hand grenadiers, which provide them with cover, have given excellent results.
From the material viewpoint, necessity of great care and cleanliness and of oiling after 5 or 6 magazines.

9th Infantry Division:
Results: the CSRG has excelled in all circumstances of combat.
Disadvantages: becomes fouled and prone to stoppages in contact with mud and dirt projections."

Robert

[huevans]

My 0.02 - When factoring battlefield effectiveness, doesn't the higher rate of fire of the Maxim actually create an intrinsic difficulty of the weapon needing more ammunition in a given space of time?? This in turn necessitates more manpower bringing up rounds to fire and a higher risk of running out of ammo.

As well, the lighter weight of the Chauchat must make it easier to aim and to track and lead targets. The Maxim must have been a beast to re align on a new target grouping.

[monk2002uk]

Now to the issue of tactical usage. This needs to considered from two perspectives: the user of the weapon; and the effect on the recipient of the fire. It is possible to fire the MG08/15 from the hip. Check out this video , starting at 3 minutes 19 seconds. There is a short segment showing that it can be done, though it is difficult because of the weight of the gun. Click here for an original photograph showing how the purpose-designed shoulder strap facilitated firing from the hip. The gunner was assisted by a loader.

A similar, at least two-man process, was used for 'tir en marchant' with the Chauchat. Before examining the specifics of this tactic, it is important to note that the 1918 edition of 'Manuel du chef de section d'infanterie' (Manual for Infantry Platoon Commanders) explicitly states that the normal mode of firing the Chauchat was 'Position normale - tireur couché' - lying down. It has a section (21) on firing while advancing:

'...the possibility of firing while advancing is the result of the [Chauchat] firing down automatically and that some lateral dispersion occurs naturally due to the motion of walking.

This type of fire can be performed piecemeal in short bursts, in long bursts, or even firing off a full magazine when something unexpected happens during a battle.

In single-shot mode, the gunner presses the trigger with the foot planted on the ground.'

There are details about how marching fire is carried out, including the importance of the gunner maintaining eyes on target while using the left hand to operate the release mechanism for an empty magazine and then handing off the magazine and taking up the next one from the loader with the right hand.

The information about the Chauchat ends with the following:

'Daily training is needed to achieve good results with firing [while advancing], including: exercises to increase suppleness; progressive [training] in loading by the gunner; marching across terrain of increasing difficulty; bounding from shell hole to shell hole; and finally the assault'.

Note the description of how training was to be conducted in '...bounding from shell hole to shell hole'. This is particularly important because it is a reminder that in many battles the concept of firing while advancing was tactically very difficult to execute because of the nature of the terrain. There has already been a clue to this in the infantry unit reports to Pétain, where many units reported not making much or any use of firing while advancing.

To the enemy on the receiving end, the effects may have been the same. Neither the Chauchat nor the MG08/15 could lay down a beaten zone. Both would apply direct fire to a relatively small point location, with the ability to spread fire a little to each side. If the Chauchat was used for marching fire (it was often used in the same as the MG08/15, to apply fire from a position off to one flank and enabling the riflemen to march onto the target) then the Chauchat could keep fire on the target for longer as it was not firing across but with the line of advance.

Here is Spears' description of Chauchats used for marching fire in a demonstration in late 1916, from his book 'Prelude to Victory':

'This year [1916] tracer-bullets were being experimented with. I succeeded in persuading our authorities to allow a party of officers to come and see a field exercise in which they were to be tested with the French equivalent of a Lewis gun [ie the Chauchat]. The more favourably to impress them, warm red wine was provided to counteract the chilling effect of the deep snow in which they had to stand.

These exercises were a very curious sight. In order to keep down the heads of the trench garrisons to be attacked, the men were being trained to fire from the hip as they advanced. The reason why I remember this occasion so well is probably because it was strange and lovely, lovely as some things were during the war, Very lights suspended like brilliant stars from the dark still sky, for instance. The tracer bullets, showing up pink against the snow, made the most beautiful curves and arabesques as they rose high or ricocheted at incredible and fantastic speeds like fireflies in an eastern night.'

Robert

[Emir of Askaristan]

So,
Scrivs, do you think these rules would be any good for 1914 games?

[scrivs]

Not really sure how they would work for 1914. I am happy with playing the later games with them. The early German platoon was a Lieutenant and nine sections each of a NCO and eight men, that may be a bit unwieldy on five command dice.

I'd be happy to give it a try though.