Who needs enemies with friends like this- Team Yankee project in 1/100

[Ultravanillasmurf]

Nice.

[Freddy]

Thank you, guys!

Thoroughly useless as an AAA platform but imagine two 57mm guns being pointed at you in an infantry support role.

In Vietnam the 57mms were responsible for a huge part of the US aircraft losses, and this bad boy has 2 on a self-propelled platform, so far from useless. But, as any AA unit, it also relies heavily on the radar systems and the proper communications between them, so the succesor, the Shilka had a huge advantage having at least the targeting radar on its own.

[Rick]

As far as I'm aware the Soviet/Russian Shilka (not so sure about the export versions) also had a data link system that enabled it to share targeting data with the other Shilka's in the battery as well as the mobile air search radar systems. It was a very advanced system for its time but limited to the 60's and 70's technology - the Soviets did try to upgrade it as much as possible but with varying degrees of success.

[carlos marighela]

Thank you, guys!In Vietnam the 57mms were responsible for a huge part of the US aircraft losses, and this bad boy has 2 on a self-propelled platform, so far from useless. But, as any AA unit, it also relies heavily on the radar systems and the proper communications between them, so the succesor, the Shilka had a huge advantage having at least the targeting radar on its own.

Vietnam was quite a different kettle of fish. For much of the air war over the North, US attack aircraft came in from largely predictable ingress routes and attacked a (relatively) limited range of targets. The North Vietnamese were able to mass S-60s and all the other elements of their panoply of AA defences around likely targets. The S-60 batteries were also equipped with fire control radar, which allowed for battery fire, ie all six guns per battery being slaved onto the one target. The US ultimately managed to jam the associated SON-50 radars reasonably effectively but the point remains that they were up against masses of AA weapons. Over North Vietnam you have the highest concentration of anti-aircraft defences in history.

The ZSU-57 lacked a fire control radar.  It's density of employment in Soviet Tank and Motor Rifle divisions was nowhere near that over North Vietnam. To that end the ZSU-57 probably ranks as a marginally more effective Soviet version of the M-42 Duster. The Soviets recognised its limitations and the fact that volume of fire and some degree of autonomous radar control were the desirable factors in a SPAAG system (the US reached the same conclusions) and fairly rapidly moved towards the ZSU-23-4 as a replacement. In fact Shilkas started to replace ZSU-57s after about seven years of service with the Soviet Army.

There are estimates that the S-60 achieved a hit for every 8,500 rounds fired in Vietnam. The massive numbers of US air losses to all forms of AAA took place over a ten year period. It's also worth noting that the bulk of US air losses were rotary wing and the circumstances of their losses meant that they were predominantly claimed by smaller weapons, rifle calibre through to 23mm

So maybe the ZSU-57 can't be described as completely useless but it was not a very effective system and an expensive one for what it was.

[Freddy]

I do not want to open a debate about the US losses in Vietnam, just wanted to point out the fact that everyone concentrates on the role of the SA-2s while the 57mms were a major contributor too.

So maybe the ZSU-57 can't be described as completely useless but it was not a very effective system and an expensive one for what it was.

The concept of a radarless AA vehicle was like the SU-122-54 or the T-10, a ww2 concept born a bit too late The most fitting two word verdict might be "outdated quickly". There are two things to consider though:
-it was not just about the concepts, but about the Soviet radar manufacturing capabilities too
-these vehicles were never meant to operate alone. Warsaw Pact AA was a complex system with layers from the huge missiles down to the tripod DShK-s AND all the locators AND all the communications between them. The war this system was designed for was never fought (thank God), but the closest to it was maybe the USA-Vietnam war. And one of the key points of Vietnamese successes was the communication: they shot down the Hueys with handguns not because their handguns were so effective or that they could shoot so well, but because they knew when and where the Hueys come, they transmitted the info through the actual public radio (well, the guerilla frequencies people listened to in secret) and everyone in the county with a gun rushed to the scene and went ratatata. And then one of the many-many bullets found its way to the pilot or to the engine.

The S-60 batteries were also equipped with fire control radar, which allowed for battery fire, ie all six guns per battery being slaved onto the one target. The US ultimately managed to jam the associated SON-50 radars reasonably effectively but the point remains that they were up against masses of AA weapons.

Hungary had these S-60 batteries too, they actually outlived in service the Zsu-57-2-s and the Shilkas too.

[carlos marighela]

People focus on the SA-2, in part because it was the new, flashy technology of the time but also because it effectively changed US tactics (not just in Vietnam) and made the older low to medium level AAA effective again.

You're right, the system in Vietnam was in many ways a continuam of Soviet, multi-layer AA doctrine and centralised fighter direction. It worked moderately well when the USAF was effectively hand tied during Rolling Thunder, it worked a lot less well against Operation Linebacker in 1972, hardly worked at all in Egypt in 1967 and was even less successful in Iraq. That's not to say that the multiplicity of Soviet systems would not have caused carnage in a Cold War turns hot scenario in Western Europe or that each historical example is an exact analogue but it does suggest those systems would likely have done a lot less well than predicted.

[Freddy]

People focus on the SA-2, in part because it was the new, flashy technology of the time but also because it effectively changed US tactics (not just in Vietnam) and made the older low to medium level AAA effective again.

You're right, the system in Vietnam was in many ways a continuam of Soviet, multi-layer AA doctrine and centralised fighter direction. It worked moderately well when the USAF was effectively hand tied during Rolling Thunder, it worked a lot less well against Operation Linebacker in 1972, hardly worked at all in Egypt in 1967 and was even less successful in Iraq. That's not to say that the multiplicity of Soviet systems would not have caused carnage in a Cold War turns hot scenario in Western Europe or that each historical example is an exact analogue but it does suggest those systems would likely have done a lot less well than predicted.

It is hard to find good analogues in the local wars for cold war goes hot, as these were more about the success of implementation of military concept rather than the concepts themselves. WP concepts were rigid systems based on stoic obedience and toleration of losses, this was not the style even for the European WP allies. It has some succeses though: the Egyptian invasion of 1973 (until they decided to go against it and halted the offensive), the Ogaden war or Vietnam itself. It, of course, had some bad examples too, Syria or Iraq. But the western doctrine was in the same situation, while IDF managed to achieve victories with it, South Vietnam in 1975 collapsed in weeks despite all the American hardware and 20 years of training.

The Vietnam air war could be a good analogue at least for the sub-topic of the AA artillery warfare as it was used as "it shold be". Yes, there were also a lot of special circumstances, but these were on both sides, the Americans fought with their hands tied by politicians sometimes, but they were still the air force of a superpower in its prime with resources unimaginable to others, versus Vietnam who solely depended on their AA artillery as their air force was small, they had no means to attack US airfields or disturb their supply chain. A war can not be won from the air alone while a massed air attack can not be stopped from the ground alone, these we already knew from ww2.

[carlos marighela]

Well the Soviets did draw at least one lesson from Vietnam. They realised that rotary wing aircaft were vulnerable to machine guns. Pre-1970 all those T-55s and T-62s were churned out of the factory minus an AAMG. Around 1970/71 the Soviets started building new versions and retrofitting older models with AAMGs for the loader.  AAMGs were considered to be somewhat passé in the 1950s as jet aircraft's speed meant engagement times and envelopes were frustratingly small, hence their absence on Soviet tanks.

[Freddy]

Well the Soviets did draw at least one lesson from Vietnam. They realised that rotary wing aircaft were vulnerable to machine guns. Pre-1970 all those T-55s and T-62s were churned out of the factory minus an AAMG. Around 1970/71 the Soviets started building new versions and retrofitting older models with AAMGs for the loader.  AAMGs were considered to be somewhat passé in the 1950s as jet aircraft's speed meant engagement times and envelopes were frustratingly small, hence their absence on Soviet tanks.

Well, that was one lesson of the many In general, Vietnam ended the late 50s-early60s rocket mania both on the East and the West, guided missile technology reached some technical limits while soldiers realized that increasing warhead size is just not the answer for every problem they might face.

[Freddy]

Well, that was one lesson of the many In general, Vietnam ended the late 50s-early60s rocket mania both on the East and the West, guided missile technology reached some technical limits while soldiers realized that increasing warhead size is just not the answer for every problem they might face.

Oh, yes, and a little weird story regarding Hungarian Army and Vietnamese experiences: Hungarian Army (like most armies I guess) has a handgun collection to train soldiers and weapon smiths for the potential enemy equipment. There is (of course) an M-16 in it too, that particular weapon came from the Soviets back in the WP days. Decades went by, WP was disbanded and Hungary joined the NATO. Like all weapons, the old M-16 has a serial number too, someone, out of curiosity, asked the Americans about that number. They said that yes, this weapon belonged to Private XY, who disappeared in the Vietnam jungle in 196x, MIA status to this day- but yay now at least his gun was found.

[carlos marighela]

Cool!

Vietnam was a significant donor of M16s to insurgent forces in Latin America post 1975, large numbers showed up in Nicaragua and then El Salvador during the Civil War. Simplified logistics no end. Cuba did the same thing with FALS and then, as things progressed, there was an influx of AK types, including Hungarian AMD-65s. Quite a few of those turned up in El Salvador, having been passed on by the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Of course the odd Hungarian weapon popped up during the Vietnam War. Here's a captured AMD-65 in use by US recon troops. Who knows, maybe it ended up in a US captured weapons stockpile?

[Freddy]

Vietnam was a significant donor of M16s to insurgent forces in Latin America post 1975, large numbers showed up in Nicaragua and then El Salvador during the Civil Wa

Vietnam tried to put everthing to a good use what they captured form the Southerners, and that was a lot of Amarican equipment. In the Cambodian war they had entire units equipped with M113s for example. F-5s were sent to the USSR for ,,benchmarking"

Of course the odd Hungarian weapon popped up during the Vietnam War. Here's a captured AMD-65 in use by US recon troops.

Wow, I was not aware of AMDs in Vietnam. A huge batch was sent to the left leaning factions in the Lebanese civil war, then to Croatia during the Bosnian war. Finally, a huge batch to help the American organized Afghan National Police during the USA-Afghan war. Regarding the situation of these places, now the AMD would not be surprising popping up anywhere in the globe- but in Vietnam, that is new.

With all these donations, the Hungarian Army is seemingly out of them, the police has some of them stockpiled. The Army now uses the locally manufactured Bren2s, reservists and territorial units still use AK-s sometimes, but these are AK-63s. Basically the predecessor of the AMD, this was a Hungarian made AKM with very minor modifications. The weapons used now were sent to conservation right out of the factory, so survived in a very good condition.

+there were actually some Hungarian soldiers in the Vietnam war, but they were in the UN comittee overseeing the ceasefire after 1973. Everyone knew that it is only an empty political stunt as the North is preparing a full scale invasion regardless of how peaceful the DMZ is. Despite that, some Hungarian soldiers died when their helicopter was shot down- unclear to this day who did it. They did not carry assault rifles though.

Who knows, maybe it ended up in a US captured weapons stockpile?

If they missed the opportunity in Vietnam and in Afghanistan, they can just buy it as some of the AMDs were converted to semiauto and sold on the USA civil market.

[carlos marighela]

I've seen photos of other examples in the hands of USMC force recon troops, so they must have sent a fair sized batch for captured examples to have kept popping up.