Napoleonic Portuguese 3rd Regiment

[gustav]

You have to feel sorry for those soldiers.

My understanding after the invasion the best men from the light and line were "transferred" by Junot into the Portuguese Legion and Russia is of course where they ended up.
How many really had a choice ?

Hard to guess in 1807/8 what would happen later on. Wiki has 1000 returning in 1814.

[Plutarch64]

I think that is why I found it so sad Gustav, in that at least some on that campaign such as the Poles had some motivation to fight, but the Portuguese draftees must have had a miserable five or six years.

[rumacara]

Totally agreed.
We will probably never know how many soldiers actually returned home after many years.
Another subject not spoken at all is that 10 per cent of the portuguese population died during the french invasions.
On a population of 2 million at the time, 200,000 lost is too many.
After the 3rd invasion, behind the lines of Torres Vedras some 50,000 or 60,000 civilians (according to the military registers) died of hunger and disease. They where forced to abandon their homes (specially from Coimbra area) burn their crops and kill or deliver their animals to the anglo-portuguese army so that a scorched land policy could be arranged to fight the french.
The rest was either killed fighting the french or vilages looted and their population wiped out.

[archiduque]

Excellent unit!!

[Plutarch64]

I agree Rumacara and have noticed that we can quite rightly read about some of the heroic stands of the Spanish populace and the deprivations they underwent, such as the sieges of Zaragoza and Gerona for example, but less of those suffered by the general Portuguese populace. I remember reading about the scorched earth policy in the retreat behind the lines of Torres Vedras (either in Gates or Esdaile - I can't recall which), but it was really only a passing comment and, from memory, provided little indication as to what would have occurred once they were behind the lines.

Thanks for the comments Archiduque - much appreciated. If my 28mm efforts ever approach your AB Miniature 18mm standards, I will be well pleased!

[janner]

The question, of course, was who selected the 'best men'

The Portuguese officer corps was unlikely to be as friendly as some of their troops to the ideals of liberty, equality, and egalitarianism. They may have seen it as a chance to thin out less desirable elements from the ranks. However, it seems that the two regiments of the Portuguese Legion in Ney's corps performed adequately in 1812. Despite desertion, campaign losses, and participation in the battle of Valutino, they could still field a battalion a piece at Borodino. In comparison, the Wurttemberg Division of the same corps was down to four battalions.

[rumacara]

When the french picked the portuguese to fight on their side they went for the best men already in the army and those who really supported the ideals of the french revolution.

When Beresford arrived in Portugal to reform the portuguese army he picked the strongest and most reliable men for the cacadores regiment specially from the interior of the country (both north and center of the country) for they where people used to the countryside and to hunt.

[janner]

Yes, but how did the French know who the 'best' soldiers were, as well as which ones were politically supportive in each unit, i.e. who told them and did they have any motives beyond helping the French to select the best men to fight alongside their army?

Now I don't have the answers to this one as it is well outside my period of professional focus, but the application of basic historic methods should help one move beyond the broad brushstrokes to consider the more fascinating underlying stories.

[rumacara]

Some of the portuguese officers shared the ideals of the french revolution so they where "afrancesados" (french suporters) therefore it was easy for them to know and advise who was who.
Many where just forced to join the ranks of the french, therefore the high number of desertions amongst the portuguese who went with the french.
This was real so its logical to me to think this way.
Dont forget that the same happened in Spain and in some german states.

[Plutarch64]

I was thinking about La Romana's evacuation from Denmark, along the same lines.

I think the thing that I initially found bewildering when first looking at this period is the constant re-alignment of "allies". How anyone managed to hold the thing together, I don't know,

Napoleon possibly came quite close, but his OOB's with the Austrians down South and Yorck's Prussians up North, to my mind at least, indicates that he must have contemplated keeping these units "out of the way".

[janner]

Some of the portuguese officers shared the ideals of the french revolution so they where "afrancesados" (french suporters) therefore it was easy for them to know and advise who was who.
Many where just forced to join the ranks of the french, therefore the high number of desertions amongst the portuguese who went with the french.
This was real so its logical to me to think this way.
Dont forget that the same happened in Spain and in some german states.

If the officers knew the best troops to choose so well, I wonder why anyone would have been forced to join to Portuguese Legion. After all, pressed men don't make for the best soldiers. So I think that you may be overlooking parts of the puzzle here by taking it at all at face value.

As an aside, do you have any statistics for the desertion rate in comparison to other foreign regiments?

[gustav]

I think though we have to be aware that our notions of loyalty / duty owed  or expected may be different to those of the early 19th century.

As I understand it the accepted historical narrative wisdom is that only until the Wars of Revolution / Napoleonic Wars that the concept of "patrie" took hold within any those European nation's involved and then one must assume it would not have been as well defined then as it has become now.

I think the earlier 18th century concepts within the armed forces were (that had either more personal loyalty to one's officers and/or fear of punishment)  the more overriding factors in keeping ranks into the Legion.  However it is also possible that they may well have been many soldiers also falling for the ideology, especially that in 1807 the likelihood of any help or change arriving soon would seem very distant. 

Possibly the large number of desertions across Spain were also due to the ideology not matching the reality.

[janner]

Then there is the French approach to logistics to consider. Being occasionally left to fend for themselves might have encouraged tired and hungry troops to drift off.

[rumacara]

Gustav, i agree on that.
Janner, indeed there was a group of reasons for a soldier to desert.
Its not need be the same for all and they may not try at the same time.

Unfortunatelly i dont have statistics for the desertion rate in comparison to other foreign regiments but i can imagine they would be high in the first months of service and while they where in Spain. After that it would be more dificult.

[janner]

Yes, these things are also complicated with as many potential motivations as people 

I'd also agree on your conclusion as to high initial rates of desertion based on some initial digging.

Interestingly, by 1811 only the 1st Regiment was described as exclusively Portuguese and considered the pick of the force. Nafziger's strength returns prove useful in seeing how it compared with the other two regiments.

15 Oct 1811:
1/1st Portuguese Legion (22/498)
2/1st Portuguese Legion (24/513) - (46/1011)
1/2nd Portuguese Legion (21/774)
2/2nd Portuguese Legion (21/769) - (42/1543)
1/3rd Portuguese Legion (18/732)
2/3rd Portuguese Legion (17/592) - (35/1324)
Depot/Portuguese Legion (39/220)

01 Aug 1812:
1/,2/1st Portuguese Line Regiment (51/500)
1/,2/2nd Portuguese Regiment (49/1,432)
1/,2/3rd Portuguese Regiment (+ artillery co)(37/1,264).

Even taking into account the probable inclusion of depot troops, the 2nd and 3rd regiments seemed to have held up well, but 1st was down to half strength on other ranks.